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The Electoral College and Jacksonian Democracy are two subjects that have been
studied extensively.  Taken together, however, little has been written on how the method
of choosing presidential electors during the Age of Jackson changed.  Although many
historians have written on the development of political parties and the increase in voter
participation during this time, none have focused on how politicians sought to use the
method of selecting electors to further party development in the country.  Between 1824
and 1832 twelve states changed their methods of choosing electors.  In almost every case,
the reason for changing methods was largely political but was promoted in terms of
advancing democracy.  A careful study of the movement toward selecting electors on a
general ticket shows that political considerations in terms of party and/or state power
were much more important than promoting democratic ideals.  Despite the presence of a
few true reformers who consistently pushed for a constitutional amendment guaranteeing
that all states used the same method, the conclusion must be that politics and party
demanded a change.
This study relies heavily on legislative records at both the state and national level
and newspapers throughout t the country from the period.  Beginning with a brief history
of the office of the president and an overview of the presidential elections prior to 1824,
the author then carefully analyzes the elections of 1824, 1828, and 1832, as well as the
various efforts to amend the constitutional provisions dealing with the Electoral College.
Particular emphasis is placed on political factions at the state level, the development of
the Democratic and National Republican parties nationally, and how each party used and
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The United States, according to historian Richard Morris, has always had a
“president.”  Beginning with the first meeting of the First Continental Congress to the
present, someone has always occupied that office.  The powers of the chief executive,
though, changed remarkably from that meeting in 1774 when the Congress elected
Peyton Randolph of Virginia to preside over the First Continental Congress to the
election of George Washington as the first president under the Constitution.  Between
1774 and 1789, the president served with the consent of the Congress − whether it was
the First Continental, Second Continental, or Confederation − and his powers tended to
be subordinate to the legislative will.  He was not, however, merely a figurehead.
Because the president was also a delegate, he voted and sat on committees.  He was also
responsible for answering any correspondence sent to the Congress and for
communicating with state governors, military commanders, and diplomats.  In addition,
Congress issued any resolutions it drafted under his name.  According to Morris, this
made him the chief administrator of the country.  Finally, as president, he presided over
state dinners and entertained any foreign dignitaries visiting the country.  Fearing too
much concentration of executive power, the congresses, especially the Confederation
Congress, strictly limited the president’s powers to these functions.  Indeed, the Articles
of Confederation actually specified that no president should serve a term of more than
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one year during his elected three-year term as a delegate.  Despite these limitations, the
president of the Congress could exert a certain amount of leadership because he set the
congressional agenda.1
During the six years following the Revolutionary War, the country suffered from
a variety of ills, mainly due to rapid inflation and restrictions on trading with Britain and
its colonies.  The citizenry, faced with rising taxes, foreclosures on homes and farms, and
increasing unemployment, sought help from the national government.  The nature of the
Articles, though, limited the amount of aid the government could give.  Fearing a strong
central government, the men who drafted the Articles of Confederation did not give
Congress the power or the authority to execute sound foreign policies or create a stable
financial system throughout the country.  Indeed, the national government did not have
the power to levy taxes.  The president was of little help because the creation of new
executive departments, beginning in 1781, eroded what little leadership he had.  Congress
divided presidential duties, such as answering congressional correspondence and drafting
resolutions, among various departments heads or secretaries.  Executive authority, what
little there was, rested in committees, most notably the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
Marine Committee, the Committee on Finance, and the Board of War.  In essence, there
was no one person responsible for formulating or implementing policy.  Matters grew
worse as the committees multiplied – the highest number reached was ninety-one – and
their duties and responsibilities began to overlap.  After the debacle of Shays’ Rebellion
1 Richard B.  Morris, The Forging of the Union, 1781-1789 (New York: Harper &
Row, 1987), 99-101; Alfred H. Kelly and Winfred A. Harbison, The American
Constitution: Its Origins and Development, 5th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976), 96.
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in Massachusetts, when Revolutionary War veterans led a group of disgruntled farmers
against the state’s militia in protest of rising economic confusion, advocates of reform
throughout the country called for a convention to address these problems before the
newly independent country fell apart.2
In May 1787, delegates from every state in the Union – except Rhode Island –
met in Philadelphia to create a more efficient form of government than that which existed
under the Articles of Confederation.  The written constitution that emerged from the
meetings at Independence Hall resulted from a series of compromises agreed to after four
months of deliberation.  The most serious disputes revolved around the relationship
between liberty and power, the issue of representation in the legislative branch of the
national government, and the nature and powers of the chief executive.  The struggle
among the delegates involved not only the balance between national power and
individual rights, but also the balance of power between the national government and the
states and the division of power between coequal branches of government.  To achieve
this delicate balance and avoid the tyranny of the absolute majority, the Founding Fathers
created a system based on the idea of federalism – shared power between the national and
2 Morris, Forging of the Union, 106; Kelly and Harbison, American Constitution, 96.
For a complete discussion of the events, especially the evolution of the executive branch
and the problems associated with the Confederation Congress leading up to the
Constitutional Convention see Merrill Jensen, The Founding of the Nation: A History of
the American Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), Jackson Turner
Main, The Sovereign States, 1775-1783 (New York: New Viewpoints, 1973), A.C.
McLaughlin, The Confederation and the Constitution (New York: London Harper &
Brothers, 1905), and Jennings B. Sanders, Evolution of Executive Departments of the
Continental Congress, 1774-1789 (Chapel Hill:  The University of North Carolina Press,
1935).
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state governments – supported by a system of checks and balances to maintain shared
power within the national government itself.
One of the more controversial provisions of the Constitution concerned the
creation of an Electoral College whose sole duty was to elect the president of the United
States.  At the Convention, the discussion of the method of choosing the president
revolved around ideological issues. The College was a compromise between those
delegates who championed the will of the majority and believed that the people should
choose the president directly and those who feared democracy, an idea they equated with
the tyranny of the uninformed that would ultimately lead to chaos.  The controversy
surrounding the Electoral College and the various modes of choosing its members
reflected the conservative and liberal, republican and democratic, philosophies that were
apparent at the convention.  Of paramount concern to the delegates was avoiding too
much concentration of power in one man − as would happen with the more democratic,
direct election of the president by the masses − and avoiding the appearance of corruption
− as would happen if the president were solely dependent upon the state legislatures or
congressional representatives for election.  The adoption of the Electoral College solved
the delegates’ dilemma, but as the first political parties developed during the early 1790s,
party supporters began using the electoral system at the state level to advance candidates
of certain political persuasions rather than as a method of electing the most qualified
candidate.
Given no direction on how to choose electors, each state in the Union was able to
adopt any method it saw fit.  The states commonly used three modes of selection.  Some
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chose to use their state legislature to pick those individuals who would officially cast the
votes for president.  As factions developed within local parties, political deals were
consummated that led to the choice of electors loyal to competing presidential candidates.
This maneuvering within and between parties caused major divisions in the assignment of
electors in New York during the elections of 1808 and 1824, Delaware during 1824, and
Louisiana during 1824.  Another mode of selection involved popular election of electors
by district.  Typically, the legislature divided the state into districts, and the candidate
who won that district received its vote; thus, different candidates could carry several
districts and receive a proportion of the state’s total electoral vote.  This mode of
selection was the cause of divided electoral votes from Maryland in 1804, 1808, 1818,
1824, 1828, and 1832, North Carolina in 1808, Illinois in 1824, Maine in 1828, and New
York in 1828.  The third method of elector selection was election on a general ticket.
This ultimately became the mode in almost every state in the Union and is the most
accurate indicator of the state’s choice (but not necessarily the public’s will), since the
candidate who won the popular vote in that state won all of its electors.3
After the first two elections, which George Washington won unanimously, party
advocates began to experiment with these different modes of choosing electors.
Although this phenomenon took place during almost every election, the presidential
campaigns in 1796 and 1800, and in 1824 and 1828, brought out a time of great activity
3 Lawrence D. Longley and Alan G. Braun, The Politics of Electoral Reform (New
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1975), 45-47; John L Moore, Congressional
Quarterly’s Guide to U.S. Elections (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.,
1994), 350.
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among state politicians.  Not coincidentally, both time periods marked the rise of
competitive two-party systems in American politics and saw an increase in calls for
reform throughout the country.  In both the 1796 and 1800 elections, the Democratic
Republicans and the Federalists tried to manipulate the selection of electors in order to
swing the election to their candidates. Twenty-four years later, citing corruption and
disregard of the people’s voice, a faction of the old Jeffersonian party supported Andrew
Jackson for president instead of Secretary of State John Quincy Adams and then split
from the old Democratic Republicans to form the Democratic party.
Political scientist Lucius Wilmerding, generally considered the foremost expert on
the subject, briefly discusses the various methods adopted periodically by the states, but
does not go into any detail about the party manipulations of selection.  Instead, he focuses
on the general ticket method that the states have adopted, which he argues is less
democratic than the district method. Historians of the Jacksonian period – Robert
Remini, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and James Hopkins foremost among them – all give
excellent interpretations of the three presidential elections involving Andrew Jackson and
the newly created Democratic party and clearly explain the most egregious examples of
elector manipulation, but never specifically address, in a complete manner, the movement
toward using a general ticket method of choosing electors among all the states.  Another
noted historian, Richard P. McCormick, gives ample information on politics at the state
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level in his book The Second American Party System:  Party Formation in the Jacksonian
Era, but fails even to address the issue of elector selection at that level.4
In addition, many political scientists and activists have also studied the electoral
process in hopes of either defending the current system or advocating change.  Neal R.
Peirce and Lawrence D. Longley, in The People’s President:  The Electoral College in
American History and the Direct Vote Alternative, extensively study the use of electors
and put forth many theories about how state voting affected the outcome, but they do not
address the partisan concerns of the state legislatures.  Although considered a classic on
the Electoral College, it is incomplete in its assessment of the impact of party
development on historical change.  Longley and Alan G. Braun address this topic to some
extent; however, they do not explore the reasons behind the changes that the states made
prior to each election. 5
4 See Lucius Wilmerding, The Electoral College (New Brunswick: Rutgers University
Press, 1958), Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Freedom
(1981; reprint, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), Arthur M.
Schelsinger, Jr. and Fred L. Israel, eds. History of American Presidential Election, 1789-
1968, 4 vols. (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1971), and Richard P. McCormick,
The Second Party System: Party Formation in the Jacksonian Era (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1966), among many others, for a complete look at the
elections and creation of political parties between 1824 and 1832.  Another excellent
source for party politics in the United States during this time is Richard Hofstadter, The
Idea of a Party System: The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the United States, 1780-
1840 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969).
5 See Neal R. Peirce and Lawrence D. Longley, The People's President: The Electoral
College in American History and the Direct Vote Alternative (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press, 1981) and Longley and Braun, Politics of Electoral Reform.  Other
useful works are Roger Lea MacBride, The American Electoral College (Caldwell, Ohio:
The Caxton Printers, 1963), Wallace S. Sayre and Judith H. Parris, Voting for President:
The Electoral College and the American Political System (Washington, D.C.:  The
Brookings Institute, 1970), and Harvey Zeidenstein, Direct Election of the President
(Lexington, Mass.:  D.C. Heath Co., 1973).
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The lack of scholarship concerning partisan manipulation of the selection of
electors at the state level represents a glaring omission in historical and political
scholarship concerning the early years of the Age of Jackson. Given the extensive
amount of research devoted to the emergence of the second two-party system following
the debacle of the 1824 election, an in-depth study of the parties’ methods and motives
for change between 1824 and 1832 can add significant understanding to the concept of
Jacksonian Democracy.  Twelve states – Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, New York
(twice), Vermont, Tennessee, Louisiana, Indiana, Alabama, Illinois, Maine, and Missouri
(twice) – changed their mode of selecting electors during this eight-year period.
Interestingly, there is no pattern apparent in the way states experimented with the
selection process.  These states vary in geographical location, length of time in the Union,
and dominant party affiliation.  Since a new party was emerging, it is not surprising that
political machinations at every level were used to gain the upper hand.  A study of this
movement throughout the country reveals the partisan political concerns of these
advocates of change.  Often change in the method of choosing electors did not reflect
primarily ideological concerns − the rising belief in democracy attributed to the
Jacksonian movement or the simple thought that the people should directly elect the
president − but instead reflected the desire to advance the party at the highest levels of
government.  This is not to say that no politicians sincerely advocated change for
democratic reasons.  Indeed, in 1826 Congress hotly debated an amendment to the
Constitution proposing selection of electors through statewide districts.  A unique blend
of desire to mend what was becoming known, rightly or wrongly, as a corrupt system and
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belief in party politics brought about significant change in how the president was elected
and in how both politicians and the voting public viewed the Electoral College.  The
corrupt system, they claimed, unresponsive to the people and abused by unscrupulous
politicians, had to be changed.  The consequences of the movement toward a uniform
method of choosing electors were three-fold.  First, it solidified and magnified party
power and influence at the national level, making the presidential contest more national
in scope.  Second, by ending partisan manipulation in each state, it made the president a
truer representative of the party and the people rather than one who was selected by a
political caucus.  And finally, the concept of democracy rather than republicanism
became more and more descriptive of the country and its political system as a whole.
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CHAPTER 2
A MEASURE FOR PARTY PURPOSES: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE
FIRST TWO-PARTY SYSTEM, 1787-1820
Serious discussion of the executive branch at the Constitutional Convention began
on 1 June 1787, when the Committee of the Whole took up the discussion in part to
postpone consideration of the creation of the legislative branch.  The delegates used
Virginian Edmund Randolph’s resolution that called for an executive to “be elected by
the Legislature for a fixed term of [left blank] years and to be eligible for reelection,” but
they quickly departed from the simple plan he had originally presented. The method of
choosing the president deeply divided the delegates, not only between northern and
southern states and smaller and larger states, but also between delegates who promoted
democracy and those who championed republicanism.  Each alternative presented to the
Committee raised objections from a variety of interests for a variety of reasons.  Political
scientist Roger MacBride found that:
The suggestion that various authorities in the states elect the President was
not popular.  Governors were eliminated as a body of men liable to
corruption.  State legislatures, meeting and voting separately, would
constitute an agency too awkward to consider.  The opinion . . . that the
qualified voters ought to elect the president directly, was not generally
held.  The difficulty of equating the voting strength of the slaveholding
South with that of the populous North, and the conviction that Americans
in the collective ought not to exercise that power directly . . . eliminated it
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from the running as a possibility even before the convention
opened.1
Two of the most ardent supporters of some form of direct election of the chief
executive were James Madison of Virginia and James Wilson of Pennsylvania.  Wilson,
well known to the delegates as a lawyer, orator, and writer, had published pamphlets
during the Revolution criticizing the tyranny of Great Britain.  Of the two, Wilson,
probably second only to Madison in influence during the following months, was the more
radical.  He possessed a deep passion for democracy and a strong belief in nationalism.
Thus, he advocated the direct election of the president.  Madison, on the other hand, said
that he could see the merits of filtering the choice of president through intervening bodies
if the process was not too far removed from the people.  “Experience,” Wilson countered,
“particularly in New York and Massachusetts, shewed [sic] that an election of the first
magistrate by the people at large, was both a convenient and a successful mode.  The
objects of choice in such cases must be a person whose merits have general notoriety.”
Taking the idea even further, Wilson stated that placing presidential and congressional
elections in the hands of the people would make both branches “as independent as
1 David G. Smith, The Convention and the Constitution (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1965), 38-39; Richard B. Morris, The Forging of the Union, 1781-1789 (New
York: Harper & Row, 1987), 287; Alfred H. Kelly and Winfred A. Harbison, The
American Constitution: Its Origins and Development, 5th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton,
1976), 124; James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 (1966;
reprint, New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), 31; Wilbourne E. Benton, ed., 1787: Drafting
the U.S. Constitution (College Station:  Texas A&M University Press, 1986), 1095; Carl
Van Doren, The Great Rehearsal:  The Story of the Making and Ratifying of the
Constitution of the United States (New York:  The Viking Press, 1961), 53; Roger Lea
MacBride, The American Electoral College (Caldwell, Ohio:  The Caxton Printers,
1963), 24-25.
12
possible of each other, as well as of the states.”  At the suggestion of Virginia delegate
George Mason, who supported Wilson's stance in theory but thought it impractical “as it
would, to refer a trial of colours to a blind man,” Wilson refined his ideas, suggesting
. . . that the Executive magistracy shall be elected in the following manner:
That the States be divided into [left blank] districts:  & that the persons
qualified to vote in each district for members of the first branch of the
national Legislature elect [left blank] members for their respective districts
to be Electors of the Executive magistracy, that the said Electors of the
Executive magistracy meet at [left blank] and they or any [left blank] of
them so meet shall proceed to elect by ballot, but not out of their own
body [left blank] person in whom the Executive authority of the national
Government shall be vested.
Thus the idea of presidential electors, a combination of Wilson's desire for popular choice
and Madison and Mason's pragmatic view of a filtration system, entered the debate.2
Delegates on the convention floor offered various arguments against Wilson's
plan.  Connecticut's Roger Sherman thought the legislature should appoint the executive,
and that he should be “appointed by and completely accountable to the Legislature only,
which was the depository of the supreme will of the Society.”  John Rutledge of South
Carolina stated that the election of the executive should take place in the upper chamber
of the national legislature.  Charles Pinckney, also from South Carolina, supported
legislative selection because “then respect will be paid to that character best qualified to
fill the Executive department of Government.”  Massachusetts's Elbridge Gerry and
North Carolina's Hugh Williamson specifically opposed the use of electors.  Gerry
believed that the delegates could create a system using the legislative selection mode in a
2 Madison, Notes of Debates, 48-50; Benton, 1787, 1097-98; Morris, Forging of the
Union, 287-88.
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way that “prevented intrigue,” whereas the use of district electors would be inconvenient.
Furthermore, Gerry did not think “that the people ought to act directly even in the choice
of electors, being too little informed of personal characters in large districts and liable to
deceptions.”   Similarly, Williamson thought the use of electors “would be attended with
considerable expence [sic] and trouble; whereas the appointment made by the Legislature
would be easy, and . . . the least liable to objection.”3
Debate over the mode of selecting the executive continued throughout most of
June.  The idea of the executive being dependent on the national legislature concerned
many delegates as it might lead to corruption.  Most of the state delegations, however,
still supported this mode of appointment.  By 19 June, the tide began to turn in favor of
Wilson's plan.  Opponents of legislative selection, notably Wilson, Madison, and
Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, continually raised the argument that if the executive
was dependent upon the legislature for his appointment, he might abdicate his duties in
exchange for a guaranteed second term.  The only solution to this dilemma was either
appointing the president for life or limiting him to one term.  Neither option appealed to a
majority of the delegates.4
On the convention floor, Madison gave a classic speech answering the concerns
of the various interests and defining the idea of American republicanism, specifically as it
3 Madison, Notes of Debates, 46, 48, 50-51; Benton, 1787, 1101-04; Morris, Forging
of the Union, 288.
4 Madison, Notes of Debates, 48-51, 306-09; Benton, 1787, 1136; Kelly and Harbison,
American Constitution, 125.  For a complete record of the debate concerning
appointment of the executive during the first two weeks of June, see Benton, 1787, 1117-
1136.
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related to the concept of separation of powers.  Madison paraphrased his speech in his
journal, writing in third person:
If it be a fundamental principle of free Government that the Legislative,
Executive and Judiciary powers should be separately exercised, it is
equally so that they be independently exercised.  There is the same and
perhaps greater reason why the Executive should be independent of the
Legislature, than why the Judiciary should:  A coalition of the two former
powers would be more immediately and certainly dangerous to public
liberty.  It is essential then that the appointment of the Executive should
either be drawn from some source, or held by some tenure, that will give
him a free agency with regard to the Legislature.  This could not be if he
was to be appointable from time to time by the Legislature.  It is not clear
that an appointment in the first instance even with an eligibility afterwards
would be attended with intrigues and contentions that ought not to be
unnecessarily admitted.  He [Madison] was disposed for these reasons to
refer the appointment to some other source.  The people at large was in his
[Madison's] opinion the fittest in itself.  It would be as likely as any that
could be devised to produce an Executive Magistrate of distinguished
Character.  The people generally could only know and vote for some
Citizen whose merits had rendered him an object of general attention and
esteem.  There was one difficulty however of a serious nature attending an
immediate choice by the people.  The right of suffrage was much more
diffusive in the Northern than the Southern States; and the latter could
have no influence in the election on the score of Negroes.  The substitution
of electors obviated this difficulty and seemed on the whole to be liable to
fewest objections.5
Madison's oratory was successful for a time.  Following a brief debate, the Committee of
the Whole approved an electoral system.  The delegates had reached a consensus,
although the issue remained open for debate.
Throughout the months of July and August, delegates raised the issue repeatedly.
Convention members vacillated between keeping the already-agreed-upon electoral
system and reverting to the original proposal to let the national legislature select the
5 Madison, Notes of Debates, 326-27; Benton, 1787, 1136-37; Morris, Forging of the
Union, 288-89.
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president.  The question of reelection and years per term, though, remained disturbing to
many delegates.  The process appears chaotic.  For instance, on 17 July the Convention
again agreed that the national legislature should choose the executive and that he should
serve a fixed term of seven years.  Gouverneur Morris, appalled at the idea, compared
legislative selection in this country to the Polish Diet choosing their king – and pointed
out that their choices had been notoriously bad.  The delegates reversed themselves on 19
July and agreed that a slate of electors chosen by the state legislatures should appoint the
president.  Under this plan, initiated by Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, each state would
be allotted one, two or three electors, depending on the size of its population.  Then, on
24 July, the convention again reverted to election by the national legislature.  This
prompted delegates to raise the question of re-eligibility once more.  Finally, on 26 July,
they returned to Randolph's original proposal of legislative appointment for a term of
seven years with no reelection.  Amid the indecision, Wilson remained adamant that the
people should have a voice in choosing their chief executive and steadfastly promoted the
electoral system.  Conscious of the turmoil, the delegates voted to postpone any further
discussion of the issue.6
By the end of August, the delegates were no closer to reaching a final decision
than they had been at the first of June.  Confusion surrounded not only the executive
branch, but also almost every other provision of the proposed constitution.  At the end of
6 Madison, Notes of Debates, 328, 356-63, 370-79; Max Farrand, ed., The Records of
the Federal Convention of 1787, 4 vols. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1937), 2: 29-31, 33-37, 52-58, 99-101, 108-115; Van Doren, Great Rehearsal, 134-35;
Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1985), 243-47.
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August, the delegates appointed a Committee of Eleven and charged them with solving,
among other things, the problems associated with the executive branch.  Meeting in
secret, the committee drafted what would ultimately become the basis for a final solution.
Adopting Wilson's electoral system, with slight changes proposed by Pierce Butler of
South Carolina, they decided that electors chosen by the qualified voters of the states
would elect the president.  They would distribute electoral votes among the states
according to their population, thus reflecting the Connecticut, or Great, Compromise that
decided congressional apportionment based on the population in the lower house and
equality in the upper house.  The person who received the most electoral votes would
become president.  If, however, no one received at least one-third of the electoral votes,
selection of the president would take place in the Senate.  According to the Committee of
Eleven, the president would serve a six-year term and be eligible for reelection. 7
The committee presented their recommendation on 4 September.  In debate, the
delegates accepted most of the committee's suggestions, making only minor changes in
the plan.  They lessened the president's term to four years, required that the candidate win
a majority rather than one-third of the electoral vote, and placed contingent election – in
case of a tie or no majority in the electoral vote – with the House of Representatives
rather than the Senate.  As far as deciding the method of choosing electors, the delegates
left that decision to the individual states, stipulating only that the number of electors be
7 Madison, Notes of Debates, 634; Farrand, Records of the Convention, 2: 401-04,
497-98, 499-502, 511-515, 522-525; McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum, 207, 228; Van
Doren, Great Rehearsal, 146; Lawrence D. Longley and Alan G. Braun, The Politics of
Electoral Reform (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1975), 25.
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fixed at the number of representatives the state sent to Congress and that the state must
not allow as electors either United States senators, representatives, or other national
officeholders.  The method of choosing the president was subject to little debate after
gaining final approval.  During the ratification process, this section of the Constitution
received little, if any, attention at the state level.  Madison, however, was not completely
convinced that this method was without problems.  Writing to Thomas Jefferson on the
day that the plan was agreed to, he said, “ . . . the plan . . . will neither effectually answer
its national object, [nor] prevent the local mischiefs which everywhere excite disgusts
agst. the State Governments.”8
The Electoral College received almost unanimous support in the end because it
incorporated the concerns of those who supported direct election and those who
supported legislative selection.  Political scientists Lawrence Longley and Alan Braun
refer to this two-stage election process as “a compromise between the principle of
population and that of state interest.”  Most of the delegates believed that the Electoral
College would serve as the nominating process, leaving the House of Representatives to
choose the president.  It was common knowledge that George Washington would win
unanimous acceptance as the first president of the United States.  Most believed, though,
that in future elections, no other person would be able to garner a majority of the
country's electoral vote.  This appealed to those who feared placing too much power in
the hands of a popularly elected president.  Because the House would make the final
8 Longley and Braun, Politics of Electoral Reform, 25; Julia E. Johnsen, Direct
Election of the President (New York:  The H.W. Wilson Co., 1949), 16; James Madison
to Thomas Jefferson, 6 Sept. 1787, in Farrand, Records of the Convention, 3: 77.
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decision, a tyranny of the majority would never occur.  The plan also appealed to those
who favored popular participation in presidential elections because the electoral vote and
the subsequent election in the House would remain fairly close to the people.  This
process would also serve to make the president less dependent on Congress because the
Electoral College gave the president power indirectly through the people.  These
suppositions, on all sides, proved false.  Despite the intentions of the Founding Fathers,
the College never worked as planned.  On only two occasions did the House decide the
outcome of a presidential race, and, what is more important, the development of the two-
party system in the United States significantly affected electoral decision-making from
almost the very beginning.  Madison, it seems, was more than accurate in his
assessment.9
Historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., succinctly summed up the mistake. “The
original process got into trouble because of one of the few notable miscalculations . . .
their failure to realize that the competition for the Presidency would generate the
formation of political parties . . . .  ”  Richard McCormick echoes Schlesinger's
conclusion, stating that “Party formation was most directly conditioned . . . by the contest
for the presidency.”  He adds, “The provisions that were made for choosing the president
were to give a national scope to politics and encourage cooperation among political
9 Longley and Braun, Politics of Electoral Reform, 26-27; Smith, Convention and
Constitution, 68; Johnsen, Direct Election, 17.  For an in-depth discussion of the
compromise-nature of the outcome of the debate concerning the Electoral College, see
Shlomo Slonim, “The Electoral College at Philadelphia: The Evolution of an Ad Hoc
Congress for the Selection of a President," American Historical Review 73 (June 1986):
35-58.
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leaders in the several states on behalf of particular candidates.”  The rise of political
parties coincided with the efforts to reform the Electoral College.  A look at the
presidential elections between 1789 and 1820, with particular emphasis on the election of
1800, will show that at the height of the struggle between Jeffersonian Republicans and
Federalists, parties at the state level tried to manipulate the process of selecting electors
to benefit their party.  When party conflict was at its lowest point, however, this type of
manipulation was almost nonexistent.10
The elections of 1788 and 1792 took place with little controversy, due in large
part to the unanimous support given George Washington.  In 1788, most states appointed
their electors through legislative action because the time between the ratification of the
Constitution and the first meeting of the Electoral College was so short.  A few states
provided for popular election, while Massachusetts set up a system in which people
nominated twice the number of electors due the state and the legislature then chose from
this slate.  There was no discussion about establishing any uniform method of selection. 11
The election of 1792 followed much the same pattern.  Of the fifteen states that
took part in the election, ten placed the selection of electors in the hands of the
legislatures.  Massachusetts and New Hampshire allowed popular vote by district, but
only insofar as the nominees from each district won a majority of the vote.  In the
10 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. and Fred L. Israel, eds., 4 vols., History of American
Presidential Elections, 1789-1968 (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1971), 1:  xxxix;
Richard P. McCormick, The Second American Party System:  Party Formation in the
Jacksonian Era (Chapel Hill:  The University of North Carolina Press, 1966), 14, 20.
11 Edward Stanwood, A History of Presidential Elections (Boston: Osgood and Co.,
1884), 11; MacBride, American Electoral College, 28; Roy F. Nichols, The Invention of
the American Political Parties (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 161.
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absence of this, the legislature made the final selection.  In Pennsylvania and Maryland,
the people chose their electors on a statewide ticket.  Virginia and Kentucky used popular
choice in districts.  Interestingly, there was a light turnout in those states allowing popular
vote.  For example, in Pennsylvania forty thousand people voted for members of
Congress, but there were less than four thousand votes cast for presidential electors.  In
all probability, this was due to the fact that George Washington, being who he was, had
no opposition, and the state wholeheartedly supported John Adams for vice-president.
There was little incentive for reforming the Electoral College at this time.12
If the first two elections for the presidency were rather tame, the next two proved
to be raucous affairs in which parties played a major role in the outcome.  The election of
1796 was a battle not only between John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, but also between
two distinct political parties and two visions of the nature of the Union.  The Federalists,
based mostly in the North, backed Adams while supporting the tenets of Alexander
Hamilton's financial plans enacted in 1790-1791.  The Democratic-Republicans, based
largely in the South, supported Jefferson while generally opposing Hamilton's plan.  The
conflict between these two groups represented the first political parties in the nation. 13
12 Edward Stanwood, A History of the Presidency, 2 vols. (Boston:  Houghton Mifflin
Co., 1924), 1: 38-39; Lucius Wilmerding, The Electoral College (New Brunswick, N.J.:
Rutgers University Press, 1958), 46-47.
13 Hamilton's financial plan involved establishing a national fiscal system that
included creating bonds that would fund the national debt, national assumption of state
debts, creating a national bank, establishing tariffs to protect U.S. industry, and placing
an excise tax on whiskey.  Morton Borden, in Parties and Politics in the Early Republic,
1789-1815 (New York:  Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1967), 44, writes:  "Without a doubt the
immediate precursor of a catalyst to party growth was Hamilton's financial program of
1790-91.  A sharp rancorous section division in congressional voting occurred on each
21
The emergence of political parties drastically changed the nature of selection to
the Electoral College, particularly in those states that allowed popular election − Georgia,
Kentucky, Maryland, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Virginia.  In Pennsylvania both
parties selected and published a list of names, an electoral slate of men who were
favorable to the leading candidates.  In addition, discussion ensued over whether an
elector should be required to state whom he supported before the election and then be
“bound” to support the candidate for whom he originally stated a preference.  Some, like
Charles Sims, an elector from Virginia, announced that if chosen he would vote for
Patrick Henry and John Adams.  Others, like Ralph Wormely, also from Virginia, sent
letters to local the local newspapers refusing to declare their intentions.  No states
actually changed the way they voted for electors – except North Carolina, which adopted
a system of popular election by district – but the presence of political parties certainly
altered the process.  Following Pennsylvania's lead, political parties throughout the
country began adopting the practice of creating a slate of electors who would support
their candidate and the idea of the “bound elector.”  After an initial struggle, both ideas
became firmly entrenched in the minds of the electorate.  Historian Edward Stanwood,
recounting the broken pledge of one of the two Federalist electors in Pennsylvania writes:
“The treachery of this elector was the subject of an exceedingly plainspoken
issue.  For example, in the second ballot on assumption, members from the Northern
states voted 24 to 9 in approval, while congressmen from the South opposed it 18 to
10 . . . .  The division on excise resulted in a vote of the Northern delegation in favor 28
to 6 (four of the latter from Pennsylvania), and Southerners opposed 15 to 7.  Finally, on
the bill to create a national bank, Northern representatives voted affirmatively 33 to 1,
and Southern representatives voted negatively 19 to 6."
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communication in the United States Gazette from an exasperated Federalist.  ‘What!’ he
exclaimed.  ‘Do I chuse [sic] Samuel Miles to determine for me whether John Adams or
Thomas Jefferson shall be President?  No!  I chuse him to act, not to think.’”14
If the election of 1796 showed how important political parties could be to binding
and publicly pledging electors to specific candidates in states where the people directly
voted for electors, the election of 1800 solidified that belief and proved that the state
legislatures could structure the selection of electors in a variety of ways to the benefit of
on party or the other.  Again, the contest was between Jefferson and Adams.  Noble
Cunningham, in The Jeffersonian Republicans, states:
As party leaders made plans and organized their forces for the contest of
1800, they gave particular attention to various state laws governing the
choice of presidential electors.  In the absence of a uniform system of
selection, the legislature of each state generally determined the method of
election according to the circumstances of the moment.  Such procedure
provided an unusual opportunity for party manipulation; and the closeness
of the election of 1796, in which Adams had received only three more
electoral votes than Jefferson, encouraged partisan attempts to arrange
election laws for party advantage in 1800.
The Federalists believed that Adams was sure to win.  Since there were 139 electoral
votes, the Federalists needed only seventy to win.  They thought that they could gain the
majority and counted on the solid vote of the New England States, New Jersey,
Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, North Carolina and South Carolina.  The methods −
Stanwood calls them “political chicanery” − used to try to gain this majority, however,
14 Noble E. Cunningham, The Jeffersonian Republicans: The Formation of Party
Organization, 1790-1801 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1957),
94-97; Stanwood, History of the Presidency, 1: 47-51.
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while saving the Federalists from a devastating defeat, gave the Republicans their sought-
for victory. 15
Of the ten states that selected electors by popular vote in 1796 only five − Rhode
Island, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and Kentucky − retained this method in
1800.  Often the people kept this right only after serious attempts at change.  For
instance, in Maryland the election of the members to the state legislature that year
revolved around the issue of the method of selecting electors.  The Federalists proposed
changing the method from electors popularly chosen by district to appointment by the
legislature or election on a general ticket.  The Federalists believed that Adams would
gain all the state's electors through either of these two methods.  Four candidates to the
State Assembly went so far as to justify the political nature of the argument when they
sent a statement to the Federalist Gazette:
We deem it a sacred duty to pursue every proper and constitutional
measure to elect John Adams president of the United States; but at the
same time we pledge ourselves to our countrymen, that whatever may be
the mode proposed, whether it be by legislative choice of electors, or by
general ticket throughout the state, we will consent to no law making a
change in the election, unless it contains a clause expressly declaring that
the present mode shall not be revived after this election.
Despite their best efforts, the Federalists in this state were unsuccessful.  Maryland
retained its method of selecting electors popularly by district, and Jefferson and Adams
split the state's ten electoral votes in half. 16
15 Cunningham, Jeffersonian Republicans, 144; Stanwood, History of the Presidency,
1:  61.
16 Cunningham, Jeffersonian Republicans, 189-90.
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The Federalists were also quite active in other states, fearing that their candidate
had become too unpopular with the general population to win the general election.  In
Pennsylvania, they presented an interesting use of party politics to manipulate the
Electoral College.  The state constitution required that the state legislature pass a law
regulating the mode of selection, to be in use for that election alone.  Prior to each
previous election, the legislature gave the people the right to select electors by district.  In
1796, this method resulted in fourteen electors pledged to Jefferson and one to Adams.
Once the Federalists gained control of the state senate in 1800, by a majority of thirteen
to eleven, they blocked passage of the bill providing for popular election by district.
Forced to yield to the Federalists, who became known as the “Federalist Thirteen,” the
Republican-controlled house agreed to joint legislative selection where they then chose
eight Jefferson and seven Adams electors.  The editor of the United States Gazette wrote,
“The Federalist Thirteen deserve the praises and blessings of all America.  They have
checked the mad enthusiasm of a deluded populace and the wicked speculation of
designing demagogues.  In reviewing the recent aspect of our political affairs, it may be
accurately said, they have saved a falling world!”  Federalists in Massachusetts, fearful
that Jefferson might secure two of the district electors, thus giving him an edge in the
national election, also advocated taking the vote from the people and placing it in the
hands of the legislature.  Since the Federalists dominated both houses in this state, they
were able to proceed with their plan, first suggested by their party delegates in Congress,
and secured all of Massachusetts's electoral votes for Adams.  Connecticut joined
Massachusetts in choosing their electors through the legislature, generating as much
25
debate on the issue as in the former state.  Despite losing the fight for choosing electors
popularly, the Republicans gained support among the populace through the newspapers.
Following the debates in the state legislature, the American Mercury stated that the
people had been “repeatedly and impudently robbed of one high privilege, choosing
Electors.”  Furthermore, the Connecticut Courant claimed, the Federalists were violating
the spirit of American independence by denying the people their rights, since “the right of
suffrage is the citadel of Liberty.”  Of course this was an overstatement because the
people had never before chosen their electors, but in a state where the Federalist party
dominated, the fact that the Republicans in 1800 could bring such a plan to a vote was
significant, particularly since in 1799 one Federalist newspaper had boldly proclaimed
that in Connecticut “democracy had not dared show its hideous head.”17
Federalists in New Hampshire followed Massachusetts's example, but in New
York they suffered a terrible blow.  The legislature, once dominated by Federalists, had
always chosen the state's electors, and in May of 1800, it came under the control of the
Republicans.  To divert the oncoming disaster, Alexander Hamilton, among others, wrote
to Governor John Jay asking him to call the old legislature into special session so that
they could change the election law to popular vote by district.  Hamilton believed that in
this manner, Adams would still win most of the state's electoral votes.  Governor Jay,
though, held firmly to his principles and refused to do something he considered unethical.
17 Stanwood, History of the Presidency, 1: 60-61; Cunningham, Jeffersonian
Republicans, 146-47; United States Gazette, 3 December 1800; William A. Robinson,
Jeffersonian Democracy in New England (1916; reprint, New York: Greenwood Press,
Publishers, 1968), 31-2; Columbian Centinel, 7 June 1800; American Mercury, 20
September 1800; Connecticut Courant, 27 October 1800, 31 March 1800, 3 June 1799.
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He labeled the plan “a measure for party purposes which I think it would not become me
to adopt.”  Jefferson won all of New York's electors.18
Although the Federalists were most active in manipulating the selection of
electors, Republicans were not averse to doing the same.  The most blatant example took
place in Virginia.  In every previous election, Virginia had given the selection of electors
to the people, who chose their electors by district.  In 1800, Virginia had twenty-one
electors and the Republicans meant for all of them to go to Jefferson.  Fearing that the
Federalists could win some districts if they did not change the method of selection, the
Republicans put all their effort into changing the law to require election on a general
ticket, thus diluting the Federalist vote.  In response to criticism from the Federalists,
Republicans tried to justify their actions.  The most common argument, according to
Stanwood, was that Virginia should “avail itself of ‘the full extent of its electoral power.’
Virginia with twenty-one electors should have influence in the election three times
greater than that of New Jersey, which had seven electors, or seven time that of
Delaware, which had three electors.”  Despite this argument, the Republican
manipulations were transparent.  The only purpose of the change from district election to
a general ticket was to secure all of the votes for Jefferson. 19
The outcome of the election of 1800 was due to many factors, including the Alien
and Sedition Acts of 1798 that made it a crime to criticize the government, the Federalist
18 Stanwood, History of the Presidency, 1: 60-1, Cunningham, Jeffersonian
Republicans, 146-47.
19 Stanwood, History of the Presidency, 1: 60; Cunningham, Jeffersonian Republicans,
144-46.
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tax program that some saw as harmful to agricultural interests, and the split that
developed within the Federalist party between those who championed Adams and those
who supported Hamilton.  Despite the Federalists’ best efforts to manipulate the Electoral
College, the Republicans had an advantage with the people that the Federalists could not
overcome.  The outcome was important for a variety of reasons.  Most saw it as a
vindication of the concept of republicanism and as proof that a peaceful transfer of power
from one political faction to another could occur.  In reality, the election of 1800 showed
how powerful political parties could become and how they could use the electoral system
to their best advantage.  In addition, the tie between the Republican presidential and vice-
presidential candidates, Jefferson and Aaron Burr, which forced the election to the House
of Representatives, showed how unwieldy the system was in its present state.  In 1804,
the Twelfth Amendment, mandating a separate ballot for the two positions, and thereby
legitimizing the existence of the two-party system, was added to the Constitution. 20
When debating the Twelfth Amendment, though, congressional representatives
did not limit themselves to discussion of a separate ballot, or designation, for the
president and vice-president.  Many also began to challenge the notion of allowing each
state to appoint its electors in whatever manner they saw fit.  Federalists in New York
provided a starting point by promoting the district mode in their state legislature as early
as 1801.  Since the Republicans had gained a slight majority of seats and could deliver
20 Borden, Parties and Politics, 55.  A complete discussion of the efforts to pass the
12th Amendment, designed to designate separate ballots for president and vice-president,
can be found in Tadahisa Kuroda, The Origins of the Twelfth Amendment: The Electoral
College in the Early Republic, 1787-1804 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994), in
its entirety.
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the state’s entire vote to the Republican candidate if they held the majority under the
appointment system, the Federalists hoped to legalize the district system, allowing the
state’s vote to be split among the various candidates.  Newly elected Senator DeWitt
Clinton introduced the national measure on the floor of the Senate, while Representatives
Lewis W. Morris of Vermont and Benjamin Walker of New York presented a similar
resolution to the House.  The resolutions were sent to committee to be studied.  Many
who would support passage of the Twelfth Amendment were not inclined to support
another amendment concerning presidential electors.  Samuel L. Mitchell, also of New
York, saw no need for Congress to step in and legitimize what the states already
practiced.  The Electoral College, he claimed did not work as the Founders intended
because of the presence of political parties, but that did not mean that any change was
needed.  In December, 1802, he spoke on the House floor:  “Wise and virtuous as were
the members of the Convention, experience has shown that the mode therein adopted
cannot be carried into operation; for the people do not elect a person for an elector who,
they know, does not intend to vote for a particular person as President.  Therefore,
practically, the very thing is adopted [that is] intended by this amendment.”  In those
states that used legislative selection, he continued, the people could count on those they
elected as legislators to choose a candidate who represented their values.  The issue was
debated on and off for the next two years.21
21 New York Daily Advertiser, 4 February 1802; Annals of Congress, 7th Cong., 1st
sess., 472, 509, 542-44, 602-03, 629, 1285-90.  See also Kuroda, Twelfth Amendment,
115-169.
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Although the 7th Congress adjourned with no action taken on this amendment,
Congressmen picked up the issue almost immediately when the 8th Congress reconvened
in January of 1803.  Virginia Representative John Clopton, arguing for a uniform method,
preferably popular choice by district, said, “The Electors are the organs who, acting from
a certain unquestioned knowledge of the choice of the people, by whom they themselves
were appointed, and under immediate responsibility to them, select and announce those
particular citizens who bear the stamp of public confidence, and affix to them by their
votes on evidence of the degree of public confidence which is bestowed upon them.”   In
the end, neither chamber chose to bring the issue of elector selection to the states as an
amendment; instead, they focused on providing for a separate ballot for the president and
vice-president.  The issue, though, was far from dead, and advocates of democracy would
bring the issue forth, both at the state and national levels.22
The presidential elections between 1804 and 1820 were anticlimactic compared
with the previous two.  Outside of New England, the Federalist party did not have enough
support to win a majority of electoral votes in a national election, particularly after the
United States fought Great Britain in the War of 1812.23  As a result, most states either
22 Annals of Congress, 8th Cong., 1st sess., 423.  See also Kuroda, Twelfth
Amendment, 115-169.
23 The Federalists in New England were generally opposed to the War of 1812.
Specifically, they felt that the policies instituted by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison
concerning trade, with Great Britain in particular, hurt the economy of their section.  In
addition, many felt that the U.S. should not declare war against Great Britain at a time
when that country was trying to end the reign of Napoleon Bonaparte in France.  They
believed that none of the justifications given, including British occupation of forts on
U.S. soil, British instigation of Indian raids, or impressment of U.S. citizens by the
British navy, was enough to go to war.  During the course of the war, many New
Englanders continued trading with the British and in some cases aided them in the war
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retained the mode of selection they used in 1800 or reverted to that which they used in
the previous three elections, although there were some notable exceptions. In 1804, the
Federalist party in many New England states began to open the election process to the
voting populace.  Specifically, Massachusetts and New Hampshire, apparently stung by
the criticism of the press in 1800, allowed popular choice for the first time – although not
always in the way the Republicans wanted.  The Republicans in both states would have
preferred to use the district rather than general ticket, where they could hope to win some
electors, but the Federalists would not go that far.  After convening state caucuses to
nominate electors on a slate to be presented to the public, the Republicans and Federalists
waited for the results, wrongly assuming that the Federalists would win all of the electors
because of the success of the Federalist congressional nominees a few weeks earlier.
Surprisingly, Jefferson carried both Massachusetts and New Hampshire in 1804.
Learning the lesson, Massachusetts reverted to legislative selection for the 1808 election,
but New Hampshire did not.24
effort.  After the Hartford Convention, in which Federalists tried to use Jefferson’s theory
of nullification, first introduced in 1798, to either condemn the U.S. position or in the
extreme call for secession, people throughout the country began to suspect the Federalist
party of a lack of national pride and support.  Andrew Jackson’s victory at the Battle of
New Orleans in January 1815 sealed the Federalists’ fate.  Although the war technically
ended in a draw with the signing of the Treaty of Ghent in December 1814, most
Americans took Jackson’s victory to heart and celebrated with a feeling of renewed
independence.  Under these circumstances, the Federalist party was doomed at the
national level.
24 Stanwood, Presidential Elections, 49; National Aegis, 5 September 1804;
Columbian Centinel, 9 June 1804, 16 June 1804, 12 September 1804; Independent
Chronicle and Universal Advertiser, 15 November 1804, 22 November 1804;
Massachusetts Spy, 22 June 1808; Henry Adams, History of the United States, 9 vols.
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1909), 4: 249.
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Table 1 shows how stable most states were during this time.  A study of the table
reveals that in the absence of true two-party competition, most states chose to either
remain with a specific mode of election or change to a new one and stay with that mode
for the remainder of this period. 25
TABLE 1.  STATE METHODS OF CHOOSING ELECTORS BY ELECTION,
1789-1820
STATE 1789 1792 1796 1800 1804 1808 1812 1816 1820
Alabama − − − − − − − − L
Connecticut L L L L L L L L G
Delaware D L L L L L L L L
Georgia L L G L L L L L L
Illinois − − − – – – – – D
Indiana – – – – – – – L L
Kentucky – D D D D D D D D
Louisiana – – – – – – L L L
Maine – – – – – – – – C
Maryland G G D D D D D D D
Massachusetts C C C L D L D L C
Mississippi – – – – – – – – G
Missouri – – – – – – – – L
New Hampshire C C C L G G G G G
New Jersey L L L L G G L G G
New York – L L L L L L L L
North Carolina – L D D D D L G G
Ohio – – – – G G G G G
Pennsylvania G G G L G G G G G
Rhode Island – L L G G G G G G
South Carolina L L L L L L L L L
Tennessee – – C C D D D D D
Vermont – L L L L L L L L
Virginia D D D G G G G G G
Key:  L - chosen by the Legislature G - chosen by popular vote on a
      general ticket
         D - chosen by popular vote in districts             C - combination of methods
25 Information for this table was taken from data in Charles A. Paullin, "Political
Parties and Opinion, 1788-1930," in Atlas of the Historical Geography of the United
States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Press, 1932), 89-95, and Longley and Braun,
Politics of Electoral Reform, 25.
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During this period of one-party control from 1804 to 1820, however, there were
many attempts to amend the provisions of the Constitution concerning presidential
selection.  Some congressmen felt that in order to avoid the political maneuverings of
1800, which they deemed unseemly, and to place the presidential election as close to the
people as possible, the Constitution should mandate one form of electoral selection –
popular voting by district or direct vote by the people.  The ardent supporters of change
included Mahlon Dickerson of New Jersey, Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina, John
Nichols of Virginia, Israel Pickens of North Carolina, and Abner Lacock of
Pennsylvania.  Four times a proposed amendment came to a vote in Congress, and all
four times it failed to gain the two-third majority needed to pass.  In 1813, a district plan
passed the Senate by a vote of twenty-two to nine, but the House refused to act on the
proposal.  In 1816, a proposal introduced in the Senate to eliminate the Electoral College
completely failed twelve to twenty-one.  A proposal for an amendment mandating
selection of electors by district passed both houses in 1818, but the measure failed to gain
the two-thirds majority required for a constitutional amendment.  Finally, in 1820, the
Senate passed a proposal for a district plan, but again it failed to achieve the needed two-
thirds majority in the House.  The district plan never came close to passage again.26
26 Wallace S. Sayre and Judith H. Parris, Voting for President: The Electoral College
and the American Political System (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1970),
26-28.  For an in-depth discussion of the efforts to amend the Constitution during this
time, see also Stanwood, History of the Presidency, 1:  121-23, and Wilmerding,
Electoral College, 56-62.  For a complete discussion on these debates, see Annals of
Congress, 13th Cong., 2nd sess. (1814), 828-24; 14th Cong., 1st sess. (1816), 213-27, 301-
12, 338-56; 15th Cong., 1st sess. (1818), 178-187.
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A look at the debates surrounding the efforts to pass an amendment mandating
uniform selection of electors throughout the states between 1800 and 1820 reveals both
serious pleas for reform as well as concern about politics and the division of power
between the states and the national government.  Sometimes, the debate did not even
touch upon an amendment of the Constitution, but rather focused on the abuse of the
electoral system by political factions.  For instance, responding to a House resolution
presented in 1809 that asked Congress to issue a condemnation of the way Massachusetts
had selected its electors in 1808, Edmund Randolph of Virginia cautioned the House to
be very careful with the subject because any congressional action would
demean the purpose the Founding Fathers.  In particular, he felt that any action by
Congress would strip the states of one of their powers, making the national government
more potent. “The Constitution has said,” he claimed, “that each state is entitled to a
number of Electors equal to the number of its Senators and Representatives, who shall be
appointed in such manner as the Legislatures shall prescribe; and if we attempt to put our
hands on this power, we might as well, in my apprehension, abrogate to ourselves the
appointment of President and Vice President.”27
The debates surrounding the amendment proposals themselves provide further
evidence of the lack of consensus within Congress.  After the Senate passed a proposed
amendment in 1813 mandating selection of electors by district, the House refused to vote
on the resolution.  There was much debate on the issue, especially by its foremost
proponent, Israel Pickens of North Carolina. William Murfree and William Gaston, both
27 Annals of Congress, 10th Cong., 2nd sess., 1303-04, see also 1376-77.
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of North Carolina, on orders issued by the state legislature, joined him in his strenuous
reform efforts.  Noting the influence of parties on decision-making at the state level,
Pickens claimed that the majority party or faction in each state wanted to give universal
suffrage and adopt a general ticket method or stay with legislative selection, while the
minority party or faction always advocated the district method. To do away with such
party maneuvering, a universal district method would ensure fairness for all groups.
Speaking on the House floor, Pickens said,
The Plan now presented appears to me most congenial with the free spirit
of our government, and the most fair and simple in its operation; if we still
maintain our first political maxim, that “all legitimate power is derived
from the people,” it must result that the most direct channel through which
this power can be conveniently communicated is to be preferred.  No
method is so direct as that by which a man makes his own ticket, and votes
it – no mode is more convenient than that by a single district.
Gaston, supporting Pickens, added as an example the differing party reasons behind
various modes of elector selection in 1812, pointing out the lack of principle behind their
actions.  “In Massachusetts no other mode could be tolerated by the Democratic part of
the Legislature, but the choice by the people in districts; while in North Carolina it was
claimed to be Republican to appoint by the Legislature.  And, vice versa, the same
political party that in North Carolina advocated the choice in districts, in Massachusetts
was found to prefer with a Legislative choice or a general ticket.”  Indeed, the record
bears out Gaston’s observation.  North Carolina went from using the district method in all
election between 1796 and 1808 to legislative selection in 1812 then to a general ticket
mode in 1816.  Massachusetts continued its trend of adopting whatever plan the majority
thought would be the best help to their party’s candidate, district election in 1804 and
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1812, legislative selection in 1808 and 1816.  “Elections will be best secured against
intrigue and corruption where this power is exercised by the scattered freemen at large,”
Pickens insisted when expressing concern about the type of party power exhibited at the
state level.  He continued, “Where this trust is centered as it were in a single point as by a
legislative vote, designing men will have more inducement to offer corrupt influence; and
in times less virtuous a few powerful men may be able to effect the elevation of an
individual whom the nation may believe to be unworthy.”  Despite his plea, the House
did not act.28
Congress again took up the issue in 1816, an election year.  Abner Lackock of
Pennsylvania in the Senate and Pickens in the House again led the call for reform.  The
Pennsylvanian was perhaps the more radical of the reformers, actually proposing that the
president be elected directly by the people with no Electoral College to act as a filter.
This was rejected out of hand, mainly on the basis of the different voter qualification
found in the various states.  The arguments for and against adopting either a district or
general ticket plan were similar to those presented in previous years.  A reading of the
record reveals that few politicians were willing to state clearly that party concerns drove
them to oppose the amendment, but delay and indecision ruled the debates.  Political
scientist Lucius Wilmerding succinctly sums up the problem faced in 1816 and in the
subsequent efforts in 1818 and 1820:
28 Annals of Congress, 13th Cong., 2nd sess., 856, 832, 836, 834; Hugh Talmage Lefler
and Albert Ray Newsome, North Carolina: The History of a Southern State (Chapel Hill:
The University of North Carolina Press), 290-91.  For a complete text of Pickens’ and
Gaston’s speeches, as well as others, see Annals of Congress, 13th Cong., 2nd sess., 828-
844.
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But although everyone knew what to do, nothing was done.  The reasons
for non-action were purely political.  The district system would have
compelled the predominant party in every state to come into the contest
fairly.  As Rufus King remarked, it would have put all the people in the
country on the same footing; the people in each district would have cast
their vote for President according to a sense of their own interest, and a
majority of districts, in a nation-wide constituency, would have chosen the
President.  On the other hand, the existing arrangements permitted the
predominant party in each state to rig each election in its own favor.  By
requiring the Electors to be appointed by the legislature or by general
ticket not only could the party suppress the votes of sections of the state
opposed to it but it could also count those votes as if they had been cast for
itself.  Since victory, not equity, is the ordinary goal of politicians, since a
great majority is preferable to a small one, the district system was much
misliked by the practical politicians who controlled each separate state.
Predictably, the amendments first introduced by Mahlon Dickerson in 1818 and
1820 met the same fate as that in 1816.  With so little real incentive to change and no
outcry at this time from the people, politicians from all factions, whether within the
Democratic Republican party or not, never could agree to approve any of the proposed
reforms.29
29 Annals of Congress, 14th Cong., 1st sess., 213-28; Annals of Congress, 14th Cong.,
2nd sess., 301-12, 337-56; Annals of Congress, 15th Cong., 1st sess., 177-187;
Wilmerding, Electoral College, 58-59.
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CHAPTER 3
THE ELECTION OF 1824 AND THE DEMISE OF
DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN UNITY
After the almost uncontested elections of 1816 and 1820, and the unsuccessful
attempts to amend the Constitution, the fervor for changing the electoral process seemed
to dissipate.  The apparent demise of the two-party political system after the dissolution
of the Federalist party following the War of 1812 suppressed competition to the extent
that change seemed unnecessary.  Issues dividing the old Jeffersonian Republicans,
however, began to surface before James Monroe’s first term had even ended.  Debate
over strict and loose construction of the Constitution again reared its head, revolving
around issues such as internal improvements, the protective tariff, slavery, and the
disposition of public lands.  In addition, reactions to the Panic of 1819, particularly in the
western states, ranged from outright hostility to the national banking system to concern
over domestic trade and currency issues.  The controversy surrounding these issues,
combined with one of the most contentious elections in the nation’s history, led to the
development of two new political parties.  Although relatively few states addressed the
issue of elector selection, the outcome of the 1824 election in conjunction with the
perceived manipulation or outright disregard of the public’s will provided the impetus for
serious change.  Three states – Alabama, Indiana and Missouri – changed the way their
electors were chosen from the previous election, and a fourth, New York, controversially
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kept its previous method.  In addition, prior to the election, reformers in Congress once
again fought for a permanent remedy to the variety of selection methods among the states
by proposing a Constitutional amendment.1
Before Monroe’s second term as president was half over, candidates for the 1824
election began to emerge.  In April of 1822, Nile’s Weekly Register listed seventeen
candidates for the position.  By the end of the year, the field had narrowed to a more
manageable six – all members of the Democratic Republican party. They were Secretary
of State John Quincy Adams from Massachusetts, Secretary of War John C. Calhoun
from South Carolina, Speaker of the House Henry Clay of Kentucky, New York
Governor DeWitt Clinton, Secretary of the Treasury William H. Crawford from Georgia,
and General Andrew Jackson, war hero and senator from Tennessee.  Each candidate had
a large core of supporters within the party from a variety of states, but none could claim a
majority endorsement.  Although Adams was the favorite, enough delegates and
candidates boycotted the national nominating caucus that the election had to proceed
without an officially declared candidate. Crawford received the caucus nomination – for
what it was worth – while state legislatures nominated the others.  This lack of a clearly
defined front-runner, combined with the number of candidates, meant that in all
likelihood the election would be decided in the House of Representatives, and the
1 Edward Stanwood, A History of the Presidency, 2 vols. (Boston:  Houghton Mifflin
Co., 1924), 1: 125; James F. Hopkins, “The Election of 1824,” in History of American
Presidential Elections, 1789-1968, 4 vols., ed. by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. and Fred L.
Israel (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1971), 1:  349; Richard P. McCormick, The
Second American Party System:  Party Formation in the Jacksonian Era (Chapel Hill:
The University of North Carolina Press, 1966), 3-4; Eugene H. Roseboom, A History of
Presidential Elections (New York:  Macmillan, 1959), 77-78.
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candidates took this into account when planning their strategies.  By the beginning of
1824, Clinton and Calhoun had withdrawn their candidacies – Calhoun in favor of the
vice-presidency – leaving the remaining four to contest the race.2
All four candidates were excellent representatives of the Democratic Republican
party and espoused political principles vague enough for the party faithful throughout the
country to accept.  Any allegiance for one candidate over another, then, would rest on
personal preference – one might be intellectually superior to the others, personal likes or
dislikes, local pride and enthusiasm, or prior service to the party and the country.
Crawford men, for example, cited his experience as Treasury Secretary, while Clay
supporters pointed to his distinguished service in the House of Representatives. Calhoun
advocates, in the beginning, could point with pride to his service as a representative in the
House and in the Monroe Administration.  Jackson backers, though, most often pointed to
his character and service to the country during the previous war.  Of the four, only Clay
had previously announced a clear-cut agenda when he introduced his American System,
focusing on a sound banking policy, protective tariffs, and internal improvements.  In the
end, though, the election would be won (or lost) on political maneuvering at the state and
the House level.  Although most believed that none could win a majority of the electoral
vote, that did not stop their sympathizers from trying to arrange which candidates would
be voted on in the House.  Since only the top three finishers in the electoral voting would
2 Stanwood, History of the Presidency, 1: 125-33; Hopkins, “1824,” 350-51; Roy F.
Nichols, The Invention of the American Political Parties (New York: Macmillan, 1967),
262-63.
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move on, it was important to secure enough state electoral votes in November, else the
candidate might be eliminated before January when the House would choose the victor.3
Adams and Crawford would be two of the final three candidates, but the most
serious disagreements, those which ultimately lead to the formation of the Democratic
and National Republican parties could be found between those who supported Clay, who
would not finish in the top three, and those who supported Jackson. Jacksonians
constantly promoted democratic ideals and feared that the growing strength of the
business community in the United States was heightening class and monetary status
differences among the people.  This in turn would limit independence and equality.
Clay’s followers often showed concern about relying on the opinion of the uninformed
masses, especially in areas of business and economic prosperity.  Historian Harry Watson
sums up the differences:  “ . . . in an age of democracy and economic development,
Andrew Jackson and his supporters feared that democracy might suffer at the hands of
development, while Henry Clay and his admirers worried that the opposite might be
true.” 4
3 Nichols, Invention of Parties, 262-63.  This division within the Democratic
Republican party had another effect – to bring an end to the caucus system as it was
practiced.  Because so many felt that the caucus would choose Crawford, they boycotted
the meeting and concentrated on nominating their favorite candidates through state
legislatures.  See M. Ostrogoski, “The Rise and Fall of the Nominating Caucus,
Legislative and Congressional, American Historical Review 5 (January 1900): 253-283.
4 Harry L. Watson, Andrew Jackson vs. Henry Clay: Democracy and Development in
Antebellum America (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1998), 2.  Other excellent
explanations of the differences between the two can be found in Major L. Wilson, Space,
Time, and Freedom: The Quest for Nationality and the Irrepressible Conflict, 1815-1860
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, Press, 1974), 73-93 and Robert V. Remini, The Legacy of
Andrew Jackson: Essays on Democracy, Indian Removal, and Slavery (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 7-44.
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    Votes     %     Votes     %     Votes     %     Votes     %
Alabama   13,603     2,422   17.8     9,429   69.3        96       0.7     1,656   12.2
Connecticut   10,647     7,494   70.4       1,965   18.5
Illinois     4,671     1,516   32.5     1,272   27.2     1,036     2.2        847   18.1
Indiana   15,838     3,071   19.4     7,444   47.0     5,316   33.6 
Kentucky   23,338      6,356   27.2   16,982   72.8 
Maine   12,625   10,289   81.5       2,336   18.5
Maryland   33,214   14,632   44.1   14,523   43.7        695     2.1     3,364   10.1
Massachusetts   42,056   30,687   73.0   
Mississippi     4,894     1,654   33.8     3,121   63.8         119     2.4
Missouri     3,432        159     4.6     1,166   34.0     2,042   59.5          32     0.9
New Hampshire   10,032     9,389   93.6          643     6.4
New Jersey   19,837     8,309   41.9   10,332   52.1      1,196     6.0
North Carolina   36,109    20,231   56.0    15,622   43.3
Ohio   50,024   12,280   24.5   18,489   37.0   19,255   38.5 
Pennsylvania   47,073     5,441   11.6   35,736   75.9     1,690     3.6     4,206     8.9
Rhode Island     2,344     2,144   91.5   
Tennessee   20,725        216     1.0   20,197   97.5         312     1.5
Virginia   15,371     3,149   22.2     2,975   19.4        419     2.7     8,558   55.7
Total 365,833 112,852   30.8 151,271   41.4 47,531   13.0 40,856   11.2
As predicted, the election results showed no clear majority.  The final popular vote tally
was as follows:  Jackson – 151,271 (41.4 percent); Adams – 113,122 (30.8 percent);
Clay – 47,531 (13.0 percent); Crawford – 40,856 (11.2 percent); and
13,053 (3.8 percent) for unpledged or scattered write-in votes.5
5 Data for this table were taken from Charles A. Paullin, “Political Parties and
Opinion, 1788-1930,” in Atlas of Historical Geography of the United States (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Press, 1932), 96, and John L Moore, ed., Congressional
Quarterly’s Guide to U.S. Elections (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.,
1994), 429.  Connecticut, Massachusetts, Missouri, North Carolina and Rhode Island
were the only states where ballots were cast for minor or unpledged candidates; thus, the
vote totals in these states do not equal 100 percent.  Because they did not appreciably
affect the outcome, no discussion is needed here.  Six states – Delaware, Georgia,
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Electorally, the results of the election were equally close, with Jackson gaining 99
votes, Adams 84, Crawford 41, and Clay 37.  Clay, despite defeating Crawford popularly,
was eliminated from the election as it moved to the House of Representatives.  He was
not, however, finished.  Using his political skills and reputation, Clay tirelessly worked to
defeat Jackson, a man he saw as a demagogue and a dangerous threat to the country and
his own political ambitions.  Adams’s victory over Jackson in the House, by a vote of
thirteen states to seven, had several anticipated and unanticipated consequences.
Primarily, Adams’s victory was tainted and his presidency stained.  With his appointment
of Clay to the position of Secretary of State, opponents saw foul play at work and the idea
of Adams  “buying” the election was widely circulated.  The Washington Gazette
published an article, “Mr. Clay and His Conscience,” immediately following the House
decision.
And Mr. Clay, in denouncing that hero, sets himself up in judgment
against the sense and the voice of the People – of the nation.  He pretends
to undervalue the minority of Mr. Crawford’s electoral votes, and yet
votes for Mr. Adams, who had a less number than General Jackson . . . .  If
the People thought Gen. Jackson worthy, is it for Henry Clay to pronounce
him unworthy?  Is it for him to say to his fellow-citizens, “You shall not
have the man you wish, but the man I will”?  No.  – Henry Clay himself
has inflicted the deepest wound on the fundamental principle of our
government. He has insulted and struck down the majesty of the People:
He has impugned their sovereignty: He has interposed between the
current of their sentiments and the object of their choice; and seeks to
justify himself by stale electioneering excuses.  A thousand “military
chieftains” could not have done so much harm to our constitutional
principles . . . .  He has shewn [sic] to the foreign world that the
Presidency may be bought and sold, like any other commodity in the
market, and taught crowned heads, if they desire to subvert our liberties,
where and how to apply the means.
Louisiana, New York, South Carolina and Vermont – have no popular vote totals because
the state legislatures chose the electors.
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Adams, as the beneficiary of Clay’s supposed manipulation, would not be able to
overcome the stigma attached to his election. More importantly, though, the appearance
of ignoring the popular will fueled efforts to reform the Electoral College and the merits
of manipulating the selection of electors, much like in 1796 and 1800, once again had
been used and would be studied in anticipation of a rematch between the two leading
candidates in 1828.6
Of the twenty-four states taking part in the election, one-half chose their electors
through popular vote on a general ticket.  These were:  Alabama, Connecticut, Indiana,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Virginia.  Six states – Illinois, Kentucky, Maine,
Maryland, Missouri, and Tennessee – used the district method.  The remaining states –
Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, New York, South Carolina and Vermont – chose their
electors through legislative selection.  Alabama, Indiana, and Missouri had chosen
electors using the legislative method in 1820.  Alabama and Indiana adopted the general
ticket method for the 1824 election and Missouri chose its electors through districts.
Massachusetts, which had demonstrated a dramatic willingness to adopt a variety of
selection methods, chose all of its electors on a general ticket in 1824.  It should be noted,
6Moore, Guide to Election, 388; Washington Gazette, 11 February 1825.  An in-depth
study of the general election can be found in a variety of sources. Those used here were
Paullin, Atlas of Political Geography, 96, Lawrence D. Longley and Alan G. Braun, The
Politics of Electoral Reform (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1975), 36;
Stanwood, History of the Presidency, 1: 125-41, Hopkins, “1824,” 349-409, and Robert
V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Freedom (1981; reprint,
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 74-99.
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however, that the latter state changing to the more democratic method really meant
nothing since Adams would receive all of that state’s vote regardless of the method used.
New York, on the other hand, did not change its mode of selecting electors, but the
presidential contest, combined with party politics, was heavily influenced by the debate
over selection of electors.7
Understanding the role that party factions, in regard to elector selection, at the
state level played in the selection of electors in 1824 requires a look not only at those
states themselves, but also at the efforts to amend the Constitution at the national level.
Prior to the serious campaigning of 1824, Congress once again took up the issue of
elector selection.  In December 1823, Representative George McDuffie of South Carolina
and Senator Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri introduce resolutions in their respective
chambers calling for an amendment specifying that the individual states would be divided
into districts for the purpose of selecting electors.  At the same time, Robert Hayne,
senator from South Carolina, also proposed an amendment that would prevent contingent
elections from devolving to Congress.  Addressing his fellow senators, Hayne gave an
impassioned plea for the resolution.  Noting the number of plans previously introduced in
both Houses, he stated that he was “opposed, in habit and principle, to rush innovations.
But,” he continued, “though it certainly is not proper to change the Constitution for light
and frivolous causes, yet the necessity certainly may exist to authorize such changes as
7 Moore, Guide to Elections, 346.  Interestingly, noted historian Richard McCormick
reports that Alabama and Missouri had adopted selection of electors on a general ticket
from the first elections they participated in.   Although commonly accepted as fact, this is
untrue.  Consequently, McCormick does not address the political or democratic motives
behind the change in either state.  See McCormick, Second Party System. 289-304.
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will tend to the future security of the country.  The necessity of some change at present, is
too obvious to be disregarded.  It is the duty of nations, as well as of individuals, by
foresight, to guard against impending evils.” Although South Carolina never had shown
any inclination to give the choice of electors to the people – indeed Hayne declared that
“so many different propositions had been offered in regard to the manner of choosing
Electors, that it had been thought proper to waive that subject” – the man better known
historically as the champion of Calhoun’s South Carolina Exposition and Protest and
apologist for slavery based much of his argument on democratic principles, at least on the
surface.
In all the modes by which elections are chosen, they represent the true
feelings and views of the people.  But this truly popular mode of election
may fail, because the choice does not happen to be made at the first
balloting.  The election ought not to come to the House of Representatives
or the Senate; for they are but the representatives of the States in such an
election, and it may happen that a small minority may give a President to
the nation . . . .  On the failure of the first balloting to produce a choice,
proceed to the second, and continue until the election is effected . . . .  If it
[the amendment] is adopted, the President will then be shut against fraud
and corruption, and all improper combinations will be prevented.  Should
Congress agree to the resolution, and the people adopt the Amendment, it
would not be too late for its application to the ensuing election. 8
Although neither Hayne nor McDuffie mentioned Calhoun’s candidacy, it becomes clear
that they were concerned their fellow South Carolinian did not have enough votes to win
outright and thought it unlikely he would fare well in a House election.
On December 29, another voice weighed in on the issue.  Martin Van Buren,
senator from New York, introduced another version of the amendment, focusing on
8 Annals of Congress, 18th Cong., 1st sess., 32-33, 39-46, 849-65.
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allowing the people to directly vote for electors through districts.  Under Van Buren’s
plan, the Electoral College would vote once, and if no one received a majority, it would
meet and vote a second time.  For the second ballot, the two candidates with the highest
totals would be the sole choices.  If after the second vote there was a tie, the election
would devolve on the House of Representatives.  This plan, according to Van Buren,
would be the most democratic and the most reflective of the public’s will.9
Debates on amending the Constitution continued throughout the months of
January, February and March 1824.  Because so many different versions were
subsequently introduced, a Senate select committee was created to study all of the
proposals and report back to the Committee of the Whole.  At that time, the proposal
would be presented as a joint resolution to both Houses.  Senator Benton summed up the
select committee’s proposal as one with “four distinct propositions:”
1. To divide the United States into Electoral Districts.
2. To discontinue the use of intermediate Electors.
3. To commit the election to a direct vote of the people.
4. To continue the umpirage of the House of Representatives, in
all cases, in which no candidate clearly has received a majority
of the whole number of votes.
In other words, the people would directly elect the president, but votes would not be
counted as such.  Instead, each district would have an “elector” whom a candidate could
win by plurality, and the candidate with a majority of “electors” would win the
presidency.  If no candidate garnered a majority of electoral districts, the House would
choose the president.  As it was designed, the amendment really had no chance of
9 Annals of Congress, 18th Cong., 1st sess., 74.
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passing.  For instance, Hayne, McDuffie and their supporters would object to the last
provision.  Men like Van Buren, despite supporting change in the previous months,
would disagree on the grounds that they were being hasty.  Van Buren, in a speech on the
Senate floor, argued that he was in favor of some amendment to the electoral clause of
the Constitution, but the one presented needed much alteration.  Would it not be better, he
asked, to wait until the next session when they would have more time to debate and study
the issue?  Throughout these three months, Congressmen repeatedly stated that they
could see the need for change, but none could agree to the same ideas.  Where one could
not abide the thought of the House making the ultimate choice in contingent election,
another would claim, as did Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina, “ . . . The President had
always been, with the exception of General Washington, elected by Congress . . . .  If the
members of Congress did not act in caucus, they would influence the people in some
other way.  The people were always writing to the members to get their opinion upon
different candidates, and their opinions would have great effect . . . .  Congress . . . will
elect the President, be the Constitution what it may.”  In other words, Macon could not
see that it made much difference.   Let Congress choose in caucus and be done with it.
Apparently, most agreed that some uniform method among the states was desirable, but
they did not agree on which method that should be.  In the end, both Houses voted to
“postpone the subject indefinitely.”10
10 Annals of Congress, 18th Cong., 1st sess., 100-02,154-60, 165-204, 326-28, 354-418,
1067-1082.
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In those states that changed their method of selection, Alabama, Indiana and
Missouri, there was little controversy over the issue.  Alabama was a relatively new state,
joining the Union on December 14, 1819.  In general, Alabama had much in common
with those states that comprised the Old South – the Carolinas, Georgia, and Virginia.
This was due to the fact that the original settlers came largely from these states.
Additionally, Alabama relied heavily on cotton and slavery in many regions – especially
the Tennessee River Valley and in the Black Belt region that stretched across the center
of the state.  In between the two areas, though, slavery was limited; thus, there existed a
conflict between “black” and “white” counties.  Besides the distinct separation between
the regions in the state, Alabama also offered another difference from other states of the
Old South.  The state constitution reflected democratic, western ideals more than
republican, southern ideals.  The people popularly elected all state, county, and federal
officials.  Historian Richard McCormick states:
Whereas in the states of the Old South, constitutions were framed with a
view to protecting the privileged position of some particular groups or
sections, the Alabama constitution was produced by a new community that
had not yet had time to organize itself into hostile or apprehensive
elements.  It was, therefore, based on the necessary assumption that each
white man was politically the equal of every other.11
Alabama’s shift to choosing electors popularly on a general ticket occurred not so
much because of the election of 1824, but because of the democratic leanings of the state
as a whole and the influence of Israel Pickens. Pickens, previously a representative from
11 McCormick, Second Party System, 287-9. For a complete discussion of the political
and social development of Alabama, see Albert B. Moore, History of Alabama and Her
People, 3 vols. (Chicago:  The American Historical Society, Inc., 1927), 1: 126-66.
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North Carolina in the House of Representatives where he had sponsored several of the
early resolution calling for popular selection of presidential electors throughout the
country, became the governor of Alabama and wielded a great deal of personal and
political power.  In 1820, Alabama choose its electors through the state legislature purely
as a matter of expedience.  This was changed by previous agreement at the constitutional
convention to popular selection at large.  This is not to say that attempts were not made to
adjust the state’s electoral laws.  The contest between Jackson and Adams almost divided
the state between the two distinct regions.  The “Georgia Machine,” which favored
Adams if Crawford could not win, conceded that Jackson would win in the northern
section of the state and more than likely would gain a plurality of the state’s popular vote
as a whole.  Thus, Adams supporters sponsored a senate resolution in September 1823,
calling for the voters to choose electors by district.  In this way, perhaps Adams would
win two of the state’s five electors.  The “Champions of the People,” however, defeated
the plan.  Jackson’s popularity among the citizen’s of Alabama ended up being so great,
that when the legislature declared him to be the choice of the state caucus, those who
voted against him felt the need to go on record saying they did not oppose him, per se,
just the nomination as a legislative action. 12
12 Alabama, Senate Journal, 1823, 12, 82; Alabama, House Journal, 1823, 77, 120-25;
Alabama Republican, 26 September 1823; Greensboro Halcyon, 1 November 1823;
Albert J. Pickett, History of Alabama (New York: University Publishing Co., 1900), 653-
54; Cahawba Press, 18, 28 June 1824, 7 July 1824; Moore, History of Alabama, 166-67;
W. Brewer, Alabama: Her History, Resources, War Record, and Public Men, From 1540
to 1872 (Montgomery: Barrett & Brown, Steam Printers and Book Binders, 1872), 47;
Thomas P. Abernathy, The Formative Period in Alabama, 1815-1828 (Montgomery:  The
Brown Printing Co., 1922), 107-08.
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Thus, the election of 1824 in Alabama, and its method of elector selection, was
not decided on the presence of party politics – the state had not yet developed sufficiently
to need political parties – nor on account of pressure from the two established groups, the
“Georgia machine” and the “Champions of the People,” although not for lack of trying.
The majority of voters overwhelmingly backed Jackson popularly and electorally.
Jackson received 9,429 votes (69.3 percent) to 2,422 (17.8 percent) for Adams, 1656
(12.2 percent) for Crawford, and 96 (0.7 percent) for Clay.  This gave Jackson all five of
Alabama’s electoral votes, and the state’s three congressmen all cast their votes for the
General in the House election.  The impetus for change and the behavior of politicians,
then, reflected a commitment to democratic ideals rather than political manipulation.
Like Alabama, Indiana was a somewhat new state, having joined the Union in
1816.  Most settlers came to the state from the South, but they were more typically poor
yeoman farmers instead of the plantation variety.  For the first two elections in which the
state participated, 1816 and 1820, the legislature chose the electors.  Strong factions
controlled politics in Indiana and national party identification did not figure prominently
in any elections except presidential.  Even then, differences more often centered on
character rather than party.  The three leading politicians in the state were Jonathan
Jennings, the first governor, William Hendricks, the first U.S. representative, and James
Noble, one of the first U.S. senators.  Prior to the 1824 presidential election, Jennings,
Hendricks and Nobel were so powerful, no factions developed to challenge their
influence.  This harmony was disturbed in 1824, when state politicians split their support
between Adams and Clay.  Indeed, in the state legislature electoral tickets for each man
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were drawn up and published for the voters.  Jackson, although a favorite among the
people, received little support from Indiana state officeholders.  He did, however, gain
the backing of Elihu Stout, founder and editor of the Vincennes Western Star.  Stout used
his paper to tout the character and patriotism of Jackson.  In an unprecedented move,
Stout called for a state convention to select electors, and advocated allowing the people to
directly vote for the slate of their choice.  In this way, he reasoned, the process would be
opened up to wider scrutiny and public participation.  Although only thirteen of fifty-one
counties were represented, the scheme succeeded in giving stature and exposure to
Jackson and involving people in the process who were not aligned with the state’s power
brokers. Using his paper as a platform, Stout railed against the old caucus system, the
methods of Governor Jennings, and the intrigues of Washington.  After the barrage of
publicity, a resolution for selection of electors on a general ticket was passed and signed
into law on 14 January 1824.  Little debate was recorded on this change, but the pressure
applied by Stout undoubtedly was extremely effective.13
Despite the apparent bias against Jackson held by the state politicians, he secured
the five electors available after winning a plurality of the votes in the general election.
Although only 37 percent of the population turned out, Jackson was undeniably the
people’s choice.  He received 7,444 (47 percent) votes, compared to Clay’s 5,316 (33.6
percent) and Adams’ 3,071 (19.4 percent).  Although they did not support him in the
general election, all of Indiana’s representatives voted for him in Washington.
13 McCormick, Second Party System, 270-73; Hopkins, “1824,” 375-76; Vincennes
Western Star, 29 March 1823, 24 September 1823, 15 October 1823.
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Technically, they could have reasonably placed their votes with Adams since Jackson did
not win a majority of the popular vote.  Previously, though, a debate had ensued over the
“right of instruction,” with the consensus among the state legislature that a representative,
state and national, should vote as his constituents wanted or resign.  With this in mind,
they followed the public’s will.14
Missouri, the last of the three states to change their electoral laws, followed much
the same pattern as the first two.  Having hastily set up a method of choosing electors
through legislative action in 1820, the state legislature quickly established itself as both
democratic and reform-minded as it prepared for the election of 1824.  At that time,
Missouri changed the law to provide for popular vote through districts.  This is not
surprising since the most influential man in Missouri politics was Thomas Hart Benton, a
man who, according to McCormick, “for three decades dominated political affairs in the
state to a degree that has rarely, if ever, been equaled.” Benton’s faction, based in St.
Louis, was so powerful that party development in the state was non-existent during his
lifetime.  Born in North Carolina and a previous resident of Tennessee, Benton was an
advocate of western development and Missouri statehood with slavery protected.  He,
along with David Barton, Missouri’s other senator, and Representative John Scott,
enthusiastically supported the popular choice of electors and clearly meant the choice to
be Henry Clay.  Although considered economically conservative, Benton was a champion
of voting rights, supplementing the change in electoral law at the state level with his
14Logan Esarey, History of Indiana, From It Exploration to 1850 (Indianapolis: W.K.
Stewart Co., 1915), 219.
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national call for direct popular election of the president and vice president.  As stated
earlier, Benton was one of the first to submit a resolution calling for a vote by the people
“in their primary assemblies,” referring to his proposed division of the country into
national electoral districts.15
The presidential contest in Missouri did not garner much enthusiasm among the
people.  Out of approximately 16,000 eligible voters, only one-fifth voted in the
presidential contest.  Only 3,432 votes were cast, with a clear majority given to Clay,
who received 2,042 or 59.5 percent.  Jackson, with 1,166 (34 percent) seemed to be the
second choice of the people, since Crawford received no votes and Adams only 159 (4.6
percent).  With Clay out of the running, Benton swung his support to Jackson.  During
the House election, though, Scott cast Missouri’s lone vote for Adams. The controversy
that arose from this vote did more than anything to turn Benton to the Jacksonian faction,
push the Missouri legislature to change from selection of electors by district to a general
ticket and – as will be explained in the next chapter – it became part of the outrage
directed toward Adams during the next four years.16
15 Missouri Republican, 12 July 1824, 9 August 1824; Missouri Intelligencer, 13, 27
March 1824, 4,13 September 1824; Independent Patriot, 22 May 1824; McCormick,
Second Party System, 304-05; Annals of Congress, 18th Cong., 1st sess., 32-33; William
Nisbet Chambers, Old Bullion Benton, Senator from the New West, Thomas Hart
Benton, 1782-1858 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1956), 65-66, 72-77; Edwin C. McReynolds,
Missouri: A History of the Crossroads State (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
1962), 122-23.
16 Journal of the Senate of the State of Missouri at the Third General Assembly, 43;
Missouri Intelligencer, 29 March 1825, 12 April 1825; Laws of a Public and General
Nature, of the District of Louisiana, of the Territory of Louisiana, of the Territory of
Missouri, and of the State of Missouri, up to the Year 1824, 2 vols. (Jefferson City: W.
Lusk & Son, 1842), 1: 640, 1004-5; 2: 1-2.
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Unlike in the other states, elector selection was a major issue in 1824 for New
York voters.  Factions of the Democratic Republican party transparently used their power
and influence to gain the advantage for their candidate of choice.  New York politics can
best be described as, at times, almost incomprehensible.  McCormick writes:
“Bewildering shifts in party allegiance of prominent politicians, violent factional strife,
intense preoccupation with the spoils of office – these were but the more obvious features
of the political scene.”  At the time of the election, there were two basic factions
operating in the state, the Clintonians and the Bucktails, both of who claimed to be the
legitimate heirs of the Jeffersonian Republicans.  The Clintonians were a loose coalition
of personal followers of former, and future, Governor DeWitt Clinton, old Federalists,
and a large number of Republicans from western counties who supported Clinton because
of his Erie Canal patronage.  Martin Van Buren and his friends, commonly known as the
Albany Regency, led the Bucktails, so-called because leaders of the Tammany Society (a
New York City political organization that supported Van Buren) wore bucktails on their
hats when they attended political meetings.  Members of the Bucktail faction were old
Democratic Republicans and former Federalists who personally disliked Clinton and who
had opposed his policies over the previous decade.17
17 McCormick, Second Party System, 104, 111, 112; Nichols, Invention of Parties,
268-69; DeAlva Stanwood Alexander, A Political History of the State of New York (New
York: Henry Holt and Co., 1906), 321-23.  A complete discussion of the division
between the factions can be found in Jabez Hammond, The History of Political Parties in
the State of New York, from the Ratification of the Federal Constitution to December,
1840, 4th ed., 2 vols. (Buffalo:  Phinney, 1850), 1: 406-534.
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The battle for New York’s thirty-six electors really took place over a two-year
period and revolved more around these two factions than democratic principles, although
these did play a role.  The Bucktails, after gaining control of the New York state
legislature – specifically the Assembly by a small margin and the Senate overwhelmingly
– and the position of governor in 1822, wholeheartedly supported Crawford, while the
Clintonians supported Adams.  Interestingly, Clinton himself supported Jackson, but his
was a minority view.  Men on both sides supported Clay, but not in enough numbers to
make him a serious candidate to win all of the state’s votes.  During the 1823 session of
the legislature, the Clintonians introduced a bill calling for popular election of electors by
districts.  Ironically, the same Clintonians had opposed the adoption of the 1821 state
constitution, which broadened suffrage and made state offices and positions open to the
people instead of being controlled by party interest.  This opposition was what cost
Clinton the position of governor and the faction its control of the legislature.  The
circumstances which led the Clintonians to sponsor the democratic proposal in 1823 was
personal, though, not idealistic.  As far back as 1822, a split had been growing between
Van Buren and John C. Calhoun.  Although “an open rupture” was avoided, the two
men’s dislike for each other continued to grow and it spilled over into New York state
politics.  Believing that there was a large faction in New York who favored him, in early
1823 Calhoun contacted some of his leading supporters in the state and suggested they
expose the Van Buren-Crawford connection.  In a letter to General Joseph G. Swift,
Calhoun urged them to attack Van Buren and Crawford as “intriguers” who needed to be
“put down.”  In this way, Van Buren would be thwarted in his attempt to give the state’s
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entire vote to Crawford, while lessening his personal influence throughout the state and
country.  With Calhoun’s request in mind, his supporters founded a newspapers called
The Patriot, whose sole purpose was to promote the South Carolinian and change New
York’s electoral law to give the vote for presidential electors to the people, where
hopefully Calhoun would gain an advantage.  Although Calhoun would drop out of the
presidential contest, the new coalition continued to support the reform and identified
themselves as the “People’s Party. 18
The Bucktails, widely known as champions of democratic reform, were placed in
the position of supporting the proposal and giving up the appointment of electors
favorable to Crawford, or opposing the plan and maintaining control of the electors but
appearing hypocritical to the people who had given them their majority.  The Bucktails
made the first of several mistakes – they opted to straddle the fence and so instructed
their representatives.  Throughout the summer and early fall, party newspapers around the
18 Alexander, Political History of New York, 323-25; Nichols, Invention Of Parties,
268-69; Martin Van Buren, The Autobiography of Martin Van Buren, ed. by John C.
Fitzpatrick (1920; reprint, New York: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1969), 514; John
C. Calhoun to General J.G. Swift, 29 April, 10 May 1823, cited in Thomas R. Hay, "John
Calhoun and the Presidential Election of 1824; Some Unpublished Calhoun Letters,”
American Historical Review 40 (October 1934): 84-86; John Ellicott to General
Blackshear, 4 September 1822, cited in J.E.D. Shipp, Giant Days, or the Life and Times
of W.H. Crawford (Americus, Ga.:  Southern Printers, 1909), 171; Thomas R. Hay, “John
Calhoun and the Presidential Election of 1824,” The North Carolina Historical Review 12
(April 1935), 32; Joseph Gardner Swift, The Memoirs of General Joseph Gardner Swift
(Worcester, Mass.:  Press of F.S. Blanchard & Co., 1890), 192; Hammond, History of
Political Parties in New York, 2:  130; Robert V. Remini, Martin Van Buren and the
Making of the Democratic Party (New York:  Columbia University Press, 1959), 39-40.
Calhoun’s correspondence suggests that his efforts to influence the outcome in New York
and elsewhere was quite extensive.  See Albert Ray Newsome, “Correspondence of John
C. Calhoun, George McDuffie and Charles Fisher, Relating to the Presidential Campaign
of 1824,” The North Carolina Historical Review 7 (October 1930): 477-504.
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state carried the debate on the issue.  The New York American claimed that the will of
the people might be obstructed because members of the legislature, sometimes chosen a
year in advance of the election, were “exposed to the arts of seduction and to the
influence of unprincipled politicians.”  To prevent the splitting of the state’s vote,
diminishing their strength, the same newspapers also clamored for a general ticket rather
than electoral districts.  As the Assembly and Senate took up the issue, the rhetoric
increased. The Albany Argus, devoted to Bucktail principles, claimed that it was not
wise to change a law passed by “wise forefathers,” that “there is not a solitary indication
that the people demand it or are prepared for it,” and that it was just a ploy to put DeWitt
Clinton into position to run for president himself.  Governor Joseph Yates followed the
Bucktail line.   Saying that although he was in favor of the idea, he thought that there was
not enough time to address the issue properly; and, given the debate currently in
Congress, it would be better to wait before deciding the issue.  Historian Robert Remini
summed up the Bucktail's dilemma succinctly:
The majority of men chosen to sit in the legislature in November, 1823,
were those who had openly promised to revise the existing law.
Fortunately, a sufficient number of them were Van Buren men so that the
Regency majorities in the Assembly and Senate were preserved intact.
But their dilemma was immediately apparent:  whether to cut their own
throats by honoring their pledges, or break their promise and invite the
people to cut their throats for them.
Although the Assembly passed the resolution with a bare majority, the state Senate killed
it – thereafter, those Bucktails who voted against popular choice were known as the
“Immortal Seventeen” – and public furor swept the state.  To make matters worse, the
Bucktails, in their arrogance and desire to remove Clinton from the public eye for good,
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removed the former governor from his position on the Erie Canal Commission around the
same time period.  Van Buren, by all accounts unaware of the move, in his autobiography
regretted the action, saying, “There is such a thing as killing a man too dead.”19
The chronology of the preceding events brings up an intriguing interpretation of
Van Buren’s motivations and actions during the fall and winter of 1823, with regard to
not only the November state elections in New York, but also the concurrent Senate
debate on the proposed constitutional amendments in December.  Robert Remini, in
Martin Van Buren and the Making of the Democratic Party, makes this connection:
In submitting his amendment, Van Buren spoke at length against a
completely centralized government and affirmed his conviction that it
should never be released from its dependence on the states.  Then he
proceeded to comment on the provision of his amendment.  His arguments
sounded very democratic but his motives were purely political.  He was
attempting to provide an excellent answer to those in the states who were
trying to anticipate Congressional action by amending their own electoral
laws.  The Regency might now appeal to New Yorkers to delay changing
their law and allow the federal government to make the necessary
revisions.  Since it would take years to ratify an amendment, the election
of 1824 would not be affected.
The record of events, though, leads one to conclude that Van Buren’s actions were deeper
than this.  He was trying to control damage to his faction when he introduced his
resolution on 29 December.  The previous month’s elections, according to Van Buren’s
19 Alexander, Political History of New York, 325-28; Remini, Van Buren, 41-42;
Charles Grier Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America: 1815-1846 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 194, 196-97; Hopkins, “1824,” 372; New York
American, 28 July 1823, 8 October 1823; The Patriot, 19, 21, 27 June 1823, 3, 14 July
1823, 6 August 1823, 17, 18, 22 September 1823, 1 October 1823; Albany Daily
Advertiser, 16, 18, 26 September 1823; New York Statesmen, 27, 30 June 1823; Albany
Argus, 8 July 1823, 23 December 1823; Michael Wallace, “Changing Concepts of Party
in the United States:  New York, 1815-1828,” American Historical Review 74 (December
1968):  465; Van Buren, Autobiography, 144.
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contemporary Jabez Hammond, were greatly influenced by the debate on changing the
electoral law.  The Bucktail candidates openly supported repeal of the electoral law
because of the public’s support for direct election.  No one, said Hammond, “dared to
avow his opposition to the measure.”  Van Buren, the leading spokesmen for the
Regency-led Bucktails, provided political cover for his followers when he took action at
the national level.  The timing was not coincidental.  Governor Yates’ support of reform,
only if the national legislature did not act, followed immediately after the introduction of
the Van Buren resolution, and the wording he used was suspiciously similar.
Unfortunately for Van Buren, the public, educated by the People’s Party-controlled press,
was not fooled.  Regardless, the Bucktails were perceived as hypocritical, calling for one
action at the national level, but denying the need for it in their own state.20
Perhaps if the Bucktails had not removed Clinton at the same time that they
defeated the electoral bill, this situation would not have spun so wildly out of control.
True, the senators who voted to kill the bill were castigated publicly – some were hanged
and burned in effigy – but they were also perceived as men of strong party principles,
even “heroes.”  The removal of Clinton, though, was “an electric shock in the whole
community” according to Hammond, and a “flagrant and wanton violation of public
trust” reported John Jenkins, another contemporary.  The New York Evening Post and
Niles Weekly Register reported on a rally held at the New York City Hall where
thousands of people came out to show support for Clinton.  Calling the removal
20 Remini, Van Buren, 45; Hammond, History of Political Parties in New York, 2:
131.
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“envenomed malignity,” the Post warned that the act would not go unpunished.  The
Bucktail combination of state and presidential politics doomed the party’s hopes of
controlling the state’s electors, even if they were unaware of it at the time.21
Clinton, seen now as a martyr, became the gubernatorial nominee and standard-
bearer for the People’s Party, while the Bucktails tried to distance themselves from the
furor by sacrificing Governor Yates.  In order to deflect criticism for the failure of the
electoral proposal and Clinton’s dismissal, the Bucktails placed the blame on Yates and
refused to renominate him for the position, instead putting forth Samuel Young.  Furious
about the “betrayal,” Yates then paid his faithless party back by calling for a special
session of the legislature to meet in August for the express purpose of taking up the issue
of the selection of electors.  Noting the failure of the national Congress to act on the
issue, Yates called on the state’s assemblymen to answer the people’s call for democracy.
Thurlow Weed, a leader of the People’s Party, took credit for having tricked Yates into
calling the session.  Recounting the tale in his autobiography, Weed claimed that he told
the Governor that Samuel Talcott, a prominent Bucktail, had said that Yates did not have
enough courage to take action and call for the special session.  When the Governor heard
the remark, he jumped up and, according to Weed writing in third person, the following
21 Albany Daily Advertiser, 8 April 1824; New York Statesmen, 13 April 1824;
Ransom Hooker Gillette, The Life and Times of Silas Wright, 2 vols. (Albany:  The
Argus Company, 1874), 1: 59; Hammond, History of Political Parties in New York, 2:
163; John S. Jenkins, History of Political Parties in the State of New York, From the
Acknowledgment of the Independence of the United States to the Close of the
Presidential Election in Eighteen Hundred Forty-Four (Auburn: Alden & Markham,




“Talcott said dat [sic] it will require decision and nerve to write a
proclamation, did he?”
“That is my information,” Weed replied.
“Well, I’ll show dat [sic] I possess decision and nerve enough to do right.”
Although nothing was accomplished, the People’s Party and its leadership, particularly
James Tallmadge and Weed, used the platform to generate public support for the
upcoming state elections.  New York Historian DeAlva Alexander sums up the process:
. . . the Regency, in insisting on the choice of electors by the Legislature,
had given the opposition the most telling cry it could possibly have found .
. . that the popular tumult over Clinton’s removal was growing from day to
day. . . .   Two weeks before the election, it was evident to everyone that
the Regency was doomed, that Van Buren was disconcerted, and that
Young was beaten . . . . In other words, the election of 1822 had been
completely reversed.22
The Bucktails’ staggering defeat at the polls – they lost control of the legislature
and all major positions at the state level – left New York in virtually the same position as
it had been in November of 1800.  The holdover legislature would choose the electors in
spite of the public’s express desire for change.  Under New York law, each chamber was
responsible for nominating a full slate of electors.  If there were differences, the houses
would next meet in joint convention and reconcile the differences between the two.  The
initial votes of both chambers were as follows:
22 Alexander, Political History of New York, 326-33; McCormick, Second Party
System, 115-16; Lucius Wilmerding, The Electoral College (New Brunswick, N.J.:
Rutgers University Press, 1958), 51-2; Charles Z. Lincoln, ed., Messages from the
Governors, 9 vols. (Albany:  J.B. Lyon Co., 1909), 3: 41-43; Register of Debates, 19th
Cong., 1st sess., 1401; Remini, Van Buren, 63-63; Wallace, “Changing Concepts of
Party,” 466; Thurlow Weed, Autobiography of Thurlow Weed, ed. by Harriet A. Weed
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1883), 115.
62
Senate Assembly Combined
Crawford    17      43      60
Adams      7      50      57
Clay      7      32      39
Since the law required that the winner receive a majority vote, the Assembly had to re-
vote three more times before the joint convention could even begin.  Threats flew from
all sides.  To end the deadlock, some Crawford men let it be known that they would
support Adams, thereby eliminating Clay from contention.  Clay supporters, fearing they
would be shut out at the joint convention, switched first, giving Adams the majority and
moving the process to the reconciliation phase.  Once there, the differences were
intensified.  In order to win all of the electors for the state, a candidate would need
seventy-nine votes to gain a majority.  As illustrated above, none were close.  Van Buren,
hoping to sway the convention to Crawford, tried to convince Clay to withdraw as a
presidential candidate and give his votes to Crawford, assuring the Kentuckian that the
vice-presidency was his.  Given Crawford’s bad health, Van Buren insinuated, this would
place Clay extremely close to the presidency.  Clay showed some interest, but the ploy
came to fruition. 23
Weed, referred to by historian James Hopkins as “a journalist later famed as a
political manipulator,” brokered a plan that all sides eventually agreed to.  New York
would split its electoral votes.  The Bucktail contingent was so weakened and in such
disarray that despite having the support of a plurality of legislators, when the voting
23 Wilmerding, Electoral College, 46; Nichols, Invention of Parties, 270-73; Hopkins,
“1824,” 372-73; Stanwood, History of the Presidency, 1: 133-34; Alexander, Political
History of New York, 338-41.
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began (see above), only four Crawford electors were selected by the joint committee.
Twenty-five Adams men were chosen, along with seven Clay supporters.  The Bucktails
had been decisively defeated, but this was not the end of the intrigue.  Clay supporters
believed that his seven votes, plus four secret votes – pledged to him by the Adams
faction for supporting their choice of electors – would give him enough electors
nationally to be eligible for the contingent election in the House of Representatives.
When the electors met, however, those from New York cast twenty-six for Adams, five
for Crawford, four for Clay, and one for Jackson.  The faithless Clay electors cost him his
position in the House election.  Since New York did not require bound electors, the
controversy in that state could have ended with little more comment.  After all, Clay
supporters were responsible for enforcing party discipline on the electors.  But, all sides
were bitter at the outcome of the voting. Crawford men felt that their candidate had been
betrayed by a coalition of Adams-Clay supporters from the outset.  Ignoring their own
faithless electors, Clay backers claimed that the four secretly pledged votes never
materialized and cost Clay the chance of having his name placed before the House of
Representatives. With those four electors, his national total would have been equal to
Crawford. Thurlow Weed had verbally promised them enough electors to get Clay into
the House election.  What happened to their promise?  Adams men retorted that those
four electors were only pledged to Clay if he carried the state of Louisiana.  Since he did
not, they were free to support Adams.  Obviously, there had been miscommunication on
both sides.  The political maneuvering in New York was the immediate cause of the
change to selection of electors by district in that state, enacted on 15 March 1825, and
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would become the basis for much of the debate over another attempted constitutional
amendment in 1826.24
With the absence of true two-party politics in the country, the election of 1824
was fought by political factions who supported one candidate or the other based on
personal preferences and principles.  With the exception of New York and Alabama, little
discussion about the method of choosing electors took place.  Those states that did
change methods – Alabama, Indiana, Missouri – seemed to have done so for democratic
reasons.  At the national level, though, the issue once again became a debating point
leading up to the election. The hostility generated by the outcome of the House of
Representative’s ultimate choice compared to the perceptions held by the people, though,
cast doubts on the equity of the current system and led to not only the development of the
Jacksonian Democratic party, but also to memorable confrontations in the following two
sessions of Congress, where not only was the method of selecting electors brought into
question, but the role of the House in the process came under a great deal of fire as well.
24 Hopkins, “1824,” 373; Stanwood, History of the Presidency, 1: 134; Nichols,
Invention of Parties, 274-75; Wilmerding, Electoral College, 51-52, 178-79; Hammond,
History of Political Parties in New York, 2: 177; Van Buren, Autobiography, 145; Epes
Sargent and Horace Greeley, “Henry Clay,” in Makers of American History: John
Caldwell Calhoun, by John S. Jenkins; Daniel Webster, by Edward Everett; Henry Clay,
by Epes Sargent and Horace Greeley, abridged and annotated by John R. Howard (New
York: University Society, 1904), 36; Calvin Colton, The Life and Times of Henry Clay
(1846; reprint, New York:  Garland Publishing, 1974), 292; McCormick, Second Party
System, 116; Alexander, Political History of New York, 338-43; Archie Baxter, ed.,
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vols. (Albany:  J.B. Lyon Co., 1902), 2: 53; Remini, Van Buren, 81-82; Roseboom,
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION AND PARTY FORMATION FOLLOWING
THE CONTROVERSY OF THE 1824 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
The outcome of the 1824 presidential election was unsatisfactory to the politicians
of all factions, the public at large, and the participants themselves.  As a result, the
political environment underwent major changes in the three years leading to the 1828
election.  First, the perception of corruption in the House voting spurred anti-Adams men
throughout the country to set up party apparatus at the state level to promote their ideas
and Andrew Jackson, the figurehead of the newly emerging Democratic party.  In
addition, two states, Louisiana and New York immediately changed their electoral laws
to popular voting for electors, on a general ticket in the former and on a district ticket in
the latter, in order to end the perceived inadequacies of the past election.  Finally, the
dissatisfaction was so great that Congress once again took up the issue of amending the
Constitution in regard to selection of presidential electors. Although many historians
have disagreed on the merits of the Jacksonians' argument – that John Quincy Adams,
aided by an unscrupulous Henry Clay, stole the election from Andrew Jackson and the
American people – the fact remains that a significant number of politicians and a majority
of the general populace agreed with the supposition and were determined to prevent a
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recurrence of the past year’s events.  If the Constitution could not be amended, the
change had to be initiated at the state level. 1
The appointment of Henry Clay to the position of Secretary of State provided
both reformers and Jackson advocates – in many instances unnatural allies – with
evidence that the system was broken beyond redemption.  Although the evidence
pointing toward a pact between Clay and Adams, in which Clay delivered the votes
Adams needed to win the presidency in exchange for the coveted appointment, is
inconclusive, many otherwise neutral observers understood the perception would
outweigh any evidence to the contrary.  One particular opponent of the appointment was
the outgoing president, James Monroe.  In a memorandum, Monroe took great pains to
distance himself from the controversy and let it be known that he opposed the
appointment because of how it would look to the public.  After recounting a series of
1 Some excellent accounts of various historiographical positions can be found in
accounts of the Jacksonian period.  For example, see Claude G. Bowers, Party Battles of
the Jackson Period (Cambridge, Mass.: The Riverside Press, 1922); Marquis James,
Andrew Jackson: Portrait of a President (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1937); Arthur
M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1945); Edward
Stanwood, A History of the Presidency, 2 vols. (Boston:  Houghton Mifflin Co., 1924);
James F. Hopkins, “The Election of 1824,” in History of American Presidential Elections,
1789-1968, vol. 1, ed. by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. and Fred L. Israel (New York:
McGraw Hill Book Co., 1971); Richard P. McCormick, The Second American Party
System: Party Formation in the Jacksonian Era (Chapel Hill: The University of North
Carolina Press, 1966); Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American
Freedom (1981; reprint, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Robert
V. Remini, Martin Van Buren and the Making of the Democratic Party (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1959); Harry L. Watson, Andrew Jackson vs. Henry  Clay:
Democracy and Development in Antebellum America (Boston:  Bedford/St. Martin’s,
1998); and Richard I. Stenberg, “Jackson, Buchanan, and the ‘Corrupt Bargain’
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meetings between 11 February and 14 February 1825, Monroe concluded:
I felt very much disturb’d by it, from a belief that it would produce, a very
unfavorable effect, on Mr Adams, & the public, as well as Mr Clay.  It was
known that the people of Kentucky preferr’d Genl Jackson to Mr Adams,
& that a like preference was given to him, by the people of some of the
other western States, whose members had voted for Mr Adams.  I doubted
whether, notwithstanding the impression which he had made on my mind,
that he had already taken the step, I ought not, to have communicated to
him the objections which occurr’d to me against it, & was particularly
anxious that he shod draw more inference from my silence that I approved
the measure.  To ascertain the fact, I requested an interview at a very early
hour, this morning [12 February], with [left blank] who was, I knew, of
the same opinion with me, as to the impropriety of such an appointment,
& requested him on an intimation of its danger, to see Mr Adams . . . .
Clearly, Monroe was concerned with how this appointment would affect the next
administration’s ability to lead and how it might shift political alliances in the future.  In
his memoirs, Adam openly stated that he was aware of the dangers associated with the
appointment, but steadfastly refused to alter his decision. 2
Monroe’s reading of the political climate was correct.  A study of the different
votes – electoral and House – shows many inconsistencies.  These anomalies can be, and
2 Barnes F. Lathrop, ed., “Monroe on the Adams-Clay ‘Bargain,’” American Historical
Review 42 (January 1937): 276; John Quincy Adams, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams,
Comprising Portions of his Diary From 179056 to 1848, edited by Charles Francis
Adams, 12 vols. (Philadelphia:  J.B. Lippencott, 1874-1877), 6: 506-07.  Italicized words
within Monroe’s memorandum are mine.  See Stenburg, “ ‘Corrupt Bargain’ Calumny,”
61-85, for a balanced account of the roles played by all parties.  Based on correspondence
and memoirs, he concludes that both Adams and Jackson friends approached Clay with
the offer; thus, both sides, especially Jackson who seems to have conveniently
overlooked the actions of his spokesmen, were guilty of using the position as a
bargaining chip.  Stenberg, noting that it was Clay and Adams who received the notoriety
from the incident, faults Jackson for his hypocrisy, yet seems to admire his political
astuteness, ending his analysis writing, “Jackson stands out more and more as the most
remarkable and fascinating man of the period – the American Napoleon, combining in his
character indomitable energy and ambition with amazing craft and boldness.”
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were, interpreted in a way that lent credence to the Jacksonian belief that the election was
tainted.
TABLE 3.  COMPARISON OF ELECTORAL COLLEGE VOTING AND HOUSE
VOTING BY STATE, 1824
State (# of Electoral
Votes)
Electoral Vote by Candidate House Vote by
Candidate
JQA AJ WHC HC JQA AJ WHC
Alabama (5)  5    3 
Connecticut (8) 8    6  
Delaware (3) 1  2    1
Georgia (9)   9    7
Illinois (3) 1 2   1  
Indiana (5)  5    3 
Kentucky (14)    14 8 4 
Louisiana (5) 2 3   2 1 
Maine (9) 9    7  
Maryland (11) 3 7 1  5 3 1
Massachusetts (15) 15    12 1 
Mississippi (3)  3    1 
Missouri (3)    3 1  
New Hampshire (8) 8    6  
New Jersey (8)  8   1 5 
New York (36) 26 1 5 4 18 2 14
North Carolina (15)  15   1 2 1
Ohio (16)    16 1 2 2
Pennsylvania (28)  28   1 25 
Rhode Island (4) 4    2  
South Carolina (11)  11    9 
Tennessee (11)  11    9 
Vermont (7) 7    5  
Virginia (24)    24 1 1 19
Totals (261) 84 99 41 37 87 71 54
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TABLE 4.  COMPARISON OF POPULAR, ELECTORAL, AND HOUSE
WINNER BY STATE, 18243
State Popular Vote Electoral Vote House Vote
Alabama Jackson Jackson Jackson
Connecticut Adams Adams Adams
Delaware N/A Crawford Crawford
Georgia N/A Crawford Crawford
Illinois Adams Jackson Adams
Indiana Jackson Jackson Jackson
Kentucky Clay Clay Adams
Louisiana N/A Jackson Adams
Maine Adams Adams Adams
Maryland Adams Adams Adams
Massachusetts Adams Adams Adams
Mississippi Jackson Jackson Jackson
Missouri Clay Clay Adams
New Hampshire Adams Adams Adams
New Jersey Jackson Jackson Jackson
New York N/A Adams Adams
North Carolina Jackson Jackson Crawford
Ohio Clay Clay Adams
Pennsylvania Jackson Jackson Jackson
Rhode Island Adams Adams Adams
South Carolina Jackson Jackson Jackson
Tennessee Jackson Jackson Jackson
Vermont N/A Adams Adams
Virginia Crawford Crawford Crawford
The results in six states, one-fourth of the total number that took part in the election,
show discrepancies between the results of the Electoral College and the House of
Representatives votes.  Furthermore, a reading of Tables 3 and 4 shows that
representatives from Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, North Carolina, and
3 Popular vote winners are not available for Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, New York,
South Carolina, or Vermont because the people did not vote directly for presidential
electors; instead the state legislature chose them.
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Ohio ignored the preferences of either their state legislature or state population when
casting their votes for the president.4
The most egregious examples of the House representatives ignoring the electoral
and/or popular returns occurred in Louisiana and North Carolina.  Since Louisiana chose
its electors through legislative action, no popular returns are available. As stated in the
previous chapter, though, contemporary newspapers gave a strong indication that
although Clay appeared to have strength with the legislature, the public’s sympathies lay
with Jackson. The St. Francisville Asylum, noting the rabid support for the Hero of New
Orleans among the people said:  “The partisans of General Jackson seemed to partake of
his disposition and feelings – One desires to write his vote in blood; another wished to
make domestic carpeting of the skins of his enemies; and a third in a public address to the
intelligent citizen’s of New Orleans, denounces the General’s opponents as enemies of
the country!”  Apparently, the legislators took popular feeling to heart, and realizing the
futility of Clay’s candidacy, split the state’s electors between Jackson and Adams, three
to two.5
In the House of Representatives, Henry Gurley, Edward Livingston, and William
Brent represented Louisiana.  Livingston, Jackson’s aide de camp and personal secretary
4 The data for Tables 3 and 4 were taken from John L. Moore, ed., Congressional
Quarterly’s Guide to U.S. Elections (Washington, D.C. Congressional Quarterly, Inc.,
1994), 429.
5 St. Francisville Asylum, 24, 31 July 1824; William H. Adams, The Whig Party of
Louisiana (Lafayette: University of Southwestern Louisiana Press, 1983), 23-24;
Louisiana, House Journal, 1824, 8.
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during the War of 1812, remained loyal to the legislative sentiments and cast his vote for
Jackson.  Gurley and Brent, though, chose to support Adams, despite previous public
pledges to the contrary.  In May of 1824, Representative Brent was quoted in the New
Orleans Mercantile Advertiser as saying he would “vote the sentiments of those I
represent,” seeming to indicate that as Jackson was the people’s choice, if it came to a
House election Jackson would also be his choice.  Biographer Marquis James quotes R.K.
Call, a Jackson supporter in New Orleans, as saying that Brent had responded to the
question on whom he would support with the saying “Vox populi, vox Dei.”  Brent’s
private correspondence with Clay, however, indicates that his public profession not
withstanding, he would abandon Jackson in the House.  In a letter published in the
Asylum, Brent excused his behavior, claiming that “General Jackson could not have been
elected under any circumstances.”  Gurley, echoing Brent, claimed to waver up until the
last minute, and then decided to support Adams since Jackson’s chance had evaporated.6
The outrage in Louisiana was great.  Throughout the state, the vote was
denounced as contrary to the people’s wishes.  The most outspoken critic of Brent and
Gurley was James McKaraher, editor and publisher of the Louisiana Gazette.  On the
outcome of the House election he wrote, “It may be as well for us to record our own
infamy.”  Brent and Gurley, by falling in with the intrigues of Clay, were guilty of
. . . shameful treachery, unparalleled in history. . . . they gave the
whole vote of the state to one, who like a codfish, could not live
6 Annals of Congress, 18th Cong., 2nd sess., 527; Adams, Whig Party of Louisiana, 24;
James, Andrew Jackson, 416; William L. Brent to Henry Clay, 3 September 18924, cited
in Joseph G. Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of Jackson: A Clash of Cultures and
Personalities (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999), 172; St. Francisville
Asylum, 2 April 1825; Louisiana Gazette, 11 March 1825.
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one season in our waters.  One whose secluded habits render him
ignorant of the feelings and habits of the western country, as
though he had been all his life studying the Chinese alphabet in the
centre [sic] of Peking. . . .  Treachery!  Treachery!  Treachery!
The immediate unrest led to change in the state’s electoral law, transferring selection
from the state legislature to the people voting on an at-large ticket.  As for the state’s
national representatives, Livingston enjoyed a long career in politics, becoming Senator
of the state and a strong advocate of amending the Constitution to enforce uniform
popular selection of presidential electors throughout the country.  Brent never returned to
live in his home state and was voted out of office in 1828, and Gurley resigned his seat in
1830 and never entered the political arena again. 7
The discrepancy between North Carolina’s popular vote and House vote is more
difficult to understand.  Officially, Adams received no popular votes, while Jackson
received 56 percent and Crawford a little more than 43 percent.  The voters were only
given two options to vote on:  an electoral slate pledged to Crawford and a coalition anti-
Crawford ticket pledged against him.  All but three electors on the fusion ticket had
publicly proclaimed their preference for Jackson prior to voting, and the group as a whole
was instructed to vote as a bloc for the most popular of the two – Jackson.  Thus, the
entire electoral vote went to Jackson even though approximately one-third of the anti-
Crawford voters favored Adams.  In spite of the popular and electoral returns, ten
7 Louisiana Gazette, 8, 28 February 1825; Louisiana Journal, 25 March 1825; Louis
Moreau Lislet, ed. A General Digest of the Acts of the Legislature of Louisiana Passed
from the Year 1804, to 1827, inclusive, and in force at this last period, with an appendix
and general index, (New Orleans :  B. Levy, 1828), 1:  449-451; Tregle, Louisiana in the
Age of Jackson, 213-24, 245.
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of the thirteen North Carolina representatives cast their votes for Adams when the House
vote was taken, and North Carolina then gave its vote to the less popular candidate,
Crawford.  Regardless of whether or not Jackson was truly deserving of the entire
Electoral College vote, the people clearly had spoken against supporting Crawford.  On
the surface, at least, the public will had been thwarted, and North Carolina was held up as
an example of the corruption that permeated the selection process.  Of the ten men who
voted for Crawford, five lost their seats in the next election. 8
The contest in Ohio also led to speculation on the part of the Jacksonians.  The
popular returns showed Clay with a slight lead over Jackson, 38.5 percent to 37 percent.
Adams, though, also finished strongly with 24.5 percent of the vote.  Because Ohio used
the general ticket method, Clay received all of the state’s electoral votes.  Since he was
ineligible for the House election, the state’s representatives were asked to choose
between Adams and Jackson.  According to the Jackson supporters, the House vote for
Ohio should have swung in Jackson’s favor based on the popular returns.  Inexplicably,
though, only two of the fourteen representatives supported Jackson, with Adams
receiving ten votes and Crawford, who was not even on the ballot in November, gaining
two.  Clay, publicly championing Adams, had used his influence to sway the Ohio
8 Lucius Wilmerding, The Electoral College (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers
University Press, 1958), 75-76; Hugh Talmage Lefler and Albert Ray Newsome, North
Carolina: The History of a Southern State (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina
Press, 1954), 326.  Historians have been in disagreement on the nature of the fusion ticket
and on popular support of the candidates in 1824.  See Wilmerding, Electoral College,
177-78; J.B. McMaster, A History of the United States, 8 vols. (New York: D. Appleton
and Co., 1904), 5: 74-5; and Albert Ray Newsome, The Presidential Election of 1824 in
North Carolina (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1939) in its
entirety.
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contingent against Jackson.  The arrangement between the Adams and Clay forces was
hardly a surprise.  Clay, as a westerners and promoter of internal improvements which
were greatly beneficial to the state, had a great deal of influence.  Also, Adams supporters
were quick to point out that in the general election, 63 percent of the voters in Ohio had
not supported the General.  The argument was irrelevant – since the vote had not been
head-to-head, no real accurate assessment of the people’s sentiments can be ascertained.
Either side could justify their beliefs.  The outcome of the House election, though, could
be (and was) used in the following years to undermine Adams and Clay throughout the
state.9
Clay’s home state of Kentucky gave its full support to the favorite son in the
general election, where he gained almost 73 percent of the vote to Jackson’s 27 percent,
as well as all of the electoral vote.  Neither Adams nor Crawford were on the ballot and,
thus neither received any votes.  With this in mind, the Kentucky legislature passed a
resolution on 11 January 1825 instructing the state’s representatives to support Jackson in
the House vote – the people preferred him to Adams.  Clay, however, had already let it be
known that he favored Adams.  Indeed, he met with Adams two evenings prior to the
legislative vote and both men understood that Clay would work on Adams behalf.  True
to his word, Clay used his influence on the Kentucky representation in Washington, D.C.
and the delegation announced its intention to support Adams after a vote of eight to four.
Outrage and indignation immediately followed.  Senator Robert Hayne of South Carolina
9 Hopkins, “1824,” 380; Remini, Course of American Freedom, 82-83; Donald J.
Ratcliffe, “The Role of Voters and Issues in Party Formation: Ohio, 1824,” Journal of
American History 59 (May 1973): 847-870.
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exclaimed, “We are all in commotion about the monstrous union between Clay & Adams,
for the purpose of depriving Jackson of the votes of the Western States where nine tenths
of the people are decidedly in his favor.”  Van Buren, warning of the consequences, told
a Kentucky colleague, “you sign Mr. Clay’s political death warrant.”  Four days later, an
unsigned letter appeared in the Philadelphia Columbia Observer accusing Clay of trading
votes for the state department position.  Many were willing to believe the intrigue, despite
the unreliability of the accuser, Pennsylvania representative George Kremer who was
better known for his eccentric dress than his political acumen, because of the seemingly
unsavory outcome of the Kentucky state vote.  Robert Remini concludes, “Thus,
Kremer’s revelation elicited little surprise; it only publicly announced what everyone
suspected.  What made the situation worse and inflicted grave damage on the public
attitude toward government was the growing feeling around the country that
“skullduggery” was the normal practice in Washington and now even included the
selection of the President.”10
Another state that offered proof of the unsatisfactory outcome of the election was
Illinois.  Popularly, the election results were fairly evenly distributed, with Adams
garnering 32.5 percent of the total, Jackson a little more than 27 percent, Clay just over 2
percent, and Crawford around 18 percent.  The electoral vote, though, was distributed
only between Jackson, who received two votes, and Adams, who received one.  Because
10 Remini, Course of American Freedom, 88-90; Adams, Memoirs, 6: 464-65; Richard
Hayne to J.V. Grimke, 28 January 1825, cited in Remini, Course of American Freedom,
89; Van Buren, Autobiography, 199-200; Hopkins, “1824,” 378-79; National
Intelligencer, 4, 8 February 1825, 16, 28 March 1825.
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Illinois used popular selection of electors by district, the outcome before the race ever
moved to the house was divisive. The election returns from the counties are incomplete,
so an accurate total is unavailable, but those records that have been preserved show that
in such a close race, Jackson was able to outpoll the other three in two of the three
electoral districts, yet still fall 244 votes shy of winning the overall popular vote.  Both
Jackson and Adams could legitimately claim that the state should support their candidacy
when the election moved to the House of Representatives.  The Illinois delegate,
undoubtedly influenced by Clay who had played a large role in Illinois politics
throughout his career, especially in connection with internal improvements, cast his vote
for the leading popular candidate, Adams.  Jackson supporters argued that those who
voted for Clay in the popular election would have supported the General if Clay had not
been in the race, so the vote should have went in Jackson’s favor.  Adams’ men countered
that the vote could have just as easily been split three ways, keeping the advantage with
Adams.  The argument is inconsequential, since there is no reliable way to predict how
the race would have ended in a contest without Clay’s presence.  The inconsistency
between the popular, electoral, and House vote provided both sides with examples of how
the system was not always equitable.11
11 Moore, Guide to Elections, 350, 368, 428-429.   The election returns for the state of
Illinois used are taken from Moore and differ considerably from those used in past
monographs of the election.  Prior to its publication in 1994, the totals commonly cited
for Illinois show Jackson winning the plurality of the popular vote over Adams, 1901 to
1542, see Hopkins, “1824,” 409.  The more recent findings are based on data collection
efforts begun in 1962 under the direction of the Inter-University Consortium for Political
and Social Research (ICPSR).  The ICPSR was able to recover returns for more than 90
percent of all presidential elections through research at the state level.  Although returns
were not always preserved, this research represents a more exhaustive canvass of the
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The last state that provided ammunition for the Jacksonians and those who felt the
presidential selection system needed to be reformed was Missouri.  The popular and
electoral returns for that state gave an overwhelming victory to Henry Clay, who received
almost 60 percent of the vote.  Jackson was clearly the second choice with 34 percent,
while Adams received less than 5 percent and Crawford not even 1 percent.  When the
process moved to the House, Senator Thomas Hart Benton used his influence for
Jackson, but Missouri’s lone representative, John Scott, supported by the other senator
David Barton, was firmly in the camp of Clay and chose to cast his vote for Adams.
Scott rationalized his choice by pointing out that Missouri’s General Assembly gave no
instructions to him, and Benton’s reading of the state mandate was dependent on
generalizations rather than fact.  In this case, then, he claimed he could only vote as his
conscience dictated.12
If this had been the full story, it probably would have elicited less a response from
politicians and the public in general.  Despite his claims to the contrary, Scott knew that
his vote would be unpopular in Missouri and had even told Adams as much in a meeting
on 21 January 1825, before the House vote took place.  At the same meeting, Scott
results available from this time period.  If, however, one chooses to rely on the previous
totals, the anomaly between the popular vote and the House vote becomes even more
pronounced.  Jackson’s win in the state returns makes the House vote even more
egregious and strengthens the Jacksonian belief that political mischief had occurred.
12 Missouri Intelligencer, 29 March 1825, 12 April 1825; Elbert Smith, Magnificent
Missourian: The Life of Thomas Hart Benton (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1957), 94-
95; William Nisbet Chambers, Old Bullion Benton, Senator from the New West, Thomas
Hart Benton, 1782-1858 (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1956), 128-30; John Vollmer
Mering, The Whig Party in Missouri (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1967), 10-
11; Edwin C. McReynolds, Missouri: A History of the Crossroads State (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1962), 13.
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brought up a family problem to ascertain whether or not Adams would be amenable to
helping deal with it.  Scott's brother, a federal judge in the Arkansas Territory, had fought
and killed a colleague in a duel.  Because this was a violation of territorial law, which
forbade duelists from holding office, an application for removal had been initiated.
Without specifically saying so, Adams indicated that the problem would be taken care of
if he were president.  In the short run, Scott gained what he sought.  His brother was not
removed from office, Adams was named president, and Clay remained his patron in the
House.  The ramifications of this “deal,” though, were equally as strong in terms of party
formation and the election of 1828.  Missourians were outraged and letters to newspapers
as well as editorials reflect this.  The words corruption and intrigue became associated
with the Missouri vote and led to the emergence of a strong Jacksonian party in that state.
As for Scott, he was voted out of office in 1826, a victim of the vote he had cast almost
two years earlier for the president, and he never was active in politics again.  On the other
hand, Benton became a celebrated Jacksonian and remained a major figure in Missouri
and United States politics until his death. 13
The arguments espoused by both sides have merit, but in the final analysis,
perception rather than fact was more important to the interpretation of the outcome of the
1824 election.  Realistically, it is not possible to determine who was the more popular
13 Adams, Memoirs, 6: 473; Robert V. Remini, The Legacy of Andrew Jackson:
Essays on Democracy, Indian Removal, and Slavery (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1988), 19; Eugene H. Roseboom, A History of Presidential Elections
(New York: Macmillan, 1959), 85; McReynolds, Missouri, 130; Missouri Intelligencer,
12 April 1825, 23 December 1825, 25 January 1826; Independent Patriot, 13, 20 August
1825; Missouri Republican, 28 March 1825, 2 May 1825, 27 July 1826.
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candidate, Jackson or Adams.  Since the race was between four men, not just two, the
votes can be interpreted in a variety of ways.  Undoubtedly, there were some
inconsistencies, especially in states like Kentucky, Illinois and Missouri, and the
Jacksonians were adept at promoting the perception that these inconsistencies were a
result of corruption, bargains, and intrigue.  For his part, Jackson seems to have truly
believed that the people’s will had been thwarted.  In a letter to John Lewis, he railed,
“So you see, the Judas of the West has closed the contract and will receive the thirty
pieces of silver.  His end will be the same.  Was there ever witnessed such a bare faced
corruption in any country before?”  Jackson, though, also firmly believed that the people
would correct any injustice, stating, “The people are the safeguards of their own liberties,
and I rely wholly on them to guard themselves.  They will correct any outrage upon
political purity by Congress. . . .”14
Others, however, were not so inclined to rely on the people.  Two distinct
movements immediately arose to rectify the abomination that some felt had occurred.
First, those who opposed Adams planted the seeds of the Democratic party, and it became
inseparable from the Jacksonian cause.  Foremost among these men was Martin Van
Buren.  In his later years, he summed up the need for parties in light of the 1824 disaster,
stating that faction had taken over the country and “moved the bitter waters of political
agitation to their lowest depths.”  Unlike factions, members of parties were committed to
14 Andrew Jackson to John Lewis, 19 February 1825, in Andrew Jackson, The
Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, ed. by James Spencer Bassett, 6 vols. (Washington,
D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1926-1933), 3: 277; Henry A. Wise, Seven
Decades of the Union (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1872), 81.
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the same general principles and the group lasted over time.  Factions, usually, short-lived,
served the purpose of only promoting the specific goals or ambitions of one man or a
small group of men.  In essence, Van Buren’s stated goal in promoting a new party was
to provide restraint on political ambition, resulting in the promotion of the public good.
To this end, a coalition formed throughout the states with the stated purpose of ending
factionalism, promoting democratic principles, and electing Andrew Jackson. 15
The other movement occurred in Congress itself and began the same year the
House vote for president took place.  Beginning in December 1825, and continuing
throughout 1826 and part of 1827, numerous resolutions aimed at amending the electoral
process and the House role in presidential elections were introduced, studied, and
eventually tabled.  The most ardent promoters of change were George McDuffie and
Robert Hayne of South Carolina, Mahlon Dickerson of North Carolina, Thomas Hart
Benton of Missouri, and Martin Van Buren of New York. Although they were
unsuccessful in their attempts to amend the Constitution, their efforts continually brought
before the public the perception that the electoral process was flawed, that corruption at
both the national and the state level was present, and that the unwieldy system had denied
the public their due say in the selection of the president.  It comes as no surprise that
many of those who championed reform became closely associated with the Democratic
15 Martin Van Buren, Inquiry into the Origin and Course of Political Parties in the
United States, ed. by Abraham and Smith Thompson Van Buren (New York: Hurd and
Houghton, 1867), 3-4, 123-24; James W. Ceasar, Presidential Selection Theory and
Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 123; See also Remini, Van
Buren, for an excellent documentation of the rise of the parties between 1824 and 1838 as
it relates to presidential politics.
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party, Jacksonian Democracy, and the political successes tied with both over the next
twenty years.
Just prior to the Christmas break in 1825, Congressmen in both Houses
introduced proposals to amend the Constitution.  In the House, McDuffie, who had made
similar proposals in previous years, submitted the following:
1.  Resolved, That, for the purpose of electing the president and Vice
President of the U.S. the constitution ought to be so amended, that a
Uniform System of voting by districts shall be established in all the States;
and that the constitution ought to be further amended in such a manner as
will prevent the election of the aforesaid officers from devolving upon all
respective houses of Congress.
2.  Resolved, That a Committee be appointed, with instructions to prepare
and report a joint resolution, embracing the aforesaid objects.
Benton, in the Senate, introduced a similar resolution on 14 December, five days later,
and the debate began in earnest.  The following day, Dickerson went even further,
proposing to limit the terms of the president and vice-president.  Several senators,
including Hayne and Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina, who had been closely
associated with earlier efforts, spoke favorably of the amendment proposal and lobbied
forcefully for a place on the committee that would take up the issue.  Not coincidentally,
each of these men, along with Van Buren, were named to that committee and met for the
next month before reporting its recommendations to the Committee of the Whole.
McDuffie led the House committee that followed the same timeline.16
16 Journal of the House of Representatives, 19th Cong., 1st sess., 9 December 1825, 32;
Journal of the Senate, 19th Cong., 1st sess., 15 December 1825 43, 45-46, 19 December
1825, 46-47; Register of Debates, 19th Cong., 1st sess., 16-18.
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The amendment reported on by the committees called for each state to be divided
by their legislature, at least every ten years following congressional redistricting, into a
number of districts equal to the number of representatives and senators to which each
state was entitled.  On the first Thursday in August, the people would vote and the person
receiving the greatest number of votes in each district would receive a single electoral
vote.  After the state governors verified the returns, the president of the Senate would
open and officially tally the electoral votes.  The person who received the majority of
votes would be declared president.  If no one received a majority, a second popular
election between the top two candidates would be held the first Thursday of December
and would follow the same procedure as the initial election.  If after the second election
no candidate received a majority of electoral votes, the House of Representatives would
choose between the two in the manner already stipulated in the Constitution.  After the
proposal was read, the Committees of the Whole opened the floor for debate.  The
discussion would last for over four months.17
The debate on the amendment became particularly heated in the House toward the
end of February.  At that time, not only were representatives arguing the merits of the
amendment, state legislatures also began sending messages either in support of or in
opposition to the proposed changes.  The state of Tennessee, prompted by new
Representative James K. Polk, sent a message proposing not only the direct election of
the president by the people, but also asking for a clause stipulating that if the House did
17 Register of Debates, 19th Cong., 1st sess., 51-53; Journal of the Senate, 19 January
1826, 102.
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have to step in and decide the election, “no member of the House, who shall vote upon
such election, shall be capable of receiving an appointment to any office under the
Government of the United States, where the power of nomination is in the President, for
the term of three years thereafter. . . .”  Representatives from Indiana and Kentucky were
particularly outraged by the backhanded insult to Henry Clay.  Jonathan Jennings of
Indiana not only voiced his concerns, but also presented a resolution adopted by the
General Assembly of the State of Indiana disapproving entirely of the entire matter,
especially the Tennessee legislature’s transparent efforts to aid Jackson. 18
Tempers became very short.  McDuffie openly invoked the “bargain &
corruption” charges against Clay, saying that he had organized a “bold and daring, and
shameless coalition, setting at defiance the will of the nation, and neglecting even the
external decencies of political morality.”  His rhetoric became even more inflammatory
when he called Clay “the skulking manager who moves the wires of this whole concerted
operation.”  Several Adams men actually challenged McDuffie to a duel over the matter;
but it was never fought because his second refused to recognize rifles as legitimate
dueling weapons.19
Debate over the proposed amendments continued throughout March, with no
consensus being reached.  Finally, in April, Daniel Webster, asked that debate end, and
18 Theodore C. Pease, The Frontier State, 1818-1848 (Chicago: A.C. McClurg & Co.,
1922), 115-16; Register of Debates, 19th Cong., 1st sess., 1462-75; Journal of the House
of Representatives, 21 February 1826, 276-77, 285-90.
19 Register of Debates, 19th Cong., 1st sess., 1431-88; Charles M. Wiltse, John C.
Calhoun, 3 vols. (Indianapolis:  Bobbs-Merrill, 1944-51), 1: 330-31; Charles Grier
Sellers, James K. Polk, Jacksonian (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 106.
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the resolution be committed to a vote.  The question of whether or not the election should
not be allowed to devolve on Congress, was answered in the affirmative.  On the question
of whether the states should be required to establish electoral districts, each having one
vote, the answer was negative.   Both Houses decided to resubmit the proposal for
electoral reform to a Select Committee with instruction to prepare a joint resolution
which could then be passed on to the states for approval.  Two key members of the select
committee were McDuffie, who had proposed the original resolution, and Polk, whose
first major speech on the House floor was in support of the proposed amendment.  The
prospects for a positive outcome were dim, however; not because a majority of
Congressmen were opposed to some kind of change, but because they could not agree on
which would be a better system.  McDuffie, in speech after speech, championed the
district method, claiming that, as shown in New York where the voters had given
overwhelming support for voting by district, “the People will never consent to the
establishment of an uniform general ticket system. . . .” If left alone, the states would
more and more adopt the general ticket, which he considered to be undemocratic and too
far afield from the Founding Fathers original intent.  Others, like Edward Everett of
Massachusetts, agreed with McDuffie that uniformity was necessary, but claimed that the
states were already headed in that direction and no further congressional action was
needed.  Everett stated:
I grant to the gentleman from South Carolina that diversity, in this respect,
is an evil.  It is an evil that one State should appoint its Electors in one
way, and another State in another way.  I admit that this is an evil for
which a remedy is desirable; though I do not know – if no other remedy
could be applied – whether it would be expedient (if it were competent to
us) to alter the constitution for this purpose.  But the gentleman himself
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tells us that there is another remedy.  He says that, as the Constitution now
is, without any alteration, the States will all be led to adopt the General
Ticket system.  What more do we want, as far as a uniformity goes?  If the
States will all adopt the General Ticket system, without any amendment to
the Constitution, then the only evil which I admit to exist, is remedied.20
Although the Select Committee met, no further action was ever taken on the
House or Senate floor, except a brief resurrection of the proposal in December of 1827.
By this time, though, both the Adams and the Jackson supporters were firmly focused on
preparation for the 1828 rematch between the two candidates.  With Van Buren at the
helm, the Democratic party focused its efforts on promoting Jackson throughout the
country.  The Adams supporters were loosely coalesced into what later became known as
the National Republican party, although they were not nearly as organized.  The election
itself, had little to do with political principles, and everything to do with personalities and
rehashing the perception that the 1824 election was stolen from the rightful winner.  With
this in mind, both sides worked to establish networks throughout the states and, when
needed, attempted to manipulate the selection of electors whenever possible.21
20 Journal of the House of Representatives, 1 April 1826, 400-06; 3 April 1826, 409-
10, 4 April 1826, 413-14; Register of Debates, 19th Cong., 1st sess., 405-07, 692-96, 874-
84, 1373, 1492-1504, 1575, 1625-33, 1748-54, 1879, 2008-10; Wilmerding, Electoral
College, 21, 57, 65-66; Sellers, James K. Polk, 106-08
21 Journal of the House of Representatives, 19 December 1827, 70-72.
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CHAPTER 5
THE ELECTION OF 1828 AND THE RISE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY
Despite the failure of attempts by Thomas Hart Benton and George McDuffie to
pass a constitutional amendment mandating selection of presidential electors by popular
vote, the 1828 election demonstrated that the public, and politicians at the state level,
considered the issue far from dead.  Six of the twenty-four states – Georgia, Illinois,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, and Vermont – that took part in the election changed
their method of selecting electors from that used in 1824 to use of a general ticket in
1828.  New York adopted the district method as a result of dissatisfaction with the 1824
results.  Not coincidentally, voter participation also changed over the four-year period,
with more than one million more votes cast in 1828 than in 1824.  This expanding
popular participation, combined with the emergence of the Democratic party and its use
of new campaign tactics and propaganda, altered presidential politics in a way that had
marked effects on future campaigns. The Electoral College, reflecting these changes,
came to resemble more closely the modern College’s use of the general ticket, with only
two states – Delaware and South Carolina – retaining selection by the state legislature,
two – Maine and New York – using a combination of the general ticket and district
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methods, and another two – Maryland and Tennessee – strictly adhering to the district
method.  All the rest chose their electors on the general ticket.1
The candidates in 1828 again were Andrew Jackson and John Quincy Adams.
Although there had been several issues of great importance before Congress in the
intervening years, most notably internal improvements, protective tariffs, and U.S.
participation in the Panama Conference, the election was really about personalities and, at
least on the part of the Jacksonians, vindication.  Jackson’s candidacy, though, involved
more than just his personal elevation to the presidency.  The coalition that formed to
support him, and which provided the basis for the newly emerging Democratic party, was
united more in opposition to Adams and his nationalistic policies, than in support of
Jackson.  For example, there was no unity on the issues of protective tariffs or internal
improvements.  Vice President John C. Calhoun, no fan of Jackson, disliked President
Adams and especially thought ill of his tariff policies.  Likewise, William H. Crawford
and his followers, usually classed as the ruling or aristocratic party in older planter
communities, hated Calhoun and did not like being associated with the frontier farmers
and urban workers who supported Jackson, but could abide Adams’s nationalism even
less.  Martin Van Buren, New York Senator and a key Crawford lieutenant in 1824, was
now in a position of working with Jackson – someone he supported only because he had
1 Lawrence D. Longley and Alan G. Braun, The Politics of Electoral Reform (New
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1975), 248-49; Charles A. Paullin, “Political
Parties and Opinion, 1788-1930,” in Atlas of Historical Geography of the United States
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Press, 1932), 96-97; John L. Moore, ed.,
Congressional Quarterly’s Guide to U.S. Elections (Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Quarterly, Inc., 1994), 346, 429.
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the best chance of defeating Adams – and Calhoun – a man whom he personally and
professionally disliked.  For his part, Jackson was not especially fond of Crawford and
was unsure of Van Buren’s support.  These unnatural allies, according to Van Buren,
“united heart and hand to promote the election of General Jackson.”  So, as stated by
Richard McCormick, “despite Jackson’s aversion to Crawford, Crawford’s hatred of
Calhoun, Calhoun’s mistrust of Van Buren, and Van Buren’s hesitancy about making a
public declaration of his support for the Old Hero, the disparate elements that were to
form the Jackson coalition joined warily together in anticipation of ousting the
beneficiaries of the ‘corrupt bargain.’”2
The Jacksonians efforts to gain the White House began almost immediately after
John Quincy Adams took up residence there.  The Tennessee legislature nominated
Jackson for the presidency in October 1825.  He immediately resigned his seat in the
Senate.  At that time, Jackson addressed both houses of the Tennessee legislature and
endorsed a constitutional amendment supporting direct election of the president by the
people, with the Electoral College acting as a rubber stamp on the popular vote.  In
addition, he called for a ban on congressmen accepting appointments from any new
president.  This, he exclaimed, would prevent any taint of corruption in the election if it
should happen to be decided by the House of Representatives.  Of course, this was a
thinly veiled reference to Clay’s actions the previous winter, and it served as the basis for
2 Eugene H. Roseboom, A History of Presidential Elections (New York: Macmillan,
1959), 89-90; Richard P. McCormick, The Presidential Game: The Origins of American
Presidential Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 126; Martin Van Buren,
The Autobiography of Martin Van Buren, ed. by John C. Fitzpatrick (1920; reprint, New
York: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1969), 514.
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the Tennessee legislature’s communication to the House of Representatives concerning
the previously discussed amendment efforts (see chapter 4) that James K. Polk introduced
in February 1826.3
Jackson’s campaign organization was vigorous and highly effective.  Led by the
Nashville Central Committee, whose purpose was stated as being responsible for
responding to “the calumnious attacks on the General,” the organization quickly spread to
other states and became the core of the Democratic party organization nationally.  The
leaders of the Nashville Committee were Judge John Overton, Jackson’s former second-
in-command on the battlefield; John Coffee, long-time friend, lawyer and minister;
George Washington Campbell; Major William B. Lewis; Tennessee governor William
Carroll; Congressman (and later Senator) Hugh Lawson White; politician John Henry
Eaton; Congressman James K. Polk; and young Sam Houston.  Its counterpart in
Washington was the Jackson Correspondence Committee headed by Martin Van Buren
and John P. Van Ness, an influential banker.4
3 McCormick, Presidential Game, 149-52; Andrew Jackson, The Correspondence of
Andrew Jackson, edited by John Spencer Bassett, 6 vols. (Washington, D.C.:  Carnegie
Institution of Washington, 1926-1933), 3:  293-96.
4 Sources on the 1828 presidential campaign are many. For this brief summary, the
following sources are used: Robert V. Remini, The Election of Andrew Jackson
(Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1963) and Florence Weston, The Presidential Election of 1828
(1938; reprint, Philadelphia: Porcupine Press, 1974) in their entirety; Robert V. Remini,
Andrew Jackson (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1966), 98-105; Edward Stanwood, A
History of the Presidency, 2 vols, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1924), 1: 142-50;
Edward Stanwood, A History of Presidential Elections, (Boston:  Osgood and Co., 1884),
96-101; Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Freedom (1981;
reprint, Baltimore:  The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 100-55; and Roseboom,
History of Presidential Elections, 88-91.  For an in-depth discussion of Jackson’s
Tennessee advisors see Lorman A. Ratner, Andrew Jackson and His Tennessee
Lieutenants:  A Study in Political Culture (Westport, Conn.:  Greenwood Press, 1997).
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Campaigning took a new turn in 1828 as the Jacksonians began creating Hickory
Clubs throughout the states, hosting parades and barbecues, publishing songs, and
planning rallies.  These techniques had been previously used at the local and state level,
but never for a national campaign.  The key to generating such excitement was the use of
newspapers throughout the country.  Specifically, Eaton raised funds to establish the
United States’ Telegraph early in 1826.  Duff Green, the Washington, D.C. editor, made
sure that stories were timely and sent reprints to Jackson newspapers in other states.
Green even published the Telegraph Extra, a weekly that ran for three months just prior
to the election and was devoted exclusively to the presidential campaign.  In all, eleven
papers supporting Jackson and ten supporting Adams were founded between 1825 and
1828 specifically for the contest.  These papers were openly partisan and existed only to
promote the candidates.  Numerous other papers, which were previously in existence,
became extensions of the official organs and served to promote the candidates.5
5 Robert V. Remini, Martin Van Buren and the Making of the Democratic Party (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 193; Erik M. Ericksson, “Official Newspaper
Organs and the Campaign of 1828,” Tennessee Historical Magazine 7 (1925): 231-47;
Culver H. Smith, “Propaganda Technique in the Jackson Campaign of 1828,” East
Tennessee Historical Society Publications 6 (1934): 44-66; William Miles, comp., The
People’s Voice: An Annotated Bibliography of American Presidential Campaign
Newspapers, 1828-1984 (Westport, Conn.:  Greenwood Press, 1987), 1-6.  Miles lists the
following newspapers devoted solely to the election:  Jackson papers – The Crisis
(Rochester, New York), Delaware Democrat and Easton Gazette (Easton, Pennsylvania),
Friend of Reform and Corruption’s Adversary (Cincinnati), Jackson Republican (Boston),
The Jacksonian (Trenton, New Jersey), The Nose:  Or Political Satirist (Albany), Spirit of
’28 (Portland), and United States’ Telegraph Extra (Washington, D.C.); Adams papers –
Anti-Jackson Bulletin and Messenger of Truth (Lexington), Anti-Jacksonian (Frederick-
Town, Maryland), Anti-Jacksonian (Newark, New Jersey), Our Country (Hagers-Town,
Maryland), Owego Free Press (Owego, New York), The Political Primer, or a Horn-Book
for the Jacksonites (Dover), The Steuben Whig  (Bath, New York), Truth’s, Advocate
91
Despite the presence of major issues, particularly the protective tariff and growing
southern sectionalism, the papers concentrated on personal attacks.  The Jacksonians, not
surprisingly, focused on the “corrupt bargain” of 1825, but also made ridiculous
accusations about Adams’ personal habits.  He was accused of procuring young
American girls for the Russian Czar, using public funds to buy a pool table and other
gambling equipment for the White House, and being a friend of monarchy, much like his
father before him.  The abuse aimed at Jackson, though, was worse.  At one time or
another, he was called ignorant, a duelist, a bigamist and adulterer.  He was also accused
of practicing the slave trade, plotting with Aaron Burr to commit treason, murdering his
own troops during the War of 1812, and being the son of a prostitute.  “The whole object
of the coalition is to calumniate me,” Jackson complained.  “Cart loads of coffin hand-
bills, forgeries, and pamphlets of the most base calumnies are circulated by the franking
privilege of members of Congress, and Mr. Clay.  Even Mrs. J. is not spared, and my
pious Mother . . . has been dragged forth . . . and held to public scorn as a prostitute who
intermarried with a Negro, and my eldest brother sold as a slave in Carolina . . . .  I am
branded with every crime.”6
Some of the most vitriolic rhetoric came from newspapers in the states where
voters and politicians had questioned the outcome of the House election in 1824.  For
example, an influential Jacksonian, Amos Kendall, used his paper the Frankfort Argus of
and Monthly Anti-Jackson Expositor (Cincinnati), “We the People” (Washington, D.C.),
and The Weekly Marylander (Baltimore).
6 United States’ Telegraph Extra, 28 March, 10-13 May, 11 October 1828; Remini,
Van Buren, 193; Andrew Jackson to Brigadier-General Richard K. Call, 16 August 1828,
in Correspondence, 3: 426.
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Western America, to remind voters continuously that, in 1824, “Mr. Clay transferred your
vote to John Quincy Adams without your consent and contrary to your will.  He now
calls on you to ratify the bargain.”  Adams, according to Kendall, was no less than “the
enemy of the West, the clumsy negotiator and the vindictive man to whom you were sold
by Henry Clay.”  Kentuckians would help answer the major question before the people,
the question “of monarchy – the Secretary succession.  Since the accession of Jefferson,
each President has appointed his successor.   . . . the whole administration uses the
patronage of the first four years to secure the election of the President for the second four,
and of the second four to secure the succession; so that the country is filled with
corruption.”  The Lexington Kentucky Gazette echoed Kendall, asserting, “Of all the
various classes among mankind, a proud monied aristocracy is the superlatively
contemptible.  These are the men who have been laboring by means of bribery and
corruption to cheat the people out of their liberties.”  Clearly, the remedy for the
Kentuckians was the removal of the source of the corruption:  John Quincy Adams and
Henry Clay. 7
The Jacksonians did not hold a monopoly on using the newspapers to their
advantage, though perhaps they were better organized.  In North Carolina, where the
voters had shown their outrage at those members who supported Adams by voting most
of them out of office in 1826, they were reassured that it would be “impossible to cheat
them out of their choice as was the case in the last election.”  But, warned, the Raleigh
7 Argus of Western America, 29 October 1828; Lexington Kentucky Gazette, 7
November 1828.
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Register, and North Carolina Gazette, “party rage is no apology for . . . such grossness
and vulgarity” as was being demonstrated.  Questioning the propriety of the Democratic
campaign tactics, the paper quoted the following toast drunk at a dinner in South
Carolina, which was being reprinted throughout the country in papers favorable to
Jackson:  “Adams, Clay & Co. – Would to God they were like Jonah in the whale's belly:
the whale to the devil; the devil in hell; and the door locked, key lost, and not a son of
Vulcan within a million miles to make another.”  More often than not, however, the
newspapers urged voter action – “Rush then to the polls, ride, walk, or swim to reach
them, and let your song of triumph be Jackson and our Country forever” – and in this
both sides were very successful.8
The outcome of the election was not close (see Table 5).  Jackson won
overwhelmingly with 642,553, or 56.0 percent, of the vote.  Adams garnered only
500,897 votes, or 43.6 percent, with 4,568 (less than one-half percent) given to minor
candidates.  In the Electoral College, Jackson's victory was even more decisive – 178 to
83, or 68 to 32 percent.  The following table illustrates the outcome and the wide
majorities Jackson enjoyed in a large part of the country9
8 Raleigh Register, and North Carolina Gazette, 14, 30 October 1928; Baton Rouge
Gazette, 25 October 1828.
9 Data for Table 5 was taken from Moore, Guide to Elections, 369, 429.  Note that
South Carolina and Delaware did not participate in the popular election since they chose
electors through legislative action; thus, no popular vote totals are represented in this
data.
94
TABLE 5. 1828 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION POPULAR AND ELECTORAL
VOTE TOTALS BY STATE
State Total
Vote
Andrew Jackson John Quincy Adams
 Popular  Electoral   Votes       %     Electoral   Votes       %     Electoral
Alabama      18,618      5    16,376   89.9         5      1,878   10.1        
Connecticut      19,378      8      4,448   23.0           13,829   71.4         8
Delaware          N/A      3        N/A                         N/A                   3
Georgia      20,004      9    19,362   96.8         9         642     3.2        
Illinois      14,222      3      9,560   67.2         3      4,662   32.8        
Indiana      39,210      5    22,201   56.6         5    17,009   43.4        
Kentucky      70,776    14    39,308   55.5       14    31,468   44.5        
Louisiana        8,687      5      4,605   53.0         5      4,082   47.0        
Maine      34,789      9    13,927   40.0         1    20,773   59.7         8
Maryland      45,796    11    22,782   49.7         5    23,014   50.3         6
Massachusetts      39,074    15      6,012   15.4           29,836   76.4       15
Mississippi        8,344      3      6,763   81.1         3      1,581   18.9        
Missouri      11,654      3      8,232   70.6         3      3,422   29.4        
New Hampshire      44,035      8    20,212   45.9           23,823   54.1         8
New Jersey      45,570      8    21,809   47.9           23,753   52.1         8
New York    270,975    36  139,412   51.4       20  131,563   48.6       16
North Carolina      51,747    15    37,814   73.1       16    13,918   26.9        
Ohio    131,049    16    67,596   51.6       16    63,453   48.4        
Pennsylvania    152,220    28  101,457   66.7       28    50,763   33.3        
Rhode Island        3,580      4         820   22.9             2,755   77.0         4
South Carolina          N/A    11        N/A                 11        N/A                  
Tennessee      46,533    11    44,293   95.2       11      2,240     4.8        
Vermont      32,833      7      8,350   25.4           24.363   74.2         7
Virginia      38,924    24    26,854   69.0       24    12,070   31.0        
Total 1,148,018  261  642,553   56.0     178  500,897   43.6       83
Given the circumstances surrounding the outcome of the 1824 election and the
highly effective campaign techniques of the newly emerging Democratic party, Jackson's
victory in 1828 came as no surprise.  Historians have often noted the huge increase in
voting – the largest turnout up to the time – but they have differed in their interpretations
of this phenomenon and how it relates to the rise of Jacksonian Democracy at all levels.
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Often overlooked, though, is the fact that the increase in voting for the president can be
linked to the change in methods used to select electors.












Alabama       13,603       18,618  +    5,015     26.9          NO
Connecticut       10,647       19,378  +    8,731     45.1          NO
Delaware                                               NO
Georgia               [20,004]         YES
Illinois         4,671       14,222  +    9,551     67.2         YES
Indiana       15,838       39,210  +  23,372     59.6          NO
Kentucky       23,338       70,776  +  47,438     67.0         YES
Louisiana                 [8,687]         YES
Maine       12,625       34,789  +  22,164     63.7          NO
Maryland       33,214       45,796  +  12,582     27.5          NO
Massachusetts       42,056       39,074  –    2,982       7.6          NO
Mississippi         4,894         8,344  +    3,450     41.4          NO
Missouri         3,432       11,654  +    8,222     70.6         YES
New Hampshire       10,032       44,035  +  34,003     77.2          NO
New Jersey       19,837       45,570  +  25,733     56.9          NO
New York             [270,975]         YES
North Carolina       36,109       51,747  +  15,638     30.2          NO
Ohio       50,024     131,049  +  81,025     61.8          NO
Pennsylvania       47,073     152,220  +105,147     69.1          NO
Rhode Island         2,344         3,580  +    1,236     34.5          NO
South Carolina                                              NO
Tennessee       20,725       46,533  +  25,808     55.5          NO
Vermont               [32,833]         YES
Virginia       15,371       38,924  +  23,553     60.5          NO
Total     365,833     815,519  +449,686     55.1
As seen in Table 6, of the twenty-four states that took part in the election, seven
of them – Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, New York, and Vermont –
changed their methods.  Excluding those states that switched from legislative selection in
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1824 to popular election in 1828, the increase in voters is exceedingly high – 55.1 percent
or 449,686 votes.  These three states – Illinois, Kentucky, and Missouri – account for
more than one-half of the total increase in voting.  Since Georgia, Louisiana, New York,
and Vermont institute popular selection of electors in 1828, their vote totals for
presidential elections automatically are increased 100 percent.  If these votes are added to
the totals in Table 6, the increase in number of voters jumps to 782,185 over 1824 total. 10
Obviously, including those states that switched from legislative selection to
popular election on either a district or general ticket skews the statistics for voter
increase.  Another way, then, to analyze the increase is to compare the increase in
population relative to the increase in voters at the presidential level in those states that
either retained the district or general ticket method and those states that switched from the
district method to the general ticket method.  Using the United States census data for
1820 and 1830, the population increase can be estimated through straight-line
projections.  Although this does not provide an exact number of residents in the states, it
is an accurate assessment of the growth-rate over the decade.  As expected, the newer
western states exhibited the most growth, with older states along the Atlantic coast
growing at a far slower rate.  Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, and Missouri, all along the
western frontier, averaged over 20 percent growth in the four-year period between
presidential elections, with Mississippi, another western state, just below the 20 percent
10 Data for Table 6 was adapted from Moore, Guide to Elections, 429.   The 1828 vote
total differs from Table 5 since Georgia, Louisiana, New York and Vermont are excluded
when analyzing increase in voting.  Those states did not allow popular selection of
electors in 1824, thus their increase is automatically 100 percent.
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rate.  Connecticut, Maryland, New Hampshire, and Virginia had less than 5 percent
growth during the same time, and New Jersey and North Carolina had only 5.5 percent.
If population increase was the only indicator used to measure increase in presidential
voting, one would expect that the western states would all show far greater numbers of
voters in 1828, while the coastal states would show little change.  This is far from true.11
TABLE 7. COMPARISON OF POPULATION AND PRESIDENTIAL VOTING
INCREASE BETWEEN THE 1824 AND 1828 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
State (Selection Method) Population Estimates
      1824          1828        %
Number of Voters
  1824         1828      %
Alabama (G)    200,553     273,205    26.6 13,603      18,618    26.9
Connecticut (G)    284,220     293,192      3.1 10.647      19,378    45.1
Illinois (D to G)      96,105     136,999    29.8   4,671      14,222    67.2
Indiana (G)    225,518     303,858    25.8 15,838      39,210    59.6
Kentucky (D to G)    613,757     663,197      7.5 23,338      70,776    67.0
Maine (D)    338,783     379,231    10.7 12,625      34,789    63.7
Maryland (D)    423,226     439,102      3.6 33,214      45,796    27.5
Massachusetts (G)    558,135     592,983      5.9 42,056      39,074    -7.6
Missouri (D to G)      96,134     125,682    23.5   3,432      11,654    70.6
Mississippi (G)      99,916     124,384    19.7   4,894        8,344    41.4
New Hampshire (G)    254,229     264,297      3.8 10,032      44,035    77.2
New Jersey (G)    294,875     312,175      5.5 19,837      45,570    56.9
North Carolina (G)    678,493     718,157      5.5 36,109      51,747    30.2
Ohio (G)    724,022     866,610    16.5 50,024    131,049    61.8
Pennsylvania (G) 1,168,968  1,288,478      9.3 47,073    152,220    69.1
Rhode Island (G)      88,715       94,371      6.0   2,344        3,580    34.5
Tennessee (D)    526,455     630,087    16.5 20,725      46,533    55.5
Virginia (G)    980,577  1,022,893      4.1 15,371      38,924    60.5
Key:  G – General Ticket D – District
11 Data for Table 7 were adapted from Moore, Guide to Elections, 429, 1350.  South
Carolina and Delaware did not allow popular selection of electors and are not included.
Also excluded are Georgia, Louisiana, New York, and Vermont because they selected
electors through the legislature in 1824.
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Those states that retained the district method – Maine, Maryland, and Tennessee –
average an 11 percent increase in population and a 47.6 increase in the number of voters
for presidential electors.  States which used the general ticket method in both elections –
Alabama, Connecticut, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Virginia – average a 9.7 percent
population increase and a 54.7 percent increase in presidential voters.  In switching from
























TABLE 8.  COMPARISON OF POPULATION AND VOTER 
INCREASE BETWEEN THE 1824 AND 1828 ELECTIONS
% Increase in Population % Increase in Voting
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increase of 67.5 percent in voting with a 12.9 percent population increase.  Clearly, those
states that used the general ticket had a higher increase in voting relative to population
growth, with those that switched from the district method outdistancing the other two
groups by a large margin.  The increase in voter participation was undoubtedly due, in
part, to excitement over the race and the liberalization of voter eligibility at the state
level, but more than one-half of the increase can be linked, one way or another, to the
democratic movement toward popular selection of presidential electors; thus, the thesis
that changes in the method of choosing electors contributed to and reflected Jacksonian
Democracy is somewhat vindicated.12
Seven states changed their method of selecting electors.  New York, which
changed from legislative selection to popular election by district, Louisiana, which
changed from legislative selection to popular election on a general ticket, and Missouri,
which changed from popular election by district to popular election on a general ticket,
have been discussed in the previous chapters.  Of the other four, Vermont and Georgia
made the more drastic change from legislative selection to a general ticket election.
12 For more information on the historical debate concerning voter participation and
Jacksonian Democracy, see Richard P. McCormick, "New Perspectives on Jacksonian
Politics," American Historical Review 65 (January 1960): 228-301; Charles Grier Sellers,
Jacksonian Democracy (Washington, D.C.: Service Center for the Teachers of History,
1958), in its entirety; and Charles Grier Sellers, "Andrew Jackson versus the Historians,"
Mississippi Valley Historical Review 44 (March 1958): 615-34.  Much of the argument
centers on the fact that the increase in voting at the national level did not meet, much less
exceed, that at the local and state level.  Thus, the movement was not really attributable
to Jackson.  This argument, put forth strenuously by McCormick, ignores the Electoral
College voting completely and is somewhat misleading since the Jacksonians were
usually the main instigators of electoral reform.  While voting totals at the national level
did not match those increases at the state level, they did increase and the root cause was
pushed by the Democratic party.
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Illinois and Kentucky both adopted the general ticket method after discarding the use of
electoral districts.  In each of these states, the increase in voting from 1824 to 1828 was at
least 67 percent.  Interestingly, in five of the seven states, Jackson took all of the electors.
In New York, the electoral vote was split twenty to sixteen in favor of the General.  Only
in Vermont did Adams win the Electoral College vote.  This outcome is almost
completely opposite of 1824, where Jackson lost each state in both the popular and
electoral vote.  Clearly, then, the change was crucial in the outcome of the 1828
election. 13
Georgia's change from legislative selection of presidential electors to popular
election on a general ticket had almost nothing to do with the election of Andrew
Jackson, per se, but to the efforts of two state factions to curry favor with both voters and
the Jackson organization in anticipation of political rewards after the General took office.
Indeed, the reasons for change rested more on competition between the two factions
rather than the developing national parties.  The “Troupites” and “Clarkites,” as they
were called, had no real differences in their basic philosophies, and the only real national
issue that interested them was Indian removal.  Thus, in 1828 the question was never if
the state would give their electoral votes to Jackson (Adams's Indian policies precluded
him from any chance to win the state), but instead which slate of electors – Troupite or
Clarkite – would win the popular vote.14
13 See Tables 2 and 3 for the 1824 popular and electoral votes by state.
14 Richard P. McCormick, The Second American Party System: Party Formation in
the Jacksonian Era (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1966), 236-38;
Anthony Gene Carey, Parties, Slavery, and the Union in Antebellum Georgia (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1978), 22.
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The division between the two groups had begun in the mid- and late-1790s.
James Jackson, a Revolutionary War hero and Democratic Republican senator out of
Savannah, resigned his seat and returned to Georgia to lead the fight in favor of
rescinding the sale of public lands along the Yazoo River.  Jackson and his supporters
argued the sale had been fraudulent; and, they were successful in having the original sale
overturned.  Jackson's lieutenants in the fight were two young politicians, George M.
Troup and William H. Crawford.  Those who fought against the Rescinding Act felt they
had been slandered by Jackson's charge of fraud.  The anti-Jackson forces gathered
around John Clark, the son of General Elizah Clark, another Revolutionary War hero.
The two cliques were also divided, somewhat, by the geography of the state and
economic class.  The Jackson (who died in 1806)-Crawford-Troup faction tended to be
more aristocratic, better educated, and either emigrants or descendants of emigrants from
Virginia.  Clarkites tended to settle more along the frontier line and usually traced their
roots to North Carolina.  Tension between the two became so strained that John Clark and
William Crawford actually dueled in 1806, with Crawford suffering a shattered left wrist
after Clark shot him with a pistol ball.15
15 Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, Georgia and State Rights: A Study of the Political History
of Georgia from the Revolution to the Civil War, with Particular Regard to Federal
Relations (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1902), 93-97; Carey,
Antebellum Georgia, 20-21; George Gilmer, Sketches of the First Settlers of Upper
Georgia, of the Cherokees, and the Author (New York: D. Appleton, 1854), 1-176, 198;
Edward J. Harden, The Life of George M. Troup (Savannah: E.J. Purse, 1859), 11; J.E.D.
Shipp, Giant Days, or the Life and Times of W.H. Crawford (Americus, GA.:  Southern
Printers, 1909), 44-76. For a complete overview of the development of the two factions,
see Phillips, Georgia and State Rights, 16-32; James H. Broussard, The Southern
Federalists, 1800-1816 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978), 247-56,
273, 296, 364, 373, 377, 381-82; Chase C. Mooney, William H. Crawford, 1772-1834
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The move in Georgia toward election of electors began with the gubernatorial
election of 1823.  At that time, George Troup defeated the Clarkite candidate Matthew
Talbot.  Troup – hoping to change the impression that the Troupites were too aristocratic
– pushed forward an old Clarkite proposal that would amend the state constitution to
allow popular election of governors, eliminating the use of the legislature in making the
choice.  This proved to be very popular with the people of Georgia.  Then, the Troup and
Clark factions finally took different positions on a national issue – the presidential
election of 1824.  The Troupite backed their favorite son, Crawford, while the Clarkites
backed Andrew Jackson.  John Clark was a personal friend of the General and admired
him greatly.  Georgia's electoral vote went to Crawford, but to no avail.  Adams’
selection by the House of Representatives was unsatisfactory to all sides.  The election
became an issue in the 1825 gubernatorial campaign between Troup and Clark, and the
issue of elector selection was used as a tool to show support for Jackson's 1828 bid for
the presidency. 16
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1974), 1-16; Harden, Troup, 1-13; Milton S.
Heath, Constructive Liberalism: The Role of the State in Economic Development in
Georgia to 1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), 71; George M. Lamplugh,
Politics on the Periphery:  Factions and Parties in Georgia, 1783-1806 (Newark:
University of Delaware Press, 1986), 144-202; and W.H. Sparks, The Memoirs of Fifty
Years, 3rd ed. (Philadelphia:  Claxton, Remsen, & Heffelfinger, 1872), 19-27.  Also,
William O. Foster Sr., James Jackson: Duelist and Militant Statesman (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1960), offers an excellent account of the founder of the
original clique, and its earliest influences on Georgia politics.
16 Phillips, Georgia and State Rights, 95-112; Mooney, William H. Crawford, 213-
321; Donald A. DeBats, Elites and Masses: Political Structure, Communication, and
Behavior in Ante-Bellum Georgia (New York: Garland Publishing, 1990), 25-30; Carey,
Antebellum Georgia, 22; Francis N. Thorpe, comp., The Federal and State Constitutions,
Colonial Charters, and Other organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies, Now
or Heretofore Forming the United States of America, 5 vols. (Washington, D.C.:
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The campaign for governor was very contentious.  W.H. Sparks, a contemporary,
remembered that the "virulence of party . . . pervaded every family, creating animosities
which neither time or reflection ever healed."  After the returns were counted, Troup won
by less than seven hundred votes, largely on the strength of his stance that the federal
government must uphold the Treaty of Indian Springs (a dubious document, which
purportedly ceded all of the remaining Creek lands to the state) or risk hostilities with the
state militia.  Troup's personal victory, though, did not extend to the legislature, where
Clarkites won a majority of seats.  With this majority, the Clark faction put in motion
their plan to change the mode of selecting presidential electors, pointing out the success
of popular participation at the state level.  The amendment passed with little opposition,
as both sided recognized that, without a doubt, the people would support Jackson and
Jackson supported the people’s right to choose the president.17
The 1828 election in Georgia was somewhat anticlimactic, since both factions
overwhelmingly supported Jackson.  The Troupites had long had ties through Crawford
campaign manager John Forsyth to Van Buren, and they easily swung to Jackson's side
since Crawford was out of the picture.  The Clarkites, of course, continued their support
from 1824.  In December 1826, the legislature adopted and Governor Troup signed a
resolution stating that the people of Georgia "looked with confidence" to the election of
Government Printing office, 1909), 2:  791-809; Paul Murray, The Whig Party in
Georgia, 1825-1853 (Chapel Hill:  The University of North Carolina Press, 1948), 4;
Georgia Journal, 3 February 1824.
17 Sparks, Memoirs, 130; Harden, George M. Troup, 334, 396; Georgia Journal, 6, 20,
27 December 1825, 10,17 January 1826; Phillips, Georgia and State Rights, 103; Carey,
Antebellum Georgia, 22-23.
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Andrew Jackson.  The Augusta Chronicle, the most influential Clark newspaper, gave
that faction full credit for pushing democratic principles – i.e., placing the election of the
governor and president in the hands of the people – against the wishes of the aristocratic
Troup factions, a statement not grounded in truth.  Not to be outdone, the Troupites
pushed a vote in the state senate at the end of December 1827 where sixty-eight of the
sixty-nine members declared their preference for the Old Hero.  Both factions put forth a
slate of electors – Troup’s slate won – but it was redundant in that each ticket was
pledged to vote for Jackson and Calhoun. 18
Ironically, Jackson's election and presidency finally ended the politics of personal
factions in Georgia and pushed the state into the national party system.  Historian
Anthony Carey accurately summarized the Jackson influence:
Jackson's forceful personality, obsessive concern with honor, fabled
military career, and status as a slaveholding planter made him a model of
southern white manhood and brought him victory in Georgia.  His
championing of Cherokee removal then cemented a popularity that long
forbade opposition; state political movements for the next eight years
hinged on reactions to Jackson's conduct.
George Gilmer, a prominent state politician, was even more succinct:  "All in Georgia
were Jackson men whilst Gen. Jackson was in office, the Clark party from choice, the
Crawford [Troup] party from necessity, so that old factions began to lose their lines of
demarcation, and new parties to be formed upon the general principles which divided the
people of the United States."  Thus, faction promoted the democratic principle of popular
18 Augusta Chronicle, 24 January 1827; Savannah Republican, 19 January 1828;
Georgia Journal, 24 November 1828; DeBats, Elites and Masses, 30; Phillips, Georgia
and State Rights, 119.
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selection of electors for reasons that involved, mostly, personal politics.  This, in turn,
brought to power a man and party that overshadowed and ended their personal power
struggles, engulfing both sided in the second party system. 19
Unlike Georgia, Vermont's shift from legislative selection of electors to election
on a general ticket was accomplished with little discussion and no political maneuvering
on the part of factions within the state.  Historian Richard McCormick states, "In brief,
the issues that so evenly divided the nation in the Jackson era did not encompass or
reflect the concerns that were most urgently felt in Vermont.  . . . Vermont was such an
atypical state that its politics could not be adjusted to a national norm."  Vermont
switched methods as a part of reform in the state in general, and, more specifically,
because New York, a state with great influence in Vermont, adopted popular selection of
electors.20
By 1817, the old Federalist party in Vermont had ceased to function as a political
entity.  The Jeffersonian Republican stronghold in the state was held not because of
widespread support, but because of Federalist defeats throughout the state and region.
Working together, the two parties slowly melded.  In 1818 the Federalist leadership
endorsed the Republican candidate for governor, disbanded the party, and left Federalist
candidates to run as independents.  Republican leaders censured zealots who wanted to
completely disregard their old opponents and openly called for reconciliation.  Ex-
Federalists began once more to become visible participants in government, until almost
19 Carey, Antebellum Georgia, 23; Gilmer, Sketches, 561.
20 McCormick, Second Party System, 69-70.
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one-third of the legislators in the mid-1820s were former Federalists.  Acting as one,
there was now no organized opposition to the Democratic-Republicans.  Between 1818
and 1828, no Republican candidate for governor was opposed.  This left them free to
work on reforms in the areas of politics (especially liberalizing voting eligibility
requirements and elector selection), temperance, antislavery, education, and religion. 21
The Vermont Legislature passed the law giving selection of electors to the people
on October 25, 1824, to be put into effect in 1828.  Unlike in other states, there was
almost no opposition to John Quincy Adams' candidacy – and the legislative records
make no mention of opposition to the law change.  From all appearances, the change had
nothing to do with politics, but rather was only one minor part of a series of reform
efforts of the time, opening voting to a larger segment of society by liberalizing voter
qualification laws and placing more emphasis on popular participation in elections.  The
unity that so pervaded the period was not to last, though.  Within two years, agitation
between more populous, wealthy communities and smaller towns began to grow, leading
the editors of the North Star to call on the people to look elsewhere for protection "from
that spirit of monied, aristocratical . . . mania."  By the election of 1828, the Democratic
and Antimasonic parties both took advantage of the unrest and fielded candidates for
local, state, and national offices.  The National Republicans still held a majority, but the
21 William Gerald McLoughlin, New England Dissent, 1630-1833: The Baptists and
the Separation of Church and State, 2 vols. (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press,
1971), 2:  877-911, 1065-1274; Randolph A. Roth, The Democratic Dilemma:  Religion,
Reform, and the Social Order in the Connecticut River Valley of Vermont, 1791-1850
(New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1987), 101, 109, 111; McCormick, Second
Party System, 70-71.
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unity gained over the past decade was much less secure.  The change in method of
selecting electors had no appreciable effect on the outcome of the election of 1828 in the
state.  Adams won overwhelmingly, with 74 percent of the vote, taking all of the state's
electors.  Jackson was able to win 25 percent of the vote, however, demonstrating the
inroads which opposition had made in the state.22
Unlike Georgia and Vermont, Illinois and Kentucky made only an adjustment in
their method of selecting electors.  In previous elections, both states had chosen electors
to represent a specific electoral district.  When using this method, a state's electoral vote
could be split between the candidates.  Indeed, just such a scenario happened four years
earlier in Illinois, where the state's three electors were divided two to one in favor of
Jackson.  For the 1828 election, both states adopted popular election on a general ticket.
In this way, the state's entire electoral vote could be given to one candidate.  Apparently,
both states adopted this method just for that reason.  Factions dominated politics in
Illinois and Kentucky, and the factions were only just beginning to ally themselves with
the national party candidates.  In an effort to give as much support as possible to one
candidate in an election where, conceivably, every vote mattered, the factions meant to
deliver all of their state's vote, not just part of it.
22 Acts of Vermont, 1824, Chapter 2; Journal of the Assembly of the State of
Vermont, 1824; Vermont Intelligencer, 14, 28 September 1825, 12,19, October 1825;
North Star, 13 March 1827. For a complete discussion of the social and political reforms
see Roth, Democratic Dilemma; Robert E. Shalhope, Bennington and the Green
Mountain Boys: The Emergence of Liberal Democracy in Vermont, 1760-1850
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); and David M. Ludlum, Social
Ferment in Vermont, 1790-1850 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939).
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Illinois' most prominent historian, Theodore C. Pease, described the state's
political division as "chaos" during its first ten years as a state.  There were no parties to
speak of, only factions.  Governor Ninian Edwards, former Chief Justice of Kentucky and
the first territorial governor of Illinois, headed one faction.  His most trusted advisor and
lieutenant was his son-in-law, Representative Daniel Pope Cook.  Arrayed against the
Edwards faction was a continuously shifting group of men who disliked Edwards for
personal reasons.  Politically both groups supported the same basic principles, mainly
removal of Indians and a liberal policy of land disposal.  The factions usually only
became active when major state and national offices – senators, congressional seats,
governor, lieutenant governor – were available.  When voting for seats in the state
legislature took place, though, the factions generally did not take part, letting local
candidates and issues take center stage.  Once, when Edwards ignored this long-standing
tradition and criticized local legislators for their position on state banking issues, both
members of his faction and newspapers throughout the state publicly chastised him.23
Election laws in Illinois were just as chaotic, being changed or refined every two
years when a new legislature was seated.  The laws under the constitution of 1818 were
quite democratic, calling for popular election of the governor, lieutenant governor,
senators, and representatives in the state assembly, congressional representatives, and
many county officials.  This first set of election laws also provided for viva voce election
23 Ninian W. Edwards, History of Illinois from 1778 to 1833; and Life and Times of
Ninian Edwards (Springfield: Illinois State Journal Company, 1870), 203-06; Illinois
Intelligencer, 6 July 1826; Theodore C. Pease, Illinois Election Returns, 1818-1848
(Springfield: Illinois State Historical Library, 1923), xviii, xix; McCormick, Second Party
System, 279, 281.
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– by voice rather than ballot.  This was not a means of intimidating voters or upholding
deference.  Pease states:
Probably a more valid reason for viva voce elections was the widespread
illiteracy that made many voters either subject to deception by ballots
offered them under false representation, or in danger if they tried to write
their own ballots of seeing their votes thrown out through a mistaking of
offices or names of candidates.  The general assembly . . . was ultimately
forced by public opinion to make their elections in most cases viva voce
also.
The following year, the general assembly passed a set of election laws to deal specifically
with presidential electors.  Under this law, the governor was to set electoral districts
every four years, based on the state’s voting population and number of representatives in
Congress.24
The move to using a general ticket had its roots in the outcome of the 1824
election.  As stated in the previous chapter, Illinois was one of the states Jacksonians
pointed to when claiming that the General had been cheated in the election.  In terms of
electors, Jackson won the popular vote in two out of the three districts, thus gaining two
electors to Adams' one.  When the vote went to the House of Representatives, though,
Cook cast Illinois' lone vote for Adams, setting aside the people's choice.  The perception,
in the state and throughout the country, was that Jackson and the people had been denied.
In reality, the returns, as best can be determined, do not necessarily bear this out.  In his
collection, Illinois Election Returns, Pease reported the following vote totals by district,
commonly accepted at that time:
24 Pease, Illinois Election Returns, lix-lx, lxiv-lxv; Illinois, Laws of 1819, 101.  In
1823, the Illinois General Assembly restored the use of ballots (see Illinois, Laws of
1823, 53).
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Adams Jackson Crawford Clay Scattered
District 1 1,062     728*       –    343       11
District 2      225     666       –    476         1
District 3 253     497      218   227        –
Total 1,540  1,891      218 1,043       12
The problem with this tally is that one candidate for elector in District 1, James Turney,
ran under the designation "Jackson or Clay."  Turney received 629 votes and these were
given to Jackson.  Thus, it is not clear that Jackson was the people's choice at all in the
first district.  If somehow these votes could be distributed in a manner that accurately
reflected the voters' choice, Jackson's total might have been less than that of Adams.
Regardless of the vote totals, Pope's vote represented the entire state, and the majority of
state politicians and newspapers were skeptical of the outcome.  The terms "bargain and
corruption" resounded loudly.  With this in mind, the anti-Edwards faction that controlled
the state assembly in 1826-1827 passed a new election law mandating the choice of
electors on a general ticket.  The effect would be two-fold.  First, the state would give its
entire vote to a single candidate and be more powerful on the national scene.  Second, no
one would be able to question which candidate had the support of the majority of voters
should the election devolve on the House of Representatives in the future.25
25 Pease, Illinois Election Returns, xxiii-xviv, lxvi, 30-35; Illinois Intelligencer, 6 July
1826; Illinois, Laws of 1827, 188; Thomas Ford, A History of Illinois, From Its
Commencement as a State in 1818 to 1847, Containing a Full Account of the Black
Hawk War, the Rise, Progress, and Fall of Mormonism, the Alton and Lovejoy Riots, and
Other Important and Interesting Events (Chicago: S.C. Griggs & Co., 1854), 74-75;
Theodore C. Pease, The Frontier State, 1818-1848 (Chicago: A.C. McClurg & Co.,
1922), 106-08, 111-13.  Later research gives Adams the plurality in Illinois (see previous
chapter).  Pope lost his reelection bid in 1826, but it is not clear whether he lost because
of the presidential election of 1824 or because Ninian Edwards, his father-in-law, was
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As for the election of 1828 itself, the state politicians seemed more preoccupied
with gaining power for their various factions.  James Hall, in a letter to senatorial hopeful
Thomas Sloo, outlined the struggle:
Smith, Kinney, and West are about to set up a Newspaper at Edwardsville
– ostensibly for Jackson, but in fact to operate in State politics.  Smith and
Kinney want to be Senator and Governor.  They go against Edwards,
Thomas, but most especially Reynolds and Tom Reynolds, the Beairs,
etc., Jno Reynolds wants to be Senator - is inveterate against Smith,
Edwards, Thomas and don't much like McLean. Party No. 3 consists of
Jesse B. Thomas Solus – the privates and officers yet to be enlisted.  The
Honorable Jesse is very bitter against Smith and Co., but more against
McLean.  He swears that McLean is a dishonest man and a dishonest
politician – that he can't, and by God – he shant be elected!
I do not see how the above named men can ever again amalgamate, at any
rate they will not join with Party No. 4 which consists of Jno McLean and
his friends – Nor with Party No. 5 which is composed of Edwards & Co.
Depend upon it, my dear sir, these combinations which are going on in our
State will ruin every man who is engaged in them.  The people are
beginning to complain loudly.  Kinney is sinking faster than I ever saw
any man, his violence disgusts even his friends.  Thomas and Edwards are
gone.  Smith is universally feared, his ambition and his intriguing spirit
alarm friends and foes.  Lockwood and Wilson are greatly depreciated.
All of these men must go down.  McLean stands best, but his prospects are
very doubtful . . . .26
Although there was widespread support for the election law change, the factions
were not unanimous in their support for a candidate.  Jacksonians three times introduced
a resolution in the state house expressing support and confidence in Jackson while
condemning the "bargain and sale . . . contrary to the will of the majority."  Rather than
running for governor that year and the Edwards faction as a whole did poorly in that
election cycle.
26 Transactions of the Illinois State Historical Society for the Year 1911 (Springfield:
Illinois State Journal Co., 1913), 41-42.
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speaking against Jackson, opponents of the resolution claimed that it would prejudice
Congress and the administration against the land grant for which the state was currently
petitioning.  Outside of the legislature, the Jacksonians conducted a series of county
meetings to drum up support.  "They hope," wrote the editors of the Illinois Intelligencer,
"by this means, not only to discover their own strength but to give tone to public feeling;
and if possible, induce a belief that Jackson is the strong candidate."  As an aid, one
faction began to publish the Illinois Corrector to spread the Jacksonian message and
coordinate meetings.  The Illinois Gazette, an Adams paper, took glee in pointing out that
only twelve to fifteen people attended most of the Jackson-sponsored county meetings,
and the Corrector was not widely read.27
Just as in the other states, most of the campaign in Illinois focused on personality
rather than issues.  Of course, Jackson was portrayed as a military chieftain, a "rowdy, a
cockfighter, a gambler, and a devotee of the code of honor." One speaker at a Fourth of
July rally, "reminded his hearers that popular rights was the favorite theme of
demagogues and that the fathers of the republic had equally opposed the despotism of a
monarch as the licentiousness of the mob."  Jackson's ruthlessness in dealing with
deserters during the War of 1812 was even put to verse:
He ordered Harris out to dire
  And five poor fellows more!
Young gallant men in prime of life,
  To welter in their gore.
27 Pease, Frontier State, 116-17; McCormick, Second Party System, 281; Illinois
Intelligencer, 24 March 1827, 12 October 1827, 5 January 1828, 1, 29 March 1828, 10
May 1828, 1 June 1828; Illinois Gazette, 3, 17 May 1828.  No copies of the Illinois
Corrector remain.
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'Twas all in vain, John Harris prayed,
  'Tis past the soul's belief.
Hard as flint was Jackson's heart,
  He would not grant relief.28
One issue of national policy, though, did play a role in the state.  Internal
improvements and protection of manufacturers was a powerful issue in a state growing so
rapidly.  Adams' supporters argued that canals and protective tariffs would bring an
economic boost to the region.  Many Jackson supporters agreed with the sentiment and
tried to paint Jackson as pro-internal improvements and pro-tariff also, even going so far
as to issue a statement to that effect during their state convention in Springfield.  In the
end, Jackson won the state by almost a two to one margin.  Significantly, though, only 52
percent, or just over 14,000, of the population turned out to vote.  Almost 17,000 voted in
August of the same year for the state's lone representative, and almost 22,000 voted in
1830 for governor.  The enthusiasm, apparently, was less than Jacksonians made it.29
Kentucky had much in common with Illinois in that factions played a large role in
state politics.  Additionally, the factions did not really dissolve until 1828 when the two
national parties took hold throughout the country.  But, unlike Illinois, the powerful
leadership and personal popularity of one man – Henry Clay – dominated Kentucky
politics.   With the ascendancy of Martin Van Buren – an old Clay nemesis – in the
Jackson camp, Clay’s support of Adams in 1828 formed two distinct groups in the state:
28 Illinois Intelligencer, 4 August 1827, 13 October 1827, 17 November 1827, 1
December 1827, 5 April 1828, 24 May 1828; Pease, Frontier State, 118-20; Illinois
Gazette, 7 June 1828.  The verse was reprinted in Chicago Democrat, 29 April 1840.
29 Illinois Intelligencer, 21 April 1827, 10 May 1828; Illinois Gazette, 10 May 1928;
Pease, Illinois Election Returns, 54-56, 61-64.
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those who disliked the New Englander but respected Clay and despised Van Buren, and
those who supported Jackson, despite Clay’s opinion, wholeheartedly as the candidate
most in tune with western ideals.  McCormick writes:  “Kentucky had Henry Clay, and in
Kentucky . . . Clay commanded sufficient popular support to provide a secure base for
opposition to Jackson.”  With few exceptions, Clay’s presence meant that those who
opposed Adams would often do so in a way so as not to offend Clay.  Finally, in many
ways, the election also turned on an old issue – debt relief – which was a major theme in
state elections from 1819 to 1827.  The split in the state between pro- and anti-Relief – or
New and Old Court – legislators would find its way into presidential politics.  Both
groups, whether split along national political lines or state banking and relief lines, were
determined that the state’s electoral vote in 1828 would be all or nothing.  Rather than
Adams versus Jackson, in Kentucky the race was between Clay and Jackson, a veritable
rematch of 1824, but with the “corrupt bargain” accusation and banking issues taking
center stage.30
As discussed earlier, Kentucky’s vote for Adams in the House election of 1825
created a great deal of controversy.  After publicly declaring his support for Adams, Clay
spent a great deal of time persuading the Kentucky delegation, among others, to follow
his lead.  Many, including the influential Senator Richard Johnson, were adamantly
opposed to this, especially since Adams had not received a single popular vote in the state
and because the Kentucky state legislature had explicitly instructed the representatives to
vote for the western candidate – a description that fit only Jackson.  Public opinion in
30 McCormick, Second Party System, 210.
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Kentucky swung against Clay, especially after Adams appointed Clay to the position of
Secretary of State.  Colonel Johnson, a long-time friend of Clay’s, was particularly
outraged.  Although he never publicly challenged him, his disdain for Adams and the
“corrupt bargain” was made clear in the following exchange William Seaton, an editor of
the National Intelligencer, recorded for Niles’ Weekly Register:
Sometime in the session of 1825-26, as I was passing through the senate
chamber to the secretary’s table after the senate had adjourned, I was
hailed by col. Johnson, (sitting near one of the fire places under the
gallery, with one other member standing or walking near him), who, in his
familiar manner of speaking said, “how goes it old friend; well, when are
you coming out?”
Editor On what subject, Colonel?
Col. J. Why on the presidential question.  Are you not coming out against
the administration?
Editor I can’t tell.  The administration had hardly commenced its career
yet, and I don’t see anything, so far, to condemn.
Col. J. What of that?  Has not Clay taken away the laws from your paper?
Editor True; but that would be making a private grievance a motive for
public conduct; and that we cannot do . . .  .  As for Mr. Clay, I know he is
no friend of ours . . . but the administration may pursue a policy that we
have approved in other administrations . . .
Col. Johnson (with vehemence, and, I think, with an oath) – I would not
care for that.  If any body injured me, I would give them as good as they
sent; and, as for this administration, we will turn them out, as sure as there
is a God in Heaven.
Editor But, Col. how can you say so, before you see what course the
administration will adopt.  Suppose they consult the public interest, and
pursue a course that you think right?
Col. J. I don’t care (raising his arm and speaking with warmth), for by the
Eternal, if they act as pure as the angels that stand at the right hand of the
throne of God, we’ll put them down.
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Apparently, Johnson was in full agreement when Jackson proclaimed, “Thus you see hear
[sic], the voice of the people of the West have been disregarded, and demagogues barter
themselves as sheep in the shambles, for their own views, and personal agrandisment
[sic].”31
The state elections in 1824 and 1826, when the issue of debt relief once more
became prominent, further solidified the division between Clay and Jackson supporters.
After the panic of 1819, many in Kentucky sought relief from creditors through state
legislative action, while others claimed this was outside of the legislature’s powers.  The
state was divided into pro- and anti-Relief Bill supporters.  Johnson, Amos Kendall, and
Francis Preston Blair were among the leaders of the relief legislation, and Kendall, in
particular, championed the cause through the press.  Bowing to popular pressure, the
legislature passed the Relief Bill, protecting debtors from land confiscation and bank
31 Robert V. Remini, The Legacy of Andrew Jackson: Essays on Democracy, Indian
Removal, and Slavery (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968), 18-19;
Remini, Course of American Freedom, 179-95; Thomas Crittenden Cherry, Kentucky:
The Pioneer State of the West (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1923), 225-27; Leland
Winfield Meyer, The Life and Times of Colonel Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky (New
York: AMS Press, 1967), 220-21; Niles’ Weekly Register, 28 April 1827; Andrew
Jackson to John Overton, 10 February 1825, quoted in Remini, Legacy of Andrew
Jackson, 19.  The reference made by Johnson about Clay having “taken away the laws
from your paper” refers to Seaton having previously held the contract to publish all
proceeding of the United States Congress.  This was given to another publisher.  Another
note:  Johnson, although never publicly condemning Clay for his support of Adams, was
conveniently absent when the Senate voted on his confirmation as Secretary of State.
Normally, the senior senator from the appointee’s states presents the nomination and
speaks on the nominee’s behalf.  Johnson’s silence on this matter spoke volumes about
his feelings on the issue of “bargain and corruption.”  Clay, himself, even referred to
Johnson’s absence during the vote.  See Meyer, Richard M. Johnson, 221.
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foreclosures.  Many thought the issue had died down, but then, in the spring of 1824, the
Kentucky Supreme Court overturned the Relief Bill, and the issue once again resounded
loudly throughout the state.  The state legislature, under the leadership of Pro-Relief
Governor Joseph Desha and with a clear majority of Relief Party members, dismantled
the state Supreme Court and created a new one, leading to the formation of the Old Court
and New Court factions.  Confusion reigned in the state as both courts heard cases and
claimed to be the legitimate authority in the judicial arena.  Ultimately, the New Court
was abandoned and the Old Court reinstated, but the political divisions held through the
legislative sessions of 1826/1827 and were then merged into the Democratic and National
Republican Parties.  Clay, an early supporter of relief legislation, was then cast in the
light of deserter, widening the split between his supporters and the coalition of Johnson,
Kendall, and Blair who worked on Jackson’s behalf.32
During 1827 the Kentucky legislature took up the issue of elector selection.  Each
party was determined to try to give the entire state vote to one candidate or the other.
The state elections in 1827 showed that the parties were evenly matched, with an almost
equal division in the state legislature and the Jacksonians having a five to seven
advantage in the national delegation.  At this time, it seemed a toss-up on who would win
the presidency and there was no opposition to the change in electoral law.  Passed in the
fall of 1827, the law was signed in February, 1828.  The next few months before the
32 Patriot, 13 March 1826, 19 June 1826; Meyer, Richard M. Johnson, 227-232;
Cherry, Pioneer State, 222-27; Steven A. Channing, Kentucky, (New York: W.W. Norton
& Co., 1977), 87.
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actual voting took place would be devoted to setting up committees and organizations
throughout the state with the aim of winning the vote.33
The election itself played out along the same lines that it did nationally, with few
exceptions.  Two notable attacks however, were used in Kentucky that could not be found
in other states.  First, Jackson’s opponents widely circulated his comments about the poor
performance of Kentucky riflemen at the Battle of New Orleans sixteen years earlier.
More important, the same opponents tried to blunt the Jacksonian argument about the
“corrupt bargain” by recounting an instance in which, they claimed, Jackson himself tried
to barter a position in the administration in exchange for Kentucky’s vote.
Representative David Trimble, when explaining his vote against Jackson in the House
election, accused the Jacksonians of trying to bribe another Kentucky Representative,
Thomas Metcalfe, with the position of senator in exchange for his vote.  The position
would be available since most believed that if elected Jackson would appoint Colonel
Johnson to the position of Secretary of War.  Metcalfe supported Trimble's accusations in
a letter dated 6 October 1826:
I was at a loss to perceive how the election of Jackson could bring me so
near the senate, and I asked him [Major Thomas P. Moore] how such an
event could happen as no vacancy could occur for several years in
Kentucky?  His answer was – “If Jackson is elected, Col. Johnson will
receive the appointment of secretary of war!”  I then asked him how it
could be so understood?  He replied with a significant nod, “that in
passing through Kentucky, the friends of the general or the general
himself, - I am not certain which – had given the intimation to the friends
of Colonel Johnson.”
33 Argus of Western America, 26 September 1827; Acts of the First Session of the 36th
General Assembly of Kentucky, 1827, 167; Argus of Western America, 16 January 1828;
McCormick, Second Party System, 216.
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Moore, a Jackson supporter, tried to blunt the effect of the letter in a slightly different
version of the conversation:
While the Presidential election was pending before the House, and after I
was appraised that General Thomas Metcalfe then a member, intended to
vote for Mr. Adams, I mentioned to him the reception of a letter from Gen.
M’fee, a relative of mine, and the friend of General Metcalfe, which said
“we all hope and believe that General Jackson will appoint Col. Johnson
Secretary of War; and in the event the party will reward out friend Gen.
Metcalfe for his magnanimity in refusing to be used by the anti against
Rowan [a reference to the issue of debt relief].  He will be elected to fill
the vacancy.”
Clearly, Moore was trying remove the conversation as far from Jackson as possible, but
in the end many who were inclined to support Clay saw this as evidence that neither side
was really free of the bargain and corruption charges.34
The outcome in Kentucky was not really close.  Jackson received almost 56
percent of the vote (39,308), while Adams only took 44 percent (31,468).  Many factors
entered into the outcome; most important were Jackson’s regional appeal and the fact that
the democratic rhetoric of the Jacksonians resounded positively in a state where issues
like debt relief had placed such an important role throughout the decade.  Adams and
Clay were in many ways perceived as supporters of the anti-Relief, or Old Court, politics
of aristocracy that were unpopular in the state.  Even Clay’s personal popularity could not
save the incumbent from defeat in the state.35
34 Channing, Kentucky, 87; Niles Weekly Register, 11, 18 October 1828;
Commentator, 20 September 1828.
35 Moore, Guide to Elections, 369; Channing, Kentucky, 87-88.  One interesting note
is that two of the main Jacksonian supporters in Kentucky, Francis Preston Blair and
Amos Kendall, became major advisors to Jackson during his presidency.  Their position
on state banking issues played a large role in influencing Jackson toward his decision to
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Andrew Jackson’s victory in 1828 ushered in a new age, one where democracy
was touted as the cure for corruption and intrigue in politics.  Right or wrong, the
perception among many was that the nation’s political system was out of control and that
to counter this, the people must be heard.  For electoral politics, this meant pushing the
states toward the more democratic system of allowing the people to vote for electors,
rather than appointing them through legislative action.  This did not mean, however, that
the politicians of the period were willing to give up their power in either presidential or
party politics.  While many were intent on bringing the people into the process, others
were equally as willing to use electoral and presidential politics as a way to increase party
or state power.  In the end, more states changed their method of selection to increase their
standing with the national parties rather than to promote democratic principles.  Vermont
alone seems to have had purely reform motives in regard to change.  Also, whether the
intentions of the state politicians were to promote democracy or to gain power, the result
was to open the process to popular participation on a scale never seen before.  Almost
800,000 more voters participated in the 1828 presidential election, and more than one-
half of them came from states that changed the method of voting for electors – an
increase due to more than just the natural population growth.
As for Jackson, by 1828 he had wholly embraced the idea of popular choice in
presidential elections, and many of his followers took their lead from him.  Whether or
not his motives were derived from a true embrace of democracy or simply a reaction to
put an end to the Bank of the United States.  The issue of banking and relief, then, had
major importance beyond the party alignments in Kentucky during the 1828 election.
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the 1824 election is not important.  Over the eight years of his presidency from 1829 to
1837, he made adopting a constitutional amendment providing for the direct election of
the president and vice president a major theme in every State of the Union addresses.
Indeed, he devoted a lengthy passage to the subject in his first Inaugural Address:
I consider it one of the most urgent of my duties to bring to your attention
the propriety of amending that part of our Constitution which relates to the
election of President and Vice-President.  Our system of government was
by its framers deemed an experiment, and they therefore consistently
provided a mode of remedying its defects.
To the people belongs the right of electing their Chief Magistrate; it was
never designed that their choice should in any case be defeated, either by
the intervention of electoral colleges or by the agency confided, under
certain contingencies, to the House of Representatives.  Experience proves
that in proportion as agents to execute the will of the people are multiplied
there is danger of their wishes being frustrated.  Some may be unfaithful;
all are liable to err.  So far, therefore as the people can with convenience
speak, it is safer for them to express their own will.
The number of aspirants to the Presidency and the diversity of the interests
which may influence their claims leave little reason to expect a choice in
the first instance, and in that event the election must devolve on the House
of Representatives, where it is obvious the will of the people may not be
always ascertained, or, if ascertained, may not be regarded.  From the
mode of voting by States the choice is to be made by 24 votes, and it may
often occur that one of these will be controlled by an individual
Representative.  Honors and offices are at the disposal of the successful
candidate.  Repeated ballotings may make it apparent that a single
individual holds the cast in his hand.  may he not be tempted to name hi
reward?  But even without corruption, supposing the probity of the
Representative to be proof against the powerful motives by which it may
be assailed, the will of the people is still constantly liable to be
misrepresented.  One may err from ignorance of the wishes of his
constituents; another from a conviction that it is his duty to be governed
by his own judgment of the fitness of the candidates; finally, although all
were inflexibly honest, all accurately informed of the wishes of their
constituents, yet under the present mode of election a minority may often
elect a President, and when this happens it may reasonably be expected
that efforts will be made on the part of the majority to rectify this injurious
operation of their institution.  But although no evil of this character should
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result from such a perversion of the first principle of our system – that the
majority is to govern – it must be very certain that a President elected by a
minority can not enjoy the confidence necessary to the successful
discharge of his duties.
In this as in all other matters of public concern policy requires that as few
impediments as possible should exist to the free operation of the public
will.  Let us, then, endeavor so to amend our system that the office of chief
Magistrate may not be conferred upon any citizen but in pursuance of a
fair expression of the will of the majority.
I would therefore recommend such an amendment of the constitution as
may remove all intermediate agency in the election of the President and
Vice-President.  The mode may be so regulated as to preserve to each
State its present relative weight in the election, and a failure in the first
attempt may be provided for by confining the second to a choice between
the two highest candidates.  In connection with such an amendment it
would seem advisable to limit the service of the Chief Magistrate to a
single term of either four or six years.  If, however, it should not be
adopted, it is worthy of consideration whether a provision disqualifying
for office the Representatives in Congress on whom such an election may
have devolved would not be proper.36
Very neatly, Jackson advocated all of the resolutions that had previously been
introduced in Congress between the elections of 1824 and 1828.  At the same time, he
made clear his opinion of Henry Clay, John Quincy Adams, and those who voted against
their state’s wishes in the previous election.  Historian T.P. Abernathy claimed that
Jackson’s motives were in no way democratic, but rather political and spiteful:  “No
historian has ever accused Jackson, the great Democrat, of having had a political
philosophy.  It is hard to see that he even had any political principles.  He was a man of
36 James D. Richardson, comp., A Compilation of Messages and Papers of the
Presidents, 1789-1897, 20 vols. (New York: Bureau of National Literature, 1924), 3: 110-
11.
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action, and the man of action is likely to be an opportunist.”  Old Hickory, Abernathy
concluded, constituted a paradox.   “He belonged to the moneyed aristocracy of
Nashville, yet he was a self-made man and devoid of snobbishness.  He thought he was
sincere when he spoke to the people, yet he never really championed their cause.  He
merely encouraged them to champion his.”  Whether Jackson was a democrat or an
opportunist, the people and members of the party that rose around him, perceived him to
be the people’s champion.  This, in turn, promoted the more democratic approach that
evolved in presidential politics.  Just as perception fueled the Jacksonian vigor after the
“bargain and sale” in 1824, perception became the biggest promoter of democracy in
1828.37
37 Thomas Perkins Abernathy, “Andrew Jackson and the Rise of Southwestern
Democracy,” American Historical Review 33 (October 1927): 76.
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CHAPTER 6
THE ELECTION OF 1832:  THE GENERAL TICKET PROMISES
UNIFORMITY AMONG THE STATES
The presidential election of 1832 was in many ways similar to 1828 in that several
states changed their method of selecting electors and, again, Andrew Jackson was a
candidate.  The election was also markedly different, though, because several major
issues of national importance became part of the debate.  The election was seen as a
national referendum on Jackson's actions, or inaction in one case, as president.
Electorally, the states continued the trend toward universal adoption of the general ticket
method of choosing electors.  Of the twenty-four states participating, only two, Maryland
and South Carolina, used a different method – the district system in the former and
legislative selection in the latter.  Stressing the need to award a single candidate all of the
state's votes, and do so democratically, Maine, Delaware, New York, and Tennessee
enacted election laws mandating popular selection on a general ticket.
Three major issues framed the election debate – the nullification crisis involving
South Carolina, the Supreme Court's decisions regarding Georgia's dealings with the
Cherokee Indians, and the veto of the Bank of the United States recharter bill.  Each had
a tremendous impact on the voting public.  In addition, the issues brought together two
former enemies, John C. Calhoun and Henry Clay.  Working under the umbrella of the
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National Republican party, they both sought to remove Jackson from the highest office in
the land.1
South Carolina had long opposed the use of protective tariffs in the United States.
Calhoun, who had anonymously written the South Carolina Exposition and Protest four
years earlier, thought he would be able to use his influence with Jackson to see that the
tariff rates were lowered.  Jackson himself believed that tariffs should be used, but more
judiciously than in previous years.  Despite his support for Jackson's presidency and his
position as vice-president, Calhoun found himself in no position to influence the
president when Congress set the 1832 tariffs.  Calhoun's loss of strength was due in part
to the Peggy Eaton Affair.  Peggy O'Neale Eaton, the wife of Secretary of War John
Eaton, had been the target of malicious gossip from other cabinet wives, similar to that
which Rachel Jackson had endured during the 1828 campaign.  When Jackson tried to
force the cabinet wives to socialize with Peggy Eaton, most of the cabinet resigned.
Calhoun's wife, Floride, was also opposed to accepting her and the vice-president
suffered for her actions. In addition, Jackson had learned in 1830 that during cabinet
debates in 1818, Calhoun as Secretary of War had urged that Jackson be censured for his
invasion of Florida, seizure of the Spanish forts at St. Marks and Pensacola, and the
execution of two British subjects, Alexander Arbuthnot and Robert Ambrister.  When
Jackson learned of Calhoun's support of the censure, he concluded the vice-president
1 Two excellent accounts of the entire election are Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson
and the Course of American Freedom  (1981; reprint, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
Press, 1988), 353-392 and Samuel R. Gammon, The Presidential Campaign of 1832
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1922) in its entirety.
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could no longer be trusted.  Taken together, these incidents led Calhoun to believe he
would be better off in another position.  He resigned the vice-presidency and returned to
South Carolina, where Governor Robert Hayne immediately appointed him senator.  As
senator, Calhoun pushed South Carolina into defying the federal government and
threatening military action if any attempts were made to collect tariffs within the state.
Although the issue was settled peacefully with South Carolina accepting a lower tariff
rate, the issue pointed out the conflict growing between states' rights advocates and the
rest of the nation. 2
The issue of Indian removal reinforced negative opinions of Jackson as
hardhearted throughout the northeastern part of the country.  The debate centered on
Georgia extending its jurisdiction in 1829 to about nine million acres of land that lay
within its boundaries but were still occupied by the Cherokee Indians.  The Cherokees'
title to the land, on which gold had been discovered, had been guaranteed previously by
2 Remini, Course of American Freedom, 300-330; Eugene H. Roseboom, A History of
Presidential Elections (New York: Macmillan, 1959), 95-99; Martin Van Buren, The
Autobiography of Martin Van Buren, ed. by John C. Fitzpatrick (1920; reprint, New
York: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1969), 376-79, 402-08; Royce C. McCrary, Jr., "
'The Long Agony is Nearly Over': Samuel D. Ingham Reports of the Dissolution of
Andrew Jackson's First Cabinet," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 100
(October 1976): 235-37; Edward Stanwood, A History of Presidential Elections (Boston:
Osgood and Co., 1884), 102-03; Edward Stanwood, A History of the Presidency, 2 vols.
(Boston:  Houghton Mifflin Co., 1924), 1:  154-55.  For an accurate and complete
account of the cabinet issues, see Richard B. Latner, The Presidency of Andrew Jackson:
White House Politics, 1829-1837 (Athens:  University of Georgia Press, 1979).  A full
account of the tariff issue can be found in Richard E. Ellis, The Union at Risk:
Jacksonian Democracy, States' Rights, and the Nullification Crisis (New York:  Oxford
University Press, 1987), as well as William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War:  The
Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836 (New York:  Harper & Row,
1965).
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treaty; thus, the Indians appealed to the federal courts to uphold their sovereignty over the
land in question.  The Supreme Court ruled against Georgia, but the state ignored those
decisions and continued to enforce its jurisdiction.  Jackson made no effort to restrain
Georgia and enforce the Court's ruling.  Southern and western states applauded Jackson's
non-action, while in New England especially, the president came under extreme
criticism. 3
The most important issue relating the 1832 election, though, involved the Bank of
the United States.  The Charter of the Bank was due to expire in 1836.  The president had
not clearly defined his position on the Bank, but he was increasingly uneasy about its
power.  More significant in an election year was the fact that large blocs of voters who
favored Jackson were openly hostile to the Bank.  In the summer of 1832, Jackson's
opponents, led by Clay, rushed through Congress a bill to recharter the bank, forcing
Jackson to either sign the measure and alienate many of his supporters or to veto it and
appear to be a foe of sound banking practices.  Jackson's cabinet was divided between
friends and critics of the Bank, but the obviously political motives of the Recharter Bill
reconciled all of them to the necessity of a veto.  On July 10, 1832, just a little over four
months before the election, Jackson sent his veto message, stating, "Having come to the
conclusion that it ought not to become a law, I herewith return it [the bill] . . . with my
3For more information on the issue, see Robert V. Remini, The Legacy of Andrew
Jackson: Essays on Democracy, Indian Removal, and Slavery (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1988); Michael Paul Rogin, Fathers and Children: Andrew
Jackson and the Subjugation of the American Indian (New York: Knopf, 1975); and
Anthony F.C. Wallace, The Long Bitter Trail: Andrew Jackson and the Indians (New
York: Hill and Wang, 1993).
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objections."  His major objections were that it had a virtual monopoly in the banking
industry, it could fall under the sway of foreign nationals, and that, despite court rulings
to the contrary, it was probably unconstitutional in its current form.  Robert Remini sums
up the dilemma this veto created:
Jackson, in writing the veto as he did, laid the Bank issue squarely before
the American people for decision.  Never before had a Chief Executive
taken a strong stand on an important matter, couched his position in
provocative language, and challenged the electorate to unseat him if they
did not approve.  And the alternative was clear.  Either Clay and the Bank
– or Jackson and no Bank.
The election results would answer the question. 4
The 1832 election was also different from 1828 in that a third-party candidate had
emerged.  Jackson, of course, represented the Democratic party, and the National
Republican party nominated Clay.  Added to this was the Anti-Masonic party, which
chose William Wirt as their standard bearer.  The election results show that despite the
presence of serious issues and opponents, the greater majority of the voters supported
Andrew Jackson, if not his policies. With 54 percent of the votes, Jackson soundly
defeated Clay and Wirt, who had gained only 37 and 8 percent respectively.  Electorally,
Jackson defeated his opponents 219 to 49 for Clay, 7 for Wirt, and 11 for John Floyd who
had been selected by the South Carolina legislature but received no votes, popular or
electoral, outside that state.
4 James D. Richardson, comp., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the
Presidents, 1787 to 1924, 20 vols. (New York: Bureau of National Literature, Inc., 1924),
3: 1139-1154; Remini, Course of American Freedom, 353-373.  A complete history of
the issue can be found in Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Bank War (New
York:  W.W. Norton & Co., 1967).
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Andrew Jackson Henry Clay William Wirt
Alabama      14,291      7   14,286 100.0     7            5     0.0 − − − −
Connecticut      32,833      8   11,269   34.3 −   18,155   55.3     8     3,409   10.4 −
Delaware        8,386      3     4,110   49.0 −     4,276   51.0     3 − − −
Georgia      20,750    11   20,750 100.0   11 − − − − − −
Illinoisa      21,481      5   14,609   68.0     5     6,745   31.4 −          97     0.5 −
Indiana      57,152      9   31,652   55.4     9   25,473   44.6 −          27     0.0 −
Kentucky      79,741    15   36,292   45.5 −   43,449   54.5   15 − − −
Louisiana        6,337      5     3,908   61.7     5     2,429   38.3 − − − −
Maine      62,153    10   33,978   54.7   10   27,331   44.0 −        844     1.4 −
Marylandb      38,316    10   19,156   50.0     3   19,160   50.0     5 − − −
Massachusettsc      67,619    14   13,933   20.6 −   31,963   47.3   14   14,692   21.7 −
Mississippi        5,750      4     5,750 100.0     4 − − − − − −
Missouri        5,192      4     5,192 100.0     4 − − − − − −
New Hampshire      43,793      7   24,855   56.8     7   18,938   43.2 − − − −
New Jersey      47,760      8   23,826   49.9     8   23,466   49.1 −        468     1.0 −
New York    323,393    42 168,497   52.1   42 154,896   47.9 − − − −
North Carolina      29,799    15   25,261   84.8   15     4,538   15.2 − − − −
Ohio    158,350    21   81,246   51.3   21   76,566   48.4 −        538     0.3 −
Pennsylvania    157,679    30   90,973   57.7   30 − − −   66,706   42.3 −
Rhode Islandd        5,747      4     2,051   35.7 −     2,871   50.0     4        819   14.3 −
South Carolina         N/A     11      N/A −      N/A −      N/A −
Tennesseee      29,425    15   28,078   95.4   15     1,347     4.6 − − − −
Vermont      32,344      7     7,865   24.3 −   11,161   34.5 −   13,112   40.5     7
Virginia      45,682    23   34,243   75.0   23   11,436   25.0 −            3     0.0 −
Total 1,293,973  288 701,780   54.2 219 484,205   37.4   49 100,715     7.8     7
a-30 votes (0.1%) cast for a write-in candidate, name unknown; b-2 electors did not cast
ballots; c-7,031 (10.4%) scattered write-in votes cast; d-6 (0.1%) scattered write-in votes
cast; e-206 (0.6%) scattered write-in votes cast
5 Information for the following table was adapted from John L. Moore, ed.,
Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections (Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Quarterly, Inc., 1994), 370, 430.  The South Carolina legislature gave John Floyd the
state's eleven electoral votes, but he was not on the ballot in any other state; thus, his vote
total is not represented in this table.
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Of those states taking part in the election, four changed their method of choosing
presidential electors from that used in 1828.  Delaware shifted from legislative selection
to the general ticket, leaving only South Carolina with the more antiquated method.
Maine, New York and Tennessee changed from the district method to the general ticket.
Maryland chose to keep its district system but, significantly, changed immediately after
the 1832 election to the general ticket method.  The transition, then, to the use of the
general ticket was almost complete.  No longer would a state's electoral vote be divided
between candidates.  Not coincidentally, the two party system was again on the way to
becoming a permanent fixture in American politics.
New York’s change from the district mode of elector selection to the use of a
general ticket was, in large part, due to Martin Van Buren’s desire to promote national
party competition and had nothing to do with the presidential election of 1832.  As
discussed in previous chapters, New York politics in the 1820s revolved around DeWitt
Clinton and those who opposed him.  Clinton had been a supporter of Jackson since
1824, but bitterly opposed Van Buren; thus, the Clintonians were not fully aligned with
the pro-Adams Republicans or the Van Buren/Regency-backed Democrats.  Clinton’s
presence, then, made true national party competition difficult in the state.  His death in
February 1828 resolved the issue.  Immediately after, the pro-Adams Clintonians aligned
themselves with the National Republican party while Jacksonians supported the Regency-
led Democratic party.  The anti-masonry movement in the state played havoc with the
1828 election results, weakening both the major political parties.  The Jacksonians were
able to maintain their hold on the General Assembly and Van Buren was elected, barely,
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as governor.  This was a position he would hold for only two months, before taking the
position as Secretary of State in the Jackson administration. 6
Obviously, Van Buren did little in his position as governor.  One change, though,
was the move to the general ticket.  The benefits of this change were two-fold.  First and
most important, use of the general ticket would allow the state’s electoral vote to go to
one candidate.  Since New York was so populous, this made the state very influential in
choosing the president.  Jacksonians knew the General would have taken the whole vote
had the general ticket been in place for the 1828 election and would probably do so if
change were enacted in time for the 1832 election. The desire to strengthen the state’s
standing in the electoral race coincided neatly with Van Buren’s desire to promote true
two-party competition throughout the country.  Parties, according to Van Buren, “are
inseparable from free government,” and are necessary because “disposition to abuse
power . . . can by no other means be effectually checked.”  Party competition had other
value than checking personal ambition.  Van Buren believed that party competition bred
discord, and this discord promoted interest in politics.  In his view, voter apathy rather
than dissension was a danger to a republic.  On at least two occasions, he discussed the
need for conflict to promote the general welfare of the country.  Referring to the War of
1812, Van Buren said,
6 Robert V. Remini, Martin Van Buren and the Making of the Democratic Party (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 195; DeAlva Stanwood Alexander, A Political
History of the State of New York (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1906), 357-69;
Donald B. Cole, Martin Van Buren and the American Political System (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1984), 177; Richard P. McCormick, The Second American
Party System: Party Formation in the Jacksonian Era (Chapel Hill: The University of
North Carolina Press, 1966), 117-21.
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. . . on the various operation of government with which the public welfare
are connected, an honest difference of opinion may exist – when those
differences are discussed and the principles of contending parties are
supported with candor, fairness, and moderation, the very discord which is
thus produced, may in a government like ours, be conducive to the public
good.
He used similar words were used when addressing the Senate about the bitter election of
1824.  Rather than being dangerous, he argued, party discord was a necessity:
In a government like ours founded upon freedom in thought and action,
imposing no unnecessary restraints, and calling into action the highest
energies of the mind, occasional differences are not only to be expected,
but to be desired.  They rouse the sluggish to exertion, give increased
energy to the most active intellect, excite a salutary vigilance over our
public functionaries, and prevent that apathy which has proved the ruin of
Republics.7
Finally, Van Buren saw the promotion of parties as a remedy to the growing
sectionalism in the country.  National parties would draw men together, whereas
sectionalism would drive them apart.  “If the old ones [party feelings] are suppressed,
geographical divisions founded on local interests or, what is worse, prejudices between
free and slaveholding states will inevitable take their place,” he wrote to Virginia
newspaper editor Thomas Ritchie in 1827.  “Party attachment in former times furnished a
complete antidote for sectional prejudices by producing counteracting feelings.”  The
winner-take-all general ticket system, then, would rouse the public, promote party over
personal ambition, and tie different sections of the country together as the party tried to
find a winning combination of states whose electoral votes would give their candidate the
victory.  After Clinton’s death, no one actively opposed the change in New York’s
7 Van Buren, Autobiography, 50, 125, 512.
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electoral law.  In 1832, Jackson won New York’s entire electoral vote.   Van Buren
gained what he would term as a victory for the country, as well as the party. 8
The next state to take up the issue of electoral reform was Maine, where politics
differed greatly from the contentious state of New York.  Maine had borrowed much of
its political framework from Massachusetts.  Prior to statehood in 1820, the Federalist
and Democratic Republican parties vied for dominance, with the Democratic Republicans
holding a majority of government positions.  Between 1803 and 1820, the Federalists
offered little competition, but they determinedly fielded candidates.  When Maine applied
for statehood, the Federalists were in a position of becoming inconsequential since their
numbers had dwindled over the years.  Faced with being a party unable to hold any
elected seats, the Federalists brokered an agreement with the Republicans.  In return for
supporting Maine's bid for statehood, the Republicans guaranteed the Federalists a quota
of government offices proportional to the party's strength – about one-half that of the
Republicans.  With the agreement in place, the Federalist party continued to run
candidates in for office until 1828.  The presidential elections of 1824 and 1828,
however, brought an end to this agreement, as well as to the Federalist party.  A split
developed in 1823 between Democratic Republicans who supported William Crawford
8 Martin Van Buren to Thomas Ritchie, 13 January 1827, cited in James W. Ceasar,
Presidential Selection Theory and Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1979), 138; Archie Baxter, ed., General Index to the Laws of the State of New York,
1777-1901, Both Dates Inclusive 3 vols. (Albany:  J.B. Lyon Co., 1902), 2: 234.  Van
Buren’s views on the necessity of political parties have been written about extensively.
See Remini, Van Buren, in its entirety, Ceasar, Presidential Selection Theory, 123-69,
and Michael Wallace, “Changing Concepts of Party in the United States: New York,
1815-1828,” American Historical Review 74 (December 1968): 453-91.
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and those who backed John Quincy Adams.  Adams won Maine's electors easily, but
many Republicans became disenchanted with his presidency and fought even harder to
remove him from office.   In 1828, the disenchanted began identifying themselves with
the Jackson party and formed an alliance with the remnants of the Federalist party.  In
that election, Adams still won every district in the state, but this time by a smaller
margin.  Historian Richard McCormick concluded, “ . . . the split that occurred in the
1828 presidential election was to be decisive . . . .  The two new parties had become
established.”9
The movement toward changing the selection of presidential electors from the
district mode to the general ticket system can be traced to the desire of both parties to
solidify the state’s power behind one candidate or another, especially in light of the
closeness of the 1828 campaign.  Additionally, state lawmakers were concerned that
dividing the state’s electoral vote would weaken its impact on the national contest.  The
issue was taken up in February 1832, when both state houses created a special joint
committee to analyze the issue, as well as that of congressional reapportionment.  The
committee issued its report recommending the switch.  Chairman Nathaniel Groton,
writing for the committee, concluded:
9 American Patriot, 19, 26 January 1828, 13 September 1828; Kennebec Journal, 11
July 1828; McCormick, Second Party System, 54.  For an excellent account of the
development of political parties and alliances in Maine, see Ronald F. Banks, Maine
Becomes a State:  The Movement to Separate Maine from Massachusetts, 1785-1820
(Middleton, Conn.:  Wesleyan University Press, 1970), Charles E. Clark, Maine (New
York:  W.W. Norton, 1977), 74-90, and Kenneth T. Palmer, G. Thomas Taylor and
Marcus A. Librizzi, Maine Politics and Government (Lincoln:  University of Nebraska
Press, 1992), 80.
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One state after another has abandoned the District system in the choice of
electors until Maine is believed to be the only State in the Union which
adheres to this ancient custom.  Maryland, New York, New Hampshire
and our parent State have with great unanimity adopted the general ticket
system, in the choice of Electors.  Indeed it seems to be the policy of all
the States to present an undivided electoral ticket in favor of some one
individual for President of the United States.
Governor Samuel Smith, a Jacksonian, signed the resolution, and Maine proceeded to
give its ten votes to President Jackson in 1832.10
Delaware’s change from selection of electors by the legislature to popular
selection on a general ticket had little to do with party competition.  Instead, the change
was a result of a broadening of suffrage rights instituted as a result of a general
constitutional convention in 1831.  Politics in Delaware had been, and remained,
unchanged from the 1790s.  McCormick described the general political atmosphere
succinctly:
Delware was distinguished above all other states for the stability of its
politics.  Parties were formed early, developed efficient organizations,
competed vigorously on a remarkably equal basis, and exhibited amazing
durability.  For more than half a century political alignments established in
the 1790’s underwent little change; even in the Jackson era the transition
from old to new party alignments was accomplished smoothly. 11
Roughly speaking, Delaware was divided geographically as far as party
allegiances went.  The northern county of New Castle leaned heavily Democratic-
Republican, and later supported the Democratic/Jacksonian party.  New Castle was
10 Civil Government for the State of Maine for the Political Year 1832, 392-93.  It
should be noted that Maryland did not actually abandon the district system until 1833,
immediately after the presidential election.  New Hampshire adopted the general ticket in
1804, New York in 1829, and Massachusetts in 1824.
11 McCormick, Second Party System, 147.
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mostly industrial, with a large Scotch-Irish, Presbyterian population.  The state’s other
two counties, Kent and Sussex, were agricultural regions that habitually elected
Federalist, then National Republican, candidates.  Although some prominent
Federalists such as Louis McLane and James Bayard switched to the Democratic party,
for the most part the geographical split remained the same after 1824 as it was before.
Indeed, McLane’s split with his old Federalist companions appeared to be a result of the
party’s failure to support his favorite, Bayard, as his successor to the United State House
in 1827 after McLane was elevated to the Senate.  The presidential question in 1824 and
1828, then, had little effect on party development in Delaware.12
In 1831, the state legislature called for, and the voters approved, the meeting of a
general convention to amend the state’s constitution.  During the convention, delegates
recommended that several changes be made so that the state would be brought in line
with the rest of the country.  One change enacted was to switch the election date for state
and national representatives from October to the “first Tuesday in November.”
Additionally, the voting provision that mandated voter eligibility be determined by “his
father’s qualification” was deleted.  Henceforth, a voter’s eligibility was based on
“having paid tax and being otherwise qualified.”  Finally, the convention recommended,
and the legislature ultimately passed, a provision giving the choice of presidential
electors to the people on a general ticket.  The liberalization of voting laws, times, and
methods was a reflection of national trends and a desire on the part of Delaware
12 McCormick, Second Party System, 148, 151, 153; Carol E. Hoffecker, Delaware
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1977), 177-78; John A. Munroe, Federalist Delaware, 1775-
1815 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1954), 213, 239.
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politicians to remain a viable, modern state at a time when its own population growth
could not hope to equal that of its neighbors.  The move toward a more democratic
society throughout the country could not be ignored.13
Andrew Jackson’s home state of Tennessee was one of the last to adopt the
general ticket system, waiting until August 1832.  This is somewhat ironic, given the
President’s support of the people’s right to choose electors and his promotion of the
general ticket system in general.  Tennessee had used the district method of selection
since 1804.  Presumably, the Jacksonians were not afraid of losing any of the state’s
electoral votes in 1832, since in the previous two elections Jackson easily won each of the
state districts.  Governor William Carroll, though, was widely hailed as a reformer.
Under his leadership from 1821 to 1827 and 1829 to 1835, many changes, both social and
political, were enacted.  “It was Governor Carroll, a spokesman for people who had little
or no voice in government,” Tennessee historian Robert Corlew concluded, “and not
Andrew Jackson, who first brought ‘Jacksonian Democracy’ to Tennessee.”14
Like many other states, personal factions and loyalties dominated Tennessee, with
no evidence of party politics.  Strictly adhering to the Jeffersonian Democratic-
Republican party prior to 1824, politicians identified themselves with their relationship to
the prominent men of the period.  More often than not, political developments can be
traced to the careers of these men, many of whom served as governor at one time or
13 Laws of the State of Delaware, 10 vols. (New Castle: State of Delaware, 1776-
1852), 8: 72-4, 215-16.
14 Robert E. Corlew, Tennessee: A Short History, 2nd ed. (Knoxville: The University
of Tennessee Press, 1981), 159.
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another.  The most influential were John Sevier, Archibald Roane, William Blount, Felix
Grundy, and John Overton.  Issues such as land disposition and Indian relations
dominated the state legislature.  This changed in 1820 because of the severe financial
crisis that affected not only Tennessee but also the entire country in 1819.  The
gubernatorial campaign of 1821 revolved solely around the banking issue.  Carroll, as
well as other reformers, was swept into office, winning every county but two by decisive
margins.  At this time, the “aristocratic” Blount faction, of which Jackson was a member,
was in disarray and Jackson’s political career seemed over.15
Carroll came to his position with an ambitious plan to reform state political and
social institutions.  The Jacksonians would later adopt many of these reforms, but the
credit for the initiative belongs to Carroll, who eventually became part of the new
Democratic party, easily bridging the gap that existed between the personal factions prior
to Jackson’s ascension to party leadership. Some of Carroll’s reforms, enacted during his
second stint in office, were establishing public schools in the state, constructing internal
improvements such as ports, enacting banking reform, creating a system of taxation based
on land value, mandating the election of county officials through popular vote rather than
through legislative selection, and revising of the state’s penal code.  Although there was
no pressing need to change the state’s electoral law, Carroll joined Jackson’s call for
15 Tennessee Gazette, 2 June 1821; Thomas Perkins Abernathy, “The Origin of the
Whig Party in Tennessee,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 12 (March 1926): 504.
Excellent accounts of the rise of Carroll can be found in Corlew, Tennessee, 126-44,
Thomas Perkins Abernathy, From Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee:  A Study in
Frontier Democracy (Chapel Hill:  The University of North Carolina Press, 1932), 182-
93, 221-26, 233-34, and McCormick, Second Party System, 222-27.
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reform, citing both the need to reflect the nationwide movement to the general ticket in
order to keep the state’s power intact and the seemingly more democratic nature of this
system.  Although Jackson’s “dictatorial tactics made it extremely difficult . . . to
maintain the ascendancy of the [Democratic] party in the state,” no one opposed the
change and few remarked on it at all.16
In the aftermath of Jackson’s reelection, Maryland opted to join the rest of the
states (except South Carolina) in adopting the general ticket method of choosing
presidential electors.  Although the state had used this system previously – in both 1789
and 1792 – the district plan had been in effect since the presidential election of 1796.
Party politics did not play a large role in this decision.  Unlike other southern and western
states, Maryland had much more in common with middle states such as Pennsylvania and
New York, where two-party competition had flourished since 1800.  The loyalties that
had been given to the old Federalist and Democratic-Republican parties were transferred
to the new parties that formed behind Adams and Jackson after 1824, with many
16 Tennessee Assembly, Journal of the Senate, 1821, 86-99; Tennessee Assembly,
Journal of the House, 1823, 9-15; Tennessee Assembly, Journal of the House, 1826, 173-
74; Tennessee Assembly, Journal of the Senate, 1831, 69; Tennessee, Public Acts, 1831,
56; Tennessee, Public Acts, 1826, 18; Tennessee, Public Acts, 1832, 2-13.  Some good
sources for detailed information on Carroll’s reforms and Jackson’s role in the
movement, see Abernathy, Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee, 234-35, Corlew,
Tennessee, 159-76, Powell Moore, “James K. Polk :  Tennessee Politician,” Journal of
Southern History 17 (November 1951), 493, and Thomas Perkins Abernathy, “Andrew
Jackson and the Rise of Southwestern Democracy,” American Historical Review 33
(October 1927), 60-70.
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prominent Federalists like Roger Brooke Taney and Thomas Carroll entering the Jackson
camp.17
The inequities inherent in Maryland’s state government, where an electoral
college chose senators, the legislature chose the governor and council, and the House of
Delegates was chosen not through representational districts but by selecting four
delegates from each county and two from each of the cities of Baltimore and Annapolis,
became apparent and were loudly proclaimed as undemocratic in 1831.  The real impetus
for change came from the publication of the 1830 national census figures.  Maryland
historian Robert Brugger explained:
They showed that about one-fourth of the population elected a majority of
legislators.  Two senators and two members of the House of Delegates
spoke for the 80,000 residents of Baltimore, whose level of representation
had not changed since the city population stood at 26,000.  Annapolis, a
normally quiet town of several thousand, sent the same number to the
State House.  Spokesmen for the older counties tightly guarded the
apportionment of delegates (four per county, regardless of population) and
senators (six for the Eastern Shore, nine for the Western); they defended
the practice of electing one federal senator from each shore and governors
from either the Eastern Shore of the lower Western Shore.  John
McMahon in his Historical View of the Government of Maryland,
published in 1831, noted that “shore jealousies” and twin government
offices had given Maryland “the character of a confederacy of two shores”
rather than the integrity of an ordinary state.
Faced with popular unrest in the face of under-representation, Maryland began to reform
17 McCormick, Second Party System, 154-55, 161-63.  An excellent account of the
development of the Democratic party in Maryland can be found in M.H. Haller, “The
Rise of the Jackson Party in Maryland, 1820-1829,” Journal of Southern History 28
(August 1962):  301-326.
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its selection process for governmental offices, giving the people the right to choose state
officers through districts. 18
The adoption of the general ticket as a means of selecting presidential electors
was only a small part of political reform in Maryland and was based solely on the
argument of maintaining the state’s power in electing the president relative to the rest of
the nation.  The preamble of the law stated:
WHEREAS, the manner of appointing electors of President and Vice
President, of the United States, by a general ticket, as directed by the
legislatures of a large majority of the states, has the effect of giving the
whole electoral vote of each of those states, to one person, for each of this
important offices; and the mode adopted and long used in the state of
Maryland, of electing in separate districts of the state, one or at most two
electors from each district, results in all cases of contest in giving a
divided vote to the candidates for the highest offices in the government,
and the majority of the citizens of Maryland are thereby deprived of their
just weight in the choice of the Chief Magistrate, as compared with the
majority of the citizens of most of the other states, . . . . 19
Although neither party explicitly stated that they supported the change for
political reasons, one can surmise that they hoped the outcome would aid their party in
the presidential election of 1836.  In 1832, the state was divided almost equally, with
Jackson winning three electoral votes and Clay five.  More important, both candidates
received approximately 50 percent of the popular vote – Jackson with 19,156 and Clay
with 19,160.  The prospect of winning all the votes despite the closeness of the two
parties had to appeal to the party faithful.
18 McCormick, Second Party System, 155; Robert J. Brugger, Maryland: A Middle
Temperament, 1634-1980 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 228.
19 Laws of Maryland, 1833, Chapter 261.
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Debate concerning the choice of presidential electors did not end with Maryland’s
decision to adopt the general ticket system.  Congress once again took up the issue at the
beginning of 1835, after repeated requests from the president.  Jackson remained constant
in his support for a constitutional amendment creating a popular election, stressing the
necessity of changing the system in every annual address to Congress while he was
president.  Like every other year, in December 1834 the president devoted part of his
State of the Union message to the issue.  “All the reflection I have been able to bestow
upon the subject increases my conviction that the best interests of the country will be
promoted by the adoption of some plan that will secure in all contingencies that important
right of sovereignty to the direct control of the people,” Jackson proclaimed.  “Could this
be attained . . . I think our liberties would possess an additional safeguard.”  Acceding to
his wishes, Congress revisited the issue.20
On 9 December 1834, Speaker of the House John Bell mandated the formation of
a select committee to study the issue.  Meeting throughout the months of December and
January, the members were unable to come to any agreement on how an amendment
should be structured.  Frustrated, Chairman George Gilmer of Georgia asked that the
committee be dissolved.  Gilmer felt strongly about the issue, however, and was not
about to let it die.  Men who were favorable to a Van Buren candidacy in 1836 had
stymied Gilmer, a Hugh Lawson White supporter, with repeated objections while in
committee, so he decided to bring the issue forward on his own.  He wrote and presented
20 Richardson, Compilation of Messages, 3: 1336 (italics are mine). For Jackson’s
requests that Congress consider an amendment changing the electoral system, see
Richardson, Compilation of Messages, 3: 1081-82, 1168, 1253, 1395-96, and 4: 1478.
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a joint resolution reminiscent of the proposal in Jackson’s first inaugural address.  The
resolution called for abolishing the Electoral College, but keeping the individual state’s
electors.  The governor, after certifying the election returns, would award that state's
electoral votes to the candidate who won the popular vote.  No electors would meet to
actually cast a vote for the president and vice president.  In the event that no candidate
won a majority of electors, a second contest between the two leading candidates would be
held the first Tuesday in December.  The House of Representatives would not get
involved unless neither candidate in the second election was able to obtain a majority of
the electoral vote.  Only then would the House choose the president.  Additionally, under
this new system, the president would be limited to one six-year term  and be ineligible for
reelection. 21
The Democratic party was deeply divided on the issue, but those who opposed
passage of the amendment could not do so on its merits since the nominal head of the
party, Andrew Jackson, supported it.  Acting on Van Buren’s wishes (he saw no point in
changing from the general ticket, the method he had pursued since 1824), enough
Democrats voted against the proposal to defeat its passage.  To be sure, most said that
they supported some type of reform, but did not believe there was enough time to address
the issue adequately.  Even James K. Polk, the administration’s spokesman in the House
who had made his first speech in Congress on the merits of amending the Constitution in
21 Journal of the House of Representatives, 23rd Cong., 2nd sess., 31 January 1835, 294,
297-98, 13 February 1835, 377-78, 25 February 1835, 453-55; Register of Debates, 23rd
Cong., 2nd sess., 1126-27, 1497.
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order to reform presidential elections, was hesitant to support the idea.  He refused to
actively campaign for its passage.  In the end, the proposal was left on the table.22
The truth of the matter was that Andrew Jackson was a lame duck in 1835 and his
party was split over the choice of his successor.  Although the General supported Van
Buren’s candidacy, many southerners did not like him and sought to deny Van Buren the
party’s nomination.  Once again, politics rather than conviction proved more important.
Jackson’s support of Van Buren, at least in terms of electoral reform, seems odd.  Van
Buren promoted the general ticket system and was loath to change.  To him, the system
as it existed promoted party unity and the public good.  Jackson seemed to hold the
opposite opinion. As he wrote in his last State of the Union Address,
I felt it my duty in the first message which I communicated to
Congress to urge upon its attention the propriety of amending that
part of the Constitution which provides for the election of the
President and Vice-President of the United States.  The leading
object which I had in view was the adoption of some new
provisions which would secure to the people the performance of
this high duty without any intermediate agency.  In my annual
communications since I have enforced the same views, from a
sincere conviction that the best interests of the country would be
promoted by their adoption. . . . All history tells us that a free
people should be watchful of delegated power, and should never
acquiesce in a practice which will diminish their control over it.
This obligation, so universal in its application to all the principles
of a republic, is peculiarly so in ours, where the formation of
parties founded on sectional interests is so much fostered by the
extent of our territory.  These interests, represented by candidates
for the Presidency, are constantly prone, in the zeal of party and
selfish objects, to generate influences unmindful of the general
good and forgetful of the restraints which the great body of the
people would enforce if they were in no contingency to lose the
right of expressing their will.  The experience of our country from
22 Register of Debates, 23rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1501-04, 1525-32; Sellers, James K.
Polk, 267-68.
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the formation of the Government to the present day demonstrates
that the people can not too soon adopt some stronger safeguard for
their right to elect the highest officers known to the Constitution
than is contained in that sacred instrument as it now stands. 23
These divergent views illustrate the political nature of electoral reform and mirror
the changes that took place between 1824 and 1833.  On the one hand, there existed a
great desire to democratize the political processes throughout the country.  On the other,
many wanted to ensure the opportunity to employ political manipulation to guarantee
victory by whatever means necessary.  For a brief time the two coincided and produced
change in the electoral process.  By 1835 the unity between the two impulses had
disappeared, and the desire to assure political maneuvering gained the upper hand.




The Electoral College and Jacksonian Democracy are two subjects that have been
studied extensively.  Taken together, however, little has been written on how the method
of choosing presidential electors during the Age of Jackson changed.  Although many
historians have written on the development of political parties and the increase in voter
participation during this time, none has focused on how politicians sought to use the
method of selecting electors to further party development in the country.  Between 1824
and 1832, twelve states – one-half of those participating in presidential elections –
changed their methods of choosing electors.  Two states, New York and Missouri,
changed twice, and a third, Maryland, amended its voting laws immediately following the
1832 election.  In almost every case, the reason for changing methods of elector selection
was largely political but was promoted in terms of advancing democracy.  A careful
study of the movement toward selecting electors on a general ticket shows that political
considerations in terms of party and/or state power were much more important than
promoting democratic ideals.  Despite the presence of a few true reformers who
consistently pushed for a constitutional amendment guaranteeing that all states used the
same method, the conclusion must be that politics and party demanded a change.
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TABLE 10.  STATE METHODS OF CHOOSING ELECTORS BY
ELECTION, 1824-18321
State 1824 1828 1832
Alabama  General Ticket  General Ticket  General Ticket
Connecticut  General Ticket  General Ticket  General Ticket
Delaware  Legislative Selection  Legislative Selection  General Ticket
Georgia  Legislative Selection  General Ticket  General Ticket
Illinois  Electoral Districts  General Ticket  General Ticket
Indiana  General Ticket  General Ticket  General Ticket
Kentucky  Electoral Districts  General Ticket  General Ticket
Louisiana  Legislative Selection  General Ticket  General Ticket
Maine  Electoral Districts  Electoral Districts  General Ticket
Maryland  Electoral Districts  Electoral Districts  Electoral Districts
Massachusetts  General Ticket  General Ticket  General Ticket
Mississippi  General Ticket  General Ticket  General Ticket
Missouri  Electoral Districts  General Ticket  General Ticket
New Hampshire  General Ticket  General Ticket  General Ticket
New Jersey  General Ticket  General Ticket  General Ticket
New York  Legislative Selection  Electoral Districts  General Ticket
North Carolina  General Ticket  General Ticket  General Ticket
Ohio  General Ticket  General Ticket  General Ticket
Pennsylvania  General Ticket  General Ticket  General Ticket
Rhode Island  General Ticket  General Ticket  General Ticket
South Carolina  Legislative Selection  Legislative Selection  Legislative Selection
Tennessee  Electoral Districts  Electoral Districts  General Ticket
Vermont  Legislative Selection  General Ticket  General Ticket
Virginia  General Ticket  General Ticket  General Ticket
The efforts to adopt the general ticket mode of elector selection can be broken
into four distinct phases.  The first phase occurred during the 1824 election, before the
second two-party system had fully developed.  Electoral laws were changed, or
1 Italics represent those states that changed their method of selection of presidential
electors for that election year.
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controversially kept, in an effort to garner a win for one of five candidates from the same
party.  Following the confusion of the 1824 election, politicians sought a remedy to the
perceived political intrigue through amending the Constitution in order to mandate
uniform elector selection throughout the country.  The third phase took place at the time
of the 1828 election, as the newly created Democratic party sought to join and solidify a
diverse group of individuals behind one presidential candidate.  And, finally, the last
phase took place after the two-party system was again in full operation and states looked
to maintain their power in the election process.
Efforts to manipulate the selection of presidential electors first appeared during
the contentious elections of 1796 and 1800.  At that time, the first two-party system,
where Democratic Republicans and Federalists vied for power, had become entrenched in
American politics.  After the demise of the two-party system following the War of 1812,
most states gave little thought to how electors were chosen.  A small group of politicians
at the national level sought true reform through amending the constitution, but their
efforts failed.  For most of James Monroe’s presidency, then, there was almost no
discussion of how the president was elected.  This changed in 1824, when the
Democratic-Republicans could not agree on one candidate for the nation’s highest office.
During the campaign before this election, three states, Alabama, Indiana, and Missouri
changed their method of selecting presidential electors, and New York kept its mode of
legislative selection after a great deal of controversy.
Of the four states, only one, Alabama, did so for purely democratic reasons.
Governor Israel Pickens had long been an advocate of the general ticket method and had
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been a leader in pushing for a constitutional amendment throughout the first term of the
Monroe administration.  In Indiana and Missouri, local factions dictated change in order
to give favorite candidates as many electoral votes as possible.  Although the leading
advocates for change in both states, Elihu Stout in Indiana and Thomas Hart Benton in
Missouri, always spoke in terms of promoting democracy, both were strong advocates of
Andrew Jackson and Henry Clay, respectively, and used their positions to promote those
candidacies.  New York kept its method of selection despite the fact that state politicians,
led by Martin Van Buren, had campaigned the previous year on a platform of giving the
people the right to choose their president.  When it became apparent that William
Crawford had no chance without New York’s thirty-two votes, the Van Buren-led
Bucktails reversed their position on elector selection.  In three of the four states, then,
politics more than democratic ideology dictated policy.
The election of 1824 was important to the issue of elector selection.  The disputed
outcome and the perception of intrigue led to the formation of the second two-party
system.  The Democratic party that formed around General Jackson made electoral
reform a major issue for the next four years, advocating change at both the state and
national level.  Also, because many state delegations in the House of Representatives
disregarded the apparent will of the people and gave the election to John Quincy Adams
who had not led in either the popular or the electoral vote, the people began to question
the legitimacy of the system.  As both parties prepared for the 1828 rematch, they began
lining up state electoral votes, keeping in mind that a majority was needed for a win.  The
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general ticket, giving one candidate all of the state’s electors, was seen as more desirable
than a district system where the vote could be split between two candidates.
The issue of electoral reform was addressed first at the national level, where once
again the call for a constitutional amendment was heard.  For three years, leaders of the
Jacksonian Democrats pushed for an amendment that would give the vote to the people
and remove the House of Representatives from the election process.  Although no
amendment proposal came close to passing, the Democrats were able to keep the issue
before the American public, reinforcing the perception that the election had been stolen
from Jackson and the people.  This, in turn, helped reinforce the efforts of the party, at
the state level, to change electoral laws
Of the seven states that changed their mode of selection of electors for the 1828
presidential election, six did so for purely political reasons.  The state legislatures in
Louisiana, Missouri, Illinois, and Kentucky, citing the outcome and intrigue of the 1824
elections, all adopted the general ticket.  Georgia, also adopting the general ticket, did so
only to curry favor with Jackson.  New York’s adoption of the district system came about
as a result of the Bucktails’ manipulations in 1824.  Only Vermont, a solid Adams state,
appeared to have adopted the general ticket for democratic reasons.  It was passed with
little fanfare, a small part of a revision of state voting laws.  In general, those states that
adopted a new method did so for party purposes.  It is not coincidence that of those seven
that changed, six gave all – or in New York’s case, a majority – of its electors to Jackson.
Nor is it coincidence, that in four of those states that adopted the general ticket –
Louisiana, Missouri, Illinois, and Kentucky – the state delegations in the House of
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Representatives had ignored the people’s will and given the state’s vote to Adams in
1825 House election.  The combination of party pressure and political intrigue led to
major changes in the selection of the president in 1828.
The presidential election of 1832 marked the last phase of change in elector
selection.  Four states – New York, Maine, Delaware, and Tennessee – all adopted the
general ticket method in time for this election, and Maryland did so immediately after the
results were announced.  Only two of the five states, Delaware and Tennessee, made this
change as a result of democratic reform.  The others did so in order to keep the state’s
electoral vote whole.  By 1832, it had become apparent that politicians and parties
preferred the general ticket method.  A state that delivered its entire vote to one candidate
would play a more important role in the election than a state that split its vote
proportionally.  Indeed, the Maine and Maryland legislatures boldly cited this very reason
in adopting the general ticket.  By 1833, every state in the Union used a winner-take-all
method of elector selection.
Those who advocated change throughout this eight-year period always spoke as
advocates of giving the people the right to choose their president.  Democracy became an
important word in the vocabulary of the successful politician.  The adoption of the
general ticket throughout the country – except in South Carolina where electors were
chosen by the state legislature until after the Civil War – was of great benefit to party
formation and fit comfortably within the concept of states’ rights.  Whether or not this
change was really democratic, though, depends on perspective.  Undeniably, allowing the
populace to vote directly for presidential electors was a giant leap toward democratic
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selection of the nation’s highest officer.  No one can deny that popular selection of
presidential electors was much more democratic than legislative selection.  And, it is true
that as voters were given a direct say in presidential electors, popular participation in
presidential elections increased relative to population increase between 1824 and 1832.
A cursory view would, indeed, lead one to conclude that this was part of a great
movement toward democracy.  This conclusion, by itself,  would be false.
The motivation for adoption of the general ticket was not the promotion of
democracy but, instead, the promotion of party and state power.  True democratic reform
would have been the adoption of either the district system or some other kind of
proportional scheme where the electoral votes were divided between the candidates.  This
type of scheme would have provided for a better representation of the public’s will.
Andrew Jackson, not known as a reformer, advocated such a scheme for eight years,
calling on Congress and the states to amend the Constitution and eliminate the Electoral
College in its current form.  Leaders of his party declined to do so.  True democratic
reform would have weakened the party and state power in the selection process.  The
Democratic party, the party that had formed around Jackson and that had been the
foremost proponent of electoral reform when it was out of power, quietly dropped the
issue when it gained control of the government.  Martin Van Buren, James K. Polk, and
Thomas Hart Benton, all of whom had at one time called for constitutional amendments,
abandoned the cause in 1835, when they were at the height of their power.  The system
that had been adopted suited the party’s needs.
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